Bolivia president Evo Morales offers talks with TIPNIS protest marchers

Gerardo Bustillos (AFP)

LA PAZ — President Evo Morales offered direct talks with almost 2,000 indigenous people about to end a grueling protest march against government plans to build a highway through an Amazon nature preserve.

Morales, the first democratically elected indigenous president of this South American nation, finds his leadership challenged by a thorny national political debate over juggling native peoples' rights and economic development.

"This dialogue would aim to iron out and build consensus on their demands in the framework of broader political action," Morales' spokesman Carlos Romero said in a statement carried by the official news agency ABI. The talks could be held as soon as late Tuesday or Wednesday, Romero said.

Planners want the Brazil-financed road to run through the Isiboro Secure National Park and Indigenous Territory, leveling an ancestral homeland inhabited by 50,000 native people from three different native groups.

Work on the highway, which had been due to be operational in 2014, began in June, although not on the segment running through the protected park.

These isolated peoples from the humid lowlands are not from the main indigenous groups that make up most of majority-indigenous Bolivia's population, the highland Andean Aymara and Quechua.

The lowland people fear their traditional lands may be overrun by landless highland farmers.

Earlier the marchers, weary after weeks of walking but energized ahead of an expected triumphant entry into La Paz, massed in Pongo. It was not immediately clear what their response to Morales offer would be.

"We have no confidence in the Bolivian government. All they do is lie," said Fernando Vargas, leader of the demonstrators, gasping for breath as the group approached the highest-altitude capital city in the world.

The marchers, including women, children and elderly people, left the northern city of Trinidad in mid-August and have endured heavy rains, low temperatures, difficult mountainous terrain and police brutality during their 600 kilometer (370-mile) journey.

Earlier this month, Morales agreed to postpone construction of the roadway, a delay that was later approved by Bolivia's legislature. But the protesters are seeking assurances that the project -- or at least the Amazon portion of it -- will be scuttled for good.

"If work begins, we will fight in the forest until death," said indigenous leader Adolfo Chavez.

Interview: Bolivia senator Adolfo Mendoz (MAS) discusses law to suspend road through TIPNIS national park

Dario Kenner, La Paz

[Senator Adolfo Mendoza is a member of the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) party led by President Evo Morales. He played a pivotal role in drafting the law suspending construction of the road through the TIPNIS. This law was approved in the senate yesterday. Bolivia Diary analysis on content of the law – Dario Kenner]

What does the approval of this law mean?

There was the need to establish a law because dialogue between the indigenous march and the executive branch was not working. The Plurinational Legislative Assembly and the indigenous march proposed draft laws. Work began between the indigenous deputies (such as Bienvenido Zacu) and MAS parliamentarians. Five out of the six articles from the indigenous marcher’s proposal are included in the approved law (still to be enacted by President Evo Morales). This was a consensus law for three reasons. Firstly, we agreed to use the indigenous march proposal as the basis for the law. Secondly, the proposal from the executive branch was rejected. Thirdly, the proposed referendum was rejected (see this article explaining why this is important). The only Article there was no consensus on was the one dealing with the suspension of the road.

This law proposes what should always have been done which is respect of the right to consultation of the owners of the territory. No one else can decide apart from the Mojeños, Yuracarés and Chimanes peoples who live inside the TIPNIS. There are several other provisions in the law such as preventing illegal settlements and a comprehensive management plan of the TIPNIS national park. (explained here)

Is this law a solution to the TIPNIS conflict?

I don´t think this is a solution because some of the leaders at the indigenous march have rejected it. It opens up the possibility for a dialogue and eventual solution.

What is strange is that some leaders at the indigenous march such as Rafael Quispe (key leader in indigenous movement CONAMAQ – see his views here) who are not from the TIPNIS reject this proposal to begin a process of free, prior and informed consultation. This is very bad for the Mojeños, Yuracarés and Chimanes.

The press are distorting the issue of whether the consultation is binding or not. This is a false discussion for several evident reasons. The Bolivian Constitution and international norms say indigenous peoples have the right to be consulted by the state. So free, prior and informed consultation is to reach an agreement that does not violate the rights of indigenous peoples. So it is arbitrary to discuss if it is binding or not. The word binding is not in the Bolivian Constitution, ILO Convention 169 or the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

Like all roads lead to Rome, all the paths to solve this conflict are through consultation.

