Bolivia: The COB vs. the GOB

Emily Achtenberg

The conspicuous absence of the COB, Bolivia’s national trade union federation, from the government’s official International Workers’ Day celebration on May 1 speaks volumes about the growing fissures in the popular coalition that brought President Evo Morales to power.

For 12 days in April, the COB led widespread mobilizations [1] to protest the MAS (Movement Towards Socialism) government’s proposed 10% wage increase for teachers, health workers, police, and members of the armed forces. The COB demanded at least 15% and called for an “indefinite general strike.” Despite the settlement reached on April 18, which included an additional 1-2% increase for teachers and health workers, the conflict has continued to simmer.

Of the 50 sectors affiliated with the COB, only 4 [2]—teachers, health workers, some miners, and La Paz municipal employees--joined the strikes and mobilizations. Workers in the state hydrocarbons, mining, and telecommunications sectors did not participate, nor did transportation workers, or indigenous and peasant organizations which are the largest COB affiliates.

But the protests shut down schools and disrupted public services across the country. Violent confrontations occurred in La Paz/ El Alto and in rural areas like Apacheta, Oruro, where police fired tear gas [3]and rubber bullets at teachers manning road blockades. The mobilizations, led by sectors formerly allied with the MAS, were among the most protracted of Morales’ presidency.

What was behind the conflict? According to the government, the proposed 10% increase—along with a 20% increase in the minimum wage--was more than enough to cover inflation, logging in at 7.18% in 2010. (Since Morales took office in 2006, the minimum wage has nearly doubled [4].)

The COB countered that cost of food, fuel, and other basic goods has sky-rocketed in recent months, even after massive protests forced the government to revoke the drastic gasoline price hike decreed in December (the Gasolinazo). With more than $10 billion in international reserves, they argued, the government can afford a reasonable wage increase. Said vice-president Alvaro García Linera [5], “We’re not going to mortgage Bolivia’s wealth just to pay salaries.”

Since the Gasolinazo, the government has suffered a crisis of legitimacy. Polls show Morales’ approval rate dropping [6] from 64% in the 2009 elections to just 30% in the four largest cities. As economist Roberto Laserna observes [7], the government’s new post-Gasolinazo policy of “gobernar obedeciendo” (to govern by obeying the people) has itself stimulated conflict, as discontented sectors feel empowered to press their particular demands.

Within the COB, internal political posturing ahead of the upcoming national congress may be another factor at work. Pedro Montes, the COB’s executive secretary, has become considerably more confrontational towards the government since he was physically attacked during the Gasolinazo by angry protestors suspicious of his then-close relationship with Morales.

Still, the government retains strong support among social sectors, especially in the countryside, who are unsympathetic to the strikers’ demands. At the height of the mobilizations, indigenous and peasant organization leaders threatened [8] to physically confront the protesters. Peasants in North Potosí occupied [9] the district school headquarters to demand the return, or dismissal, of striking teachers. For noted anthropologist Xavier Albó [10], these incidents evoked painful memories of the 1960s, when the military dictatorship mobilized peasant militias to crush insurgent miners.

The federation of coca growers’ unions, still affiliated with the COB but inactive in recent years, has vowed to re-engage in COB organizational politics. “We are the majority,” says Gustavo Bustamante [11], a cocalero leader. “We want to redirect the political line [of the COB] and restructure the monopoly that exists in it.”

This may be easier said than done. While indigenous and peasant groups are the largest COB affiliates, existing regulations limit their representation [11] to 16% of the delegates. Workers control 51% of the delegates and “middle class” sectors 25%. Peasants can occupy only 5 of 39 national executive positions.

The COB’s executive secretary must be a mine worker. At the official International Workers' Day celebration held in Huanuni, where state mineworkers have a long revolutionary history and strongly support the government, vice-president Linera suggested [12] that it was time for Huanuni to assume leadership of the COB.

While the government clearly doesn’t control its popular sector allies, it has managed the conflict badly. Provocative comments by public officials have intensified hostilities. Just days after the settlement, Linera denounced [13] the mobilizations as a counter-revolutionary effort by “middle class” workers to appropriate state resources and destabilize the government, in alliance with ultra-right forces.

The COB is now calling for a referendum to oust Linera, while mobilizing for new protests against the discounts being applied to striking teachers’ and health workers’ wages. The government says the savings, estimated at $3 million, will be used for school supplies and children’s medicine [14].