Pagina Siete (Bolivian newspaper) has distorted what President Evo Morales said yesterday (the newspaperreported Morales as saying consultation would not be binding). What he was actually talking about was the case put before international courts between Saramaka and the state of Surinam that is an emblematic case on prior consultation.

[The question of whether the consultation is binding or not is still not clear. For example this afternoon Bolivian Vice President Álvaro García Linera said the government would respect and guarantee the decision the result of the prior consultation with the indigenous peoples of the TIPNIS]

How can the consultation be prior if work has already begun on the road?

There are some important things to get across here. On 23 September 2011 the United Nations representative in Bolivia said in relation to the TIPNIS issue that it would be convenient to stop road building and do prior consultation. On 28 September 2011 James Anaya, Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous People on Indigenous Issues, said from Geneva that the way to solve the TIPNIS issue was to do prior consultation. The spirit of this law is to open the process of prior consultation.

The entire road does not go through the TIPNIS indigenous territory. There are two key elements. Two of the sections do not pass through the TIPNIS. The first section between Villa Tunari and Isinuta already exists; it does not touch the TIPNIS. TIPNIS has a boundary but it is not that where the boundary ends it is the moon or some imaginary place, it is part of Bolivia. If the state decided to build a road that was within 1 kilometre of the national park it would still affect it.

In the contract between the Bolivian Highway Authority and Brazilian company OAS it does not mention three sections, just one road. Can you explain this?

The contract with OAS has three sub-credits. Sub-credit A refers to the initial operations. Sub-credit B refers to the first and third sections. Sub-credit C refers to the second section. There is no final design for this second section and road building has not begun.

If there is no final design for the second section how can there be a calculation for the entire distance of the road and total cost?

How was the cost calculated? This was done through technical studies and based on comparing costs of other roads. OAS (Brazilian company building the road) has a proposal for the second section but there is no final design. There are several proposals on the table including going through the middle of the national park and on its borders. Another option would be to build a via-duct 55 kilometres long between Ichoa and Santo Domingo. The sub-credit C will not be disbursed until there is a final design and the results of the consultation.

Republished from Bolivia Diary

Election of judges a key test for Bolivia's Morales

By Carlos Alberto Quiroga

LA PAZ, Oct 13 (Reuters) - Bolivian President Evo Morales faces an important test this weekend when voters elect judges for the first time, the latest reform aimed at giving a bigger say to the country's indigenous majority.

Leftist Morales, Bolivia's first president of Indian descent, has been hurt by weeks of protests over his plans to build a highway through the Amazon, and Sunday's election is seen as a referendum on his presidency.

The candidates running for election to serve as 28 judges on four national courts do not represent political parties.

Morales' rightist rivals, however, have sought to undermine the election by urging voters to spoil their ballots. That means high turnout and few blank votes will be crucial for Morales as he seeks to regain his political footing after the damaging road protests.

Political analyst Jorge Lazarte said Sunday's election could mark "the beginning of the end" for Morales' hopes for a third consecutive term in 2014 if the ballot is perceived to be a failure for the government.

Morales, a fierce critic of U.S. foreign policy who rose into politics as leader of the coca farmers, has hinted at the possibility of running for re-election.

Low turnout and a sense that the opposition's campaign undermined Morales' reform drive could intensify pressure on the president after the road protest debacle and massive protests over a planned fuel price hike late last year.

In a speech at the pre-Colombian ruins of Tiwanaku this week, he said he was confident "a majority of the people will vote, defeating the rightist, neoliberal conspiracy."

He has billed the first direct election of national judges as "the next step in the refounding of Bolivia."

Besides a series of reforms aimed at giving more political power to the country's indigenous people, Morales has also reversed the privatizations of the free-market 1990s by strengthening the state's hand in the economy.

He nationalized the country's vast natural gas resources months after taking office in 2006, steps that proved popular with the country's poor majority.

Voters will choose members of the country's four national courts from a list of 116 candidates. Half the candidates are women and many are indigenous. The opposition rejects them because they were picked by the government-controlled Congress.

Until now, these judges were chosen directly by Congress.

The judicial shake-up is the latest in a series of reforms that Morales says will help reverse five centuries of discrimination against indigenous peoples in Bolivia and domination by a European-descended elite.

Morales managed to push through a new constitution in 2009, a key demand of the rebellious social groups that toppled two governments between 2003 and 2005.