The continuing conflict underscores the difficult challenge the MAS government faces in balancing the immediate expectations of its diverse constituencies with the need for long-term economic stability. These days in Bolivia, it seems that settling a strike is just the beginning.

Source URL: https://nacla.org/blog/bolivia-cob-vs-gob

Links:
[1] http://www.greenleft.org.au/node/47466
[2] http://www.cambio.bo/noticia.php?fecha=2011-04-15&idn=43066
[3] http://www.paginasiete.bo/2011-04-15/Nacional/Destacados/BLOQUEO1504.aspx
[4] http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=123553
[5] http://af.reuters.com/article/metalsNews/idAFN0710794520110407
[6] http://www.correodelsur.com/2011/0109/81.php
[7] http://www.paginasiete.bo/2011-04-16/Nacional/Destacados/03Nal01160411.aspx
[8] http://www.bolpress.com/art.php?Cod=2011041308
[9] http://www.paginasiete.bo/2011-04-15/Nacional/Destacados/29Ad01150411.aspx
[10] http://www.rebelion.org/noticia.php?id=126776
[11] http://www.la-razon.com/version.php?ArticleId=129131&EditionId=2506
[12] http://www.la-razon.com/version.php?ArticleId=129672&EditionId=2516
[13] http://www.paginasiete.bo/2011-04-19/Nacional/Destacados/VICE1904.aspx
[14] http://www.la-razon.com/version.php?ArticleId=129878&EditionId=2520
[15] https://nacla.org/category/tags/bolivia
[16] https://nacla.org/category/tags/cob
[17] https://nacla.org/category/tags/gasolinazo
[18] https://nacla.org/category/tags/general-strike
[19] https://nacla.org/category/tags/mas
[20] https://nacla.org/category/tags/protest

Bolivia: Communities Pioneer Sustainable Development

Emily Achtenberg

Cotapata Mining Cooperative

In remote corners of Bolivia, local communities are pioneering sustainable mining and forestry strategies that could provide useful models in the global struggle against climate change.

Deep in the Yungas cloud forest outside La Paz, Bolivia, in Cotapata National Park, the Cotapata Mining Cooperative [1] (see video below) is producing the world’s first “fair-trade/ fair-mined” [2] gold, certified last December by the non-profit Fairtrade International (FLO) and the Alliance for Responsible Mining (ARM). The cooperative was officially formed in 1991 when it secured land rights and a mining concession from the government, after many years of informal mining activity.

The cooperative currently consists of 88 families, including 3 women who work as mining technicians. Cotapata Mining Cooperative. Credit: ARMThe workers live in a tent camp during their 2-week shifts, leaving their families behind in La Paz. The cooperative produces 6-7 pounds of gold per month.

Cotapata is one of 500 [3] community-based “artisanal” mining organizations that account for more than 80% [4] of Bolivia’s mining workforce. This sector has been dominant since the collapse of the state mining industry in 1985, and is characterized by modest wages, dangerous working conditions, and environmental contamination from toxic chemicals used in the extraction process. Cooperative mining is expanding rapidly as soaring mineral prices draw subsistence farmers to more viable opportunities.

At Cotapata, the cooperative subscribes to FLO standards mandating improved working conditions, collective bargaining rights, restrictions on child labor, responsible use of toxic chemicals, and support for the local community. In exchange, they are guaranteed to receive at least 95% of the international gold price [5] (currently most small mining producers get only 30% - 85%, due to exploitation by middlemen).

With its fair trade designation, the cooperative can now sell directly to European importers linked to the FLO network, avoiding costly intermediaries. In addition, they receive a 10% fair-trade premium to reinvest in community and business projects. “The first thing we will do is buy a smelter,” says coop leader [5] Juana Peña Endata.

The cooperative is recognized for its high level of organization and respectful labor and environmental practices. All workers receive the same monthly salary of $300-$600 [6] (depending on the profitability of the mine), as well as insurance benefits. This is much higher than the current minimum wage of $97.

Cotapata has pioneered the use of a closed-circuit mercury recovery system to reduce environmental degradation. If they can eliminate the use of toxic chemicals altogether, they will receive an additional 5% premium. Current premiums are also being used to improve housing conditions and health services at the camp, and to support local schools.

At least eight other mining cooperatives [2] in Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador are in the process of being certified by FLO and ARM. Meanwhile, twenty jewelry companies [7] have signed up to sell fair trade/ fair mined gold products. The goal is to capture at least 5% of the gold jewelry market in the next 15 years.

Zapocó Community Forest Management

In the tropical dry forests of Santa Cruz, the indigenous community of Zapocó is the first in Bolivia to sell its timber through a public bidding process [8] to a manufacturer committed to sustainable forest management. Zapocó Community Forestry. Credit: APCOBAs Jean Friedman-Rudovsky describes in a recent Time article [9], the community of 65 families secured a 20-year logging concession from the government in 2001, with the help of APCOB, a local NGO.

With the 6^th largest forest area [10] in the world, Bolivia currently loses an estimated 1.2 million acres [11] per year to logging, agribusiness, and cattle ranching, primarily on indigenous land. For groups like Zapocó, community forest management is a strategy for both sustainable development and the defense of ancestral territory and resources.

Under a new initiative established with the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), Zapocó manages its forests, harvests its trees, and markets its lumber according to strict sustainability standards set by the non-profit Forest Stewardship Council. Logging is based on a long-term plan that targets only select, mature trees and maintains forest habitat for diverse species.

Zapocó receives a fair market price for its certified wood through its 4-year contract with Petunos, the Bolivian company that won the public bid, which makes deck flooring for the US market. A portion of the sales proceeds is allocated to community benefits, including education, health services, agriculture, and reinvestment in the forestry program.

According to Friedman-Rudovsky, the new initiative has brought financial stability to Zapocó for the first time. Most community members are employed by the forestry project, and residents also receive an annual stipend of $150 to cover basic family needs.

Petunos belongs to Bolivia’s Global Forest and Trade Network [12], one of 30 WWF-sponsored alliances that link certified wood producers with responsible manufacturers and purchasers of forest products. More than 350 companies [13], NGOs, and governments are involved in the worldwide network, along with dozens of other indigenous forest managers like Zapocó.

To be sure, these initiatives are barely making a dent in the mining and forestry industries, and the income received by communities like Cotapata and Zapocó is only a pittance compared to the enormous profits generated further up the supply chain. Still, projects that empower local communities while furthering the goals of sustainability and economic development help to model an alternative future that looks a lot better than the present.

Source URL: https://nacla.org/blog/bolivia-communities-pioneer-sustainable-development

Links:
[1] http://www.communitymining.org/index.php/en/bolivia
[2] http://www.communitymining.org/attachments/134_FT_Gold_policy_report_2011_download.pdf
[3] http://aguabolivia.blogspot.com/2011/05/cooperativas-mineras-de-bolivia.html
[4] http://www.boliviainfoforum.org.uk/documents/999865291_BIF%20Bulletin%2018.pdf
[5] http://www.theecologist.org/News/news_round_up/766497/worlds_first_fairtrade_gold_goes_on_sale_in_the_uk.html
[6] http://www.fairtrade.org.uk/gold/files/Cotapata%20Profile%20shorter%20version%20100111.pdf
[7] http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1356740/Gold-rush-New-hallmark-sign-Fairtrade-Fairmined-precious-metal.html
[8] http://bolivia.panda.org/index.cfm?uNewsID=107080&uLangID=1
[9] http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2071694,00.html
[10] http://www.worldchanging.com/archives/004938.html
[11] http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=55710
[12] http://gftn.panda.org/gftn_worldwide/latin_america/bolivia/
[13] http://gftn.panda.org/
[14] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6nhuK9UijjM
[15] https://nacla.org/category/tags/bolivia
[16] https://nacla.org/category/tags/cotapata
[17] https://nacla.org/category/tags/forestry
[18] https://nacla.org/category/tags/mining
[19] https://nacla.org/category/tags/sustainable-development
[20] https://nacla.org/category/tags/zapoc%C3%B3

También La Lluvia: Postscript

Emily Achtenberg

The feature film “También La Lluvia” (“Even the Rain”) has been giving U.S. movie audiences a taste of the popular struggle against water privatization [1] that took place in Cochabamba, Bolivia in April 2000.