But he has encountered growing resistance over the last year, facing opposition even within his indigenous support base over the fuel price hike and his plan to build a road that cuts through the TIPNIS indigenous territory and national park.

Opponents have urged voters to scuttle the judicial vote to protest the government's handling of anti-road demonstrations.

"A spoiled ballot paper is a vote in favor of the TIPNIS," opposition lawmaker Roy Moroni said last week. "That is the way to reject these undemocratic elections."

(Writing by Helen Popper; Editing by Cynthia Osterman)

Bolivia lawmakers halt contested highway plans

AFP, La Paz — Bolivian lawmakers agreed Tuesday to postpone plans to build a highway through an Amazon nature preserve after months-long mass protests from indigenous people.

The Chamber of Deputies approved President Evo Morales's decision to halt the project in order to consult with the local population in the wake of police violence against the demonstrators for which he has apologized.

The Brazil-financed road was due to run through the Isiboro Secure reserve, home to some 50,000 natives from three different indigenous groups.

These isolated groups, from the humid lowlands, are not from the main indigenous groups that make up most of Bolivia's population, the highland Andean Aymara and Quechua peoples.

The lowland people fear their traditional lands may be overrun by landless highland farmers.

Protesters left the northern city of Trinidad in mid-August and are now about 80 kilometers (50 miles) from the capital La Paz, though facing high altitude and frigid conditions that have slowed their march.

Once they have reached their destination, the protesters will have marched some 600 kilometers (370 miles).

"We should be arriving next week, Tuesday or Wednesday," march leader Miguel Charupa told AFP.

"We are not particularly in a hurry to arrive in La Paz."

He said protesters now numbered about 2,000.

A counter-protest of about 1,000 government supporters was expected Wednesday in the capital.

Chamber of Deputies president Hector Arce said halting the road project in response to the Indians demands would open the way for an "informed dialogue" with the affected communities.

But protesters ignored the parliamentary vote, just as they have rejected the proposal from Morales. They demand that the project be canceled, not just postponed.

Work on the highway, which had been due to be operational in 2014, began in June, though not on the segment running through the reserve.

Interview with former Bolivia Vice Minister for Rural Development Roxana Liendo: Reflections on TIPNIS and rural development

[Roxana Liendo resigned on 26 September from her post in the Vice Ministry of Rural Development in protest at thepolice repression of a march by indigenous movements. They are marching against the Bolivian governments plan to build a road through the TIPNIS national park and indigenous territory. I talked to her about why she decided to resign and also about the importance of rural development in Bolivia - Dario Kenner]

What position did you have in the government?

I was Coordinator of SISPAM (Information and monitoring system on agricultural production, prices and markets) in the Vice Ministry of Rural Development. My job was to monitor agricultural production and prices (national and international) to then inform government policy. I was invited to do the job by the Vice Minister of Rural Development in July 2011. I was glad to be there because I believe rural development is very important.

Between September 2007 and March 2008 I was Vice Minister of Rural Development.

Why is rural development important?

It is the way to achieve food security and sovereignty. Agro-industry is important to generate income from exports but the majority of what is consumed in Bolivia is produced by small scale producers, they are the pillars of food security who cover about 60-70% of the family food basket. From the start of the Morales government in 2006 there was more technical support for these small producers. The aim was to reduce imports of products like wheat. Bolivia has great potential because of its varied ecosystems and large land area to first cover internal demand and then export.

The problem is land. There are around 5.5 million hectares of productive land but only half is cultivated, this is partly due to rotation of land. There is sufficient land but it depends on who owns it. The majority of the most fertile land is in the hands of the agro-exporters. There are no up to date studies but we know a lot of the soya production is in the hands of Brazilians, Colombians and Paraguayans. Small plots are common in the western highlands and central valleys.

How can the distribution of land change?

The process of agrarian reform and reversion of lands needs to be deepened. There have been some fiscal (state) lands that have been distributed but there has been little attack on the big landowners in the east. But the problem is how will people adapt if you give lands in the east to people from the western highlands? They find it very difficult to adapt to the tropical climate. Programmes have to be implemented with comprehensive support from the state to support these settlements in their initial years. The lands in the west also have potential. There must also be programmes to increase productivity of lands in the western highlands such as irrigation, making credit available, technical assistance and appropriate mechanisation.

Crops in Bolivia´s western highlands (credit: Dario Kenner)

Crops in Bolivia´s western highlands (credit: Dario Kenner)

Has rural development been a priority of the Morales government?