Drawing parallels between the exploitation of indigenous people—and their organized resistance—in colonial, neoliberal, and contemporary times, the film was shot on location in Cochabamba and features 3,000 extras drawn from the city’s poor southern hillside neighborhoods who were actual protagonists in the Water War. The main indigenous character (played by an actor/ filmmaker from El Alto) is partially modeled on Oscar Olivera, a leader of the water revolt.

The feature film “También La Lluvia” (“Even the Rain”) has been giving U.S. movie audiences a taste of the popular struggle against water privatization [1] that took place in Cochabamba, Bolivia in April 2000.

Drawing parallels between the exploitation of indigenous people—and their organized resistance—in colonial, neoliberal, and contemporary times, the film was shot on location in Cochabamba and features 3,000 extras drawn from the city’s poor southern hillside neighborhoods who were actual protagonists in the Water War. The main indigenous character (played by an actor/ filmmaker from El Alto) is partially modeled on Oscar Olivera, a leader of the water revolt.

Fast-forwarding eleven years, it’s both inspiring and sobering to reflect on the impact of the Water War and how much (or how little) Bolivia has changed.

The Water War was precipitated when SEMAPA, Cochabamba’s municipal water company, was sold to a transnational consortium controlled by U.S. based Bechtel, in exchange for debt relief for the Bolivian government and new World Bank loans to expand the water system. A new law also allowed Bechtel to administer water resources that SEMAPA did not even control, including the communal water systems prevalent in the ever-expanding southern periphery and in the countryside which had never been hooked into the grid. (The film draws its title from local fears that “even the rain” collected and distributed for centuries by local irrigating farmers’ associations would become subject to Bechtel’s control.)

These concerns, along with a 50% average increase in water rates for SEMAPA customers, led to the formation of the Coordinadora, a broad alliance of farmers, factory workers, rural and urban water committees, neighborhood organizations, students, and middle class professionals. Joined by the militant federation of coca growers from the Chapare, led by Evo Morales, the Coordinadora organized civic strikes, road blockades, and massive popular assemblies. They eventually forced Bechtel to abrogate its contract, return SEMAPA to public control, and withdraw its legal claim against the Bolivian government for $50 million in compensation.

This iconic struggle sparked a chain of events in Bolivia leading to the Gas Wars of 2003 and 2005, the overthrow of two neoliberal presidents, and the subsequent election of Evo Morales and the MAS (Movement Towards Socialism) party as a “government of the social movements.” Bolivia’s new constitution, enacted in 2009, proclaims that access to water is a human right and bans its privatization.

Outside Bolivia, the Water War helped to inspire a worldwide anti-globalization movement and provided a model for struggles against water privatization and for water justice throughout the Americas and beyond. The Bolivian government led the successful drive for UN recognition of water [2] as a human right last year, and is currently in the forefront of a new campaign for a UN declaration against water privatization.

At the same time, Bolivia still has one of the lowest rates of access [3] to safe drinking water (85%) and sewerage services (46%) in Latin America. And in Cochabamba, Bolivia’s third largest city, the struggle to provide good quality water to a rapidly expanding population continues. While SEMAPA has more than tripled the size [4] of its service area since 2000, at least half of the City’s residents—and 70-80% of those living in the poorer southern districts [5]--still lack piped water and sanitation services. Those remaining outside the grid are forced to pay 5 to 10 times more than SEMAPA consumers for trucked-in water of dubious quality. Even on the grid, water service is intermittent.

Although the reconstituted SEMAPA includes elected community representatives on its board of directors, it has been plagued by continuing problems of mismanagement, corruption, and inefficiency. The system loses an estimated 55% [4] of its water to leaks and clandestine hook-ups and just last year overcame a $3 million cash deficit [3] (in part by laying off 150 workers).

Frustrated with both the private and state water management models, residents of the City’s southern zones are increasingly relying on traditional community-run water systems [6] as an alternative. These neighborhoods—which were the main protagonists of the Water War--have built their own independent water systems, with wells managed by elected water committees, cooperatives, or community councils. Drawing on residents’ organizing experience as ex-miners as well as their collective traditions as indigenous farmers, the water committees have established autonomous and participatory water distribution systems, that collaborate to varying degrees with SEMAPA.

Since 2004, many of the local water groups have affiliated through ASICA-Sur (the Association of Community Water Systems of the South), an umbrella organization that provides technical assistance, coordination, and funding. ASICA-Sur has secured EU financing to develop independent water systems in targeted neighborhoods, which seek to buy water at bulk rates from SEMAPA [7] but remain community controlled—a new model of social-public water management.

With Cochabamba’s water table dwindling rapidly due to population growth compounded by global warming, the need for massive public investment to develop new water sources is critical. The long-delayed Misicuni dam [8], reservoir, and hydroelectric power plant project is now under construction with partial funding from the Bolivian government, but many doubt that its projected 2013 completion date is achievable. Elsewhere in Bolivia, the government is also providing $100 million for irrigation and water projects [9] in 327 municipalities.

Among those who think the Bolivian government should be doing more to implement the right to water and similar promises enshrined in the Constitution is Oscar Olivera. In a recent “Open Letter [10]” to Evo Morales, Olivera and other Water War activists have openly broken with the MAS leadership whom they accuse of continuing neoliberal economic policies and anti-democratic politics, betraying the popular movements that brought them to power.

Olivera laments that Morales’ recent policies such as the Gasolinazo [11]—a (failed) attempt to hike gasoline prices by 73% that drove up transportation and food costs and sparked massive protests —have encouraged divisions between the city and countryside [12], consumers and merchants, transportation workers and users, and salaried and unsalaried workers. These sectors, he says, “have now lost sight of their true common enemies: the big mining, hydrocarbons, and financial corporations, who have benefitted most from this government.” Indeed, the coalition of popular organizations and constituencies that came together during the Water Wars, consolidated nationally during the Gas Wars, and achieved political power in 2005 has now effectively fragmented, raising significant questions about the future of Bolivia’s “process of change.”

Looked at another way, what Olivera once said about SEMAPA’s difficulties [13] could be a metaphor for the challenges and contradictions that Bolivia faces today. “The problem is, we know how to resist. But we are only now learning how to construct something new.”

If you missed “También La Lluvia,” you can rent it from Netflix later this month. As for the next chapter in real-life Bolivia, as in the film and in the actual Water War, the Bolivian people will be the protagonists. Stay tuned.

Republished from NACLA

Footnotes:
[1] http://www.democracyctr.org/bolivia/investigations/water/
[2] http://www.uusc.org/content/united_nations_adopts_resolution_recognizing_human_right_water_and_sanitation
[3] http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=54959
[4] http://www.ucpress.edu/content/chapters/11049.ch01.pdf
[5] http://www.cipamericas.org/archives/1723
[6] http://www.democracyctr.org/blog/2009/11/cochabambas-poorest-neighborhoods-take.html
[7] http://www.ourwatercommons.org/water-solutions/case-5-%E2%80%9Csocial-control%E2%80%9D-and-public-collective-partnerships-community-run-systems-coc
[8] http://www.dams-info.org/en/dams/view/misicuni/
[9] http://www.elpaisonline.com/noticias/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=24118:concluye-el-programa-mas-inversion-para-el-agua-mi-agua-&catid=2:nacional&Itemid=3
[10] http://narconews.com/Issue67/article4292.html
[11] https://nacla.org/node/6903
[12] http://www.vientosur.info/articulosweb/noticia/?x=3572
[13] http://narconews.com/Issue63/article3993.html

Bolivia Steps Up Campaign at U.N. to Legalise Coca Leaf

Haider Rizvi

UNITED NATIONS, Apr 30, 2011 (IPS) - Is coca a dangerous drug that should be tightly regulated, or an essential part of Andean indigenous people's cultural and medicinal heritage? Or perhaps both?

In the coming months, diplomats at the U.N. body will face the thorny issue of how to address the production and use of coca plants in the Andes region of South America.

The United States and some of its European allies contend that coca leaf is a narcotic substance and that its production must be banned in accordance with the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs.

The Bolivian government strongly disagrees, and for the past two years has been calling for an amendment to article 49 of the U.N. anti-narcotics treaty that considers coca production unlawful.

In a bid to convince the international community to legalise the use and production of coca in the Andes, President Evo Morales has repeatedly stressed that, "Coca is not cocaine."

Coca leaf-chewing by indigenous communities in the Andes is a centuries-old tradition. The native communities consider it a vital source of energy, nutrition and social unity.