It was in the first few years. There were important changes and from 2006 there was a big push for an alternative way of doing development. But when it got down to the practical ways this would be done we repeated many of the methods and ideas of previous governments such as using tractors and fertilizers. These methods do bring fast results but have negative environmental impacts. What was difficult was to find medium term strategies. I believe implementing a new way of doing things is crucial to deepen the process of change.

When I was Vice Minister of Rural Development there was a policy of state-led rural and forestry development. It was based on a pyramid of state companies at the top (EMAPA), followed by a mixed economy with alliances between the state and small producers (for example seed producers), and with support for small producers at the bottom (CRIAR programme); and that took into account forestry activities as part of a integrated rural development approach. But since I left in March 2008 I saw this integrated approach fragment and now there is little of it left.

Do you think the government will change its position on the TIPNIS issue? Will the government change the route of the road so it does not go through the TIPNIS?

The government must do a deeper political analysis. They need to calculate the consequences of their actions. A road is important but the current route is not justified. We do need a road to integrate and it is important. But we do not just need a major highway that will allow heavy goods vehicles to move goods from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean. The government should listen to the indigenous peoples who are saying they do need a road. This is a basis for dialogue. What is at stake is not if there will be a road but instead where it goes. Hopefully everyone will agree on a route that is good for all.

I hope the government will listen to more critical voices from inside such as the Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca (incidentally Choquehuanca was a crucial figure who convinced President Morales to reverse the controversial gasolinazo in December 2010).

Indigenous march leaving Caranavi a few days ago on its way to La Paz (credit: Communications Commission of the march)

Indigenous march leaving Caranavi a few days ago on its way to La Paz (credit: Communications Commission of the march)

What is the impact of the government not revealing who gave the order for the police repression of the indigenous march on 25 September?

It is mistaken political calculation. The more time the government does not recognise its responsibility the more mistrust it generates in the population. I don´t know about the rest of the country but this is definitely the case in La Paz. It generates a loss of trust. The government must be transparent and tell us what happened. In community justice the principles of asking for forgiveness and reparation are very important for the indigenous peoples. Evo has asked for forgiveness and I thought it was genuine but then in the days afterwards it didn´t look as much like it was.

Why did you resign?

Many people have asked me and even questioned by decision. For several years I fought from the inside for alternatives and change. But there was no space for debate, no openness. It soon became clear that the hegemonic ideology was to deepen the extractive and modernisation model of development.

At the end of August I said to my colleagues that as a government we cannot go against basic principles such as the cultural identity of indigenous peoples and of Mother Earth. I said I didn´t want to be part of a process of generating conflict between campesinos and indigenous peoples (see this article explaining the difference).

My limit is when people are not respected. As soon as I heard about the violence and repression of the indigenous march I handed in my resignation (letter) the next day.

What impact will the TIPNIS issue have on the future of the process of change?

I hope there will not be clashes between grassroots groups who were crucial to establishing this process of change. It looks like the most negative impact in the long-term will be the polarisation between these groups. They should work together because they have common needs and demands.

The positive effect has been the intense debates about the difference between discourse and practice, on Mother Earth and Vivir Bien (to “Live Well“) as a new model of development. I hope these spaces for debate continue and the government listens to them. We are discussing a lot more what is Vivir Bien. How does industrial and rural development link to Vivir Bien? We don´t really know. We need to get a lot more practical and concrete about what we mean and how we do Vivir Bien.

People abroad need to understand Bolivia is a poor country. We need to generate income and can´t just rely on foreign aid. This is part of achieving our sovereignty. We don’t want to depend on others. We should take advantage of the natural resources from extractive industries to focus on building the foundations for a more sustainable, equal and inclusive development.

Republished from Bolivia Diary

The critical moment for Bolivians

Cambio- Septemper, 30 2011

Juan Carlos Zambrana Marchetti

Recent events concerning the conflict generated by the construction of the highway through the TIPNIS require a stop along the road to attempt an act of reflection. The media hurried to condemn what it called the brutality of the violent police repression of the march of indigenous people, the death of a child, and a large number of disappeared. Public opinion, including the government’s, swallowed the news without questioning it, because it was not easy to detect such malice in the description of the events.