Officials in northern Europe and the United States are opposed to Morales' call to declare coca leaf a non-narcotic crop because the use and abuse of cocaine is pervasive in their countries.

Experts say accurate figures on the numbers of cocaine users in the United States are hard to come by, but estimate the number of addicts at between three and four million.

According to Michael's House, a nationally recognised treatment center, the United States is the top user of cocaine in the world.

Medical research shows that cocaine, a refined, concentrated form of coca extract mixed with certain chemicals, causes hyperactivity and euphoria, but in high doses can lead to paranoia, delusions and addiction.

For decades, the U.S. has sought to extend its war on drugs to the Andean nations that grow coca, but with little impact on the flow of the drug to the United States.

A recent report by the International Narcotics Control Board noted that, worldwide, in many cases corrupt law enforcement officials work in collusion with the smugglers, and the U.S. is no exception.

Bolivia says it is taking effective actions against the illicit cocaine trade and adheres to INCB rules, but the U.S. continues to oppose La Paz's assertion that coca chewing be considered legal.

"The position of the U.S. government is not to support the proposed amendment based on the importance of maintaining the integrity of the 1961 Convention," the U.S. mission to the U.N. said in a recent statement.

Independent experts note that the U.S. itself has sought amendments to the anti-narcotics treaty in the past.

Martin Jelsma of the Transnational Institute, which conducts research on global social movements and their struggle for economic, social and environmental justice, thinks the ban on coca chewing is "a violation of indigenous peoples' rights and that it is in contravention of several other treaties and declarations".

The U.N. biological diversity treaty and the declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples, for example, fully recognise the right of native peoples to practice their cultural values and belief systems.

In a report released earlier this year, the INCB, which is obligated to implement the anti-narcotics treaty, criticised Bolivia for not doing enough to curtail coca leaf production and curb the use of cocaine.

"The board remains concerned about the continuous increase in both the reported total area under coca bush cultivation and the expected… leaf production since 2005," the report said.

For the Bolivians, such an assessment is nothing but a reflection of Euro-centric thinking about coca.

"[It's] part of a colonial mindset," Pablo Salon, the Bolivian ambassador to the U.N., told IPS in response to a question about why the U.S. and the some European governments were opposed to coca chewing.

Despite opposition from the U.S. and certain European nations, Bolivia has managed to get support from the 118-member Non-Aligned Movement, as well as Japan and Spain, to amend the treaty.

Diplomats and U.N. officials told IPS that the rules to amend the treaty require that parties to the treaty hold an international conference, which has not been scheduled as yet.

Republished from IPS News

Morales annuls mining, banking and investment laws in Bolivia

Bolivian President Evo Morales Sunday announced the Bolivian government will end current mining, banking and investment laws to increase state control of those sectors.

Dorothy Kosich, Monday , 02 May 2011

Official Bolivian news agency ABI reported Sunday President Evo Morales issued a decree that would bury 20 years of neoliberalism in the nation's mining industry.

Essentially Morales is ending market rule and privatization of mines contained in Supreme Decree 21060, which was enacted in 1985 by former Bolivian President Victor Paz Estensoro.

Morales also annulled laws pertaining to banking and investment in order to increase state control of those sectors.

"The best legacy of the Bolivian people is to be anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist and anti-neoliberal," he declared.

At a special Workers Day ceremony Sunday miners burned a black box symbolizing the end of the old mining legislation.

At a mass rally Sunday in the Coliseum in Huanuni, Bolivian Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera urged Huanuni miners to "take control" of the leadership of the Miners' Federation to promote state mining and economic activity in Bolivia. He also called on miners to "preserve and protect" the struggles of indigenous peoples, workers and peasants which "form the backbone of our country."

Last month Bolivian mining unions asked the state to "recover" the silver, zinc, lead and tin mines currently operated by private companies.

However, Deputy Mining Minister Hector Cordova told Bloomberg that a new mining bill to be sent to the Bolivian Congress won't substantially change contract conditions for Coeur d'Alene Mines, which operates the nation's largest pure silver mine, San Bartolome; Pan America Silver's San Vincente silver mine; and Orvana Minerals.

Nevertheless, he said the government will seek to renegotiate contracts with Glencore International, whose Sinchi Wayra subsidiary controls five small and medium-size mines in Bolivia, including Porco, and will sign a contract with Sumitomo Metal Mining, which operates the San Cristobal silver-lead-zinc mine.

Cordova told Bloomberg that the new legislation is aimed at giving state miner Comibol a controlling interest in joint ventures and forces companies to return mining concessions which aren't being developed.

Meanwhile, the new mining law will require mining companies "to pay a little more in royalties because metals prices have risen," he added.

Republished from Mineweb.com

Bolivia: Wage disputes pose challenges

Federico Fuentes

Several weeks of conflict between the government of President Evo Morales and Bolivian trade unions has again thrown into sharp relief some of the serious challenges confront Bolivia’s process of change.

For two weeks in April, the Bolivian Workers Central (COB) called mobilisations across various cities to protest the government’s proposed 10% pay rise for teachers, health workers, police and soldiers, and 20% rise in the minimum wage.

The COB initiated an “indefinite general strike” on April 7, saying the proposed rise fell below the annual inflation rate. The government rejected the argument by pointing to National Statistic Institute figures showing inflation was 6.1% for 2010.

The impact of the strike was minimal, but the protests, made up predominately of teachers and health workers, as well as some factory and mine workers, were some of the biggest workers’ protests against the government since Morales was first elected in 2005.

Gas workers, workers in the state-owned mines and telecommunications company, transport workers and indigenous and peasant organisations affiliated to the COB did not take part.

The main driving force behind the protests was the impact of the government decision in December to remove fuel subsides. The measure led to a dramatic rise in fuel costs and contributed to rise in already high prices of basic food staples affected by the global food crisis.

The mass reaction against the measure, including among sectors loyal to the government, forced Morales to reverse the decision.

However, food prices remain artificially high, with shortages affecting peoples’ ability to access certain goods.

The response to this mistaken government policy took the form of workers demanding higher wage rises to cope with the increased prices that exceeded the general inflation rate.

A secondary factor was attempts by some sections of the COB to position themselves as the more “radical” wing of the union movement by criticising the “betrayal” of the current leadership in the lead up to the union federation’s congress in May.

Initially, a sentiment of intransigence, rather negotiation, seemed to predominate in relations between the COB and the government after the government’s March 2 wage rise announcement.

After calling for a general strike, the COB refused to negotiate with the government unless Morales was present in discussions.

Morales said he would only talk to the new COB leadership elected at its May congress.

Unions raised secondary demands such as measures to reactivate the economy to create jobs. But the focus of most sectors was winning par rises ranging from 15-20%.

Some, such as the Oruro Departmental Workers Central (COD), headed by long time Morales foe, Jaime Solares, called for a 70% rise.

The Morales government denounced such demands as “laughable”. It called on workers to consider the national economy and other sectors not covered by the wage rises.

Negotiations between the COB and the government finally began on April 9, lasting for three days. This included an 18 hour meeting in which Morales took part.

A wide-ranging provisional agreement was announced on April 11, pending approval by the COB’s affiliated unions.

The agreement included creating a joint COB-government commission to draft new mining, forestry, labour, banking, investment and electricity laws to replace old neoliberal laws still in place.

Another commission was proposed to discuss industrialisation projects. The government also pledged to continue its battle for food sovereignty and provide the COB with information on food production, distribution and consumption.

Another point involved advancing the proposed restructure of the National Health Fund (CNS) to deal with due of nepotism in the institution. CNS workers, who were most of majority the health workers on strike, have opposed the government’s right to intervene in the institution.

The miners’ federation, FSTMB, immediately announced its support for the agreement.

The Bolivian Information Agency (ABI) reported on April 11 that FSTMB executive secretary Guido Mitma, said his union would no longer “be focussing on the issue of the wage rise, we will focus on the issue of annulling [neoliberal decree 21060] and reactivating the productive apparatus”.

He added “we consider that … the government has shown amply willingness in this regards”.

Mitma said the FSTMB supported the government’s decision to renationalise mines privatised by pre-Morales governments —a demand raised by the FSTMB.

However, the COB, and the teachers unions in particular, rejected the agreement. It insisting a 15% pay rise was affordable if the government redirected some of its international currency reserves, which are at a historic high level.

The government responded that the reserves belonged to all Bolivians, not just the workers.

The COB again refused to negotiate with government ministers. It intensified protests, setting up roadblocks in various regions and clashing with police.