“Disappeared” is not a term for those who went into hiding or headed out into the wilderness. The term applies to the 30,000 young people who were thrown into the River Plate in Argentina during the right-wing dictatorships. The death of a child was not confirmed, either, but that did not stop the dissemination of the report like a trail of gunpowder. Emphasis was placed on the words “repression” and “brutality,” in order to evoke the memories of the dictatorships and neoliberal governments. With emotions exacerbated, public opinion was detoured from rational analysis and trapped in deceit.

No one recalled, for example, that the indigenous president, yielding to the demands of the marchers, had sent his highest-level diplomat, also indigenous, to negotiate under pressure within a march in which there were indigenous people armed with bows and arrows, and whose attitude was in no way diplomatic; that they acted threateningly towards him and forced him to march along with them, using him as a shield to break the police blockade that had been set up to avoid a confrontation with other indigenous people who waited in their path to stop them.

Under those circumstances, the police, among whom there were surely indigenous officers, were threatened by the marchers. There was no exaggeration in the frequent use of the word “indigenous” in the recounting of these events. The fact is that, since Morales rose to power, giving a leading role to the indigenous and recognizing their rights, their autonomy, and their 36 nations within the new Plurinational State, the Right, unable to defend its postulates, has “discovered” its own indigenism, politically opposed to Morales. The transnationals, the NGOs, the power sectors, the church, the media, and every political aspiration, are now indigenist.

The golden dream of the opposition to Morales is to force a confrontation among indigenous people, obtain a few deaths, and expel the president like Sanchez de Lozada was expelled. So prepared were they for the effort that one of the opposition parties hastened to bring charges of genocide against Morales without there being a single shot, a single killing, or the slightest grounds to support the crime mentioned. They know that the complaint has no possibility of moving forward, but that has never been the objective, which is continuous and sustained disinformation to promote discontent.

Nothing justifies the excess of violence, but one cannot help but notice the sophisticated opposition lattice of plans designed to provoke it, blame it on Morales, exaggerate it, and publicize it. That could explain the government’s fear of committing any violence, due also to the high standard of respect for life and to civil rights to which it is committed. Without a doubt, there is an enormous campaign against Morales, because, while from Chile to Europe and by way of the United States, far less provocative protests are daily repressed with much more violence, the international media concentrates on exaggerating and taking out of context the case of Bolivia.

The conflict, nonetheless, goes far beyond what is seen, for it has at its heart an element too dangerous to remain unperceived. Perhaps due to idealism, and to the opposition’s strategy of calling him “dictator” in order to neutralize his overwhelming majority, Morales committed an error much like that which weakened president German Bush: nullifying the legitimate parliamentary force that supported him. Morales did not shut down Congress, but did reduce enormously its power, making it submit anew, directly and constantly, to the will of the people, not taking into account that fragments of that people remained largely trapped by the same transnational powers that had just lost the elections. Politically defeated, but economically powerful, the Right invested fortunes in the manipulation of that “people” and set off the chaos that has never ceased to strike back at Morales.

Now, if we believe the media, we would get the impression that the people have turned their backs on the president, or even worse. Blockades, strikes, marches, protests and more protests, as if they faced a government that has betrayed the national interests and subjugates the people in order to loot them. That takes place because, by legislating inadequately the mechanisms of consultation and protest, a popular government with two-thirds of parliamentary power has allowed itself to be reduced to the will of its defeated opponents, who act covertly in the name of the people in order to destroy the government’s agenda. It is not the people who protest, as hard as that may be to understand because the disinformation has gained ground and confused various segments of society. The manipulators are few, but very powerful, and know how to broadcast their discourse.

Bolivians must rapidly internalize all of the power that they have achieved with Morales, in order to understand that a government based on the sustained respect of the people requires the participation of a people who think and are free of the ties of colonialism. The moment is critical, therefore, not for Evo and his government, but at bottom for the Bolivian people and the future that it is betting while marching like automatons toward the destruction of their own emancipatory process. Their dilemma is whether to open their eyes to see who is hiding behind the parapets of organizations that tempt some of their leaders with power, or to go off the cliff playing useful fools in a regressive political change that would place the government in the hands of their historical enemies.

The country has been many times in situations where, because of excessive demands from the Left, power ended up in the hands of the Right, which only restored immediately its full structure of looting and illicit enrichment, without the least regard for the indigenous people nor the misguided Left that supported it in subversion. That happened with the governments of Gualberto Villarroel and of Juan Jose Torres, among others.

It is now up to the Bolivian people to make an effort to overcome the old patterns of conduct, and to add political clarity to the courage, tenacity, and