Council workers from the opposition-controlled La Paz municipal council also joined protests.

On April 12, indigenous and peasant organisations from the National Coalition for Change (Conalcam) said they were preparing to take to the streets against the “intransigence” of the COB and in support of the government.

Denouncing forces “that follow a Trotskyism that simply obeys the plans to destabilise a government that belongs to the social movements”, peasant union leader Roberto Coraite said that “this process of change has to be deepened … but not with blockades or mobilisations that simply lead to the destabilisation of a popular government”.

After further negotiations on April 17-18, an agreement was finally reached for an additional 1% pay rise for teachers and health workers.

A commission will be established to look at ways of funding a further possible 1% rise from the national budget, retroactive to January 2011.

On April 23, Morales pledged to use US$2 billion, or 20%, of its international reserves for projects for industrialisation and productive projects.

Despite the agreement, Vice-President Alvaro Garcia Linera denounced on April 19 what he said was attempts by some union leaders, particular from the teacher and health worker unions, to manipulate the genuine “social content” of the workers’ struggle to convert in into a movement to overthrow the government.

Garcia Lineras said an indefinite strike is “by definition” a political measure aimed at “bringing down” a government. At a press conference, he said: “Who proposed this measure? Those middle class public employees who have taken over the COB and its ideology.”

He said the recent conflict was the result of an “ebb” in the process initiated by the January 2000 uprising in Cochabamba against water privatisation and that lead to Morales’s election.

Addressing a mass mobilisation of pro-government peasants, coca growers, unionist and local government authorities in Cochabamba later that day, Garcia Linera said the government had won with the signing of the agreement.

But he called on those present to defend “our revolutionary process … and if it is necessary to march once or twice to La Paz, we will to ensure that the peasant, indigenous, worker and popular movements are respected”.

Coca grower union leader Marcelino Quiroga denounced the attitudes of the “Trotskyist” leaders of the teachers union at the gathering. Peasant leader Manuel Mamani said teachers who had participated in the protests should not be allowed to return to their jobs.

The coca growers union federation has announced that it coordinate efforts with the other main indigenous and peasant organisations to intervene into the upcoming COB congress.

The federation is still technically affiliated to the COB, it they stopped taking part after Morales, then president of the federation, was unilaterally expelled from the COB in 2003 by then COB secretary Solares.

The main indigenous and peasant groups represent the largest COB affiliates by far. However, statutes limit peasant representation in COB congress to 16% of delegates, behind workers (51%) and those designated “middle class” (25%).

The COB’s statutes also limit the number of spots peasants can fill on the national executive to five out of 39 positions. The executive secretary must be a mine worker.

Gualberto Bustamante, vice-president of the coca growers federation of the Chapare, said: “We are the majority … we want to redirection the political line [of the COB] and restructure the monopoly that exists in it.”

Teacher unions have called another protest, but not strike, for May 3 after the labour minister said teachers and health workers would have pay deducted for each day they were on strike.

On April 27, the COB threatened to rip up the agreement if the government proceed with this threat.

A new hurdle to the agreements has come from mine workers in the four privatised mines singled out for nationalisation by the government.

On April 26, representatives from 15 mine unions, as well as some FSTMB executives, said they would hold vigils on May 1 to stop attempts to return those mines to state control.

Cesar Lugo, an FSTMB executive member, said workers at the private mines said they opposed state takeover because they were not convinced the state company had the capacity to administer the mines.

Lugo was defeated by Mitma in the last union elections for the position of executive secretary.

The same day, the FSTMB reiterated it believed the mines “should pass into the hands of the Bolivian state … administered and operated by COMIBOL [the state mining company]”.

The mine workers union at Huanuni issued a statement denouncing the fact that the mining transnationals refuse to allow workers to audit and monitor their financial records, and send their profits overseas.

The transationals “are used to corrupt and control leaders” that long ago betrayed the traditional militancy of the miners’ union, the statement said.

Mining minister Jose Pimentel said the position taken by the workers opposed to nationalised was due to the greater benefits they received in recent times from the mining companies, resultant from the increasing in world mineral prices.

On April 27, Pimentel said the four mines would not be nationalised, as the government would only proceed with the workers’ consent.

However, the owners of the privatised mines would be forced into joint ventures that would give the state at least 51% control and greater supervisory powers over administrative and financial matters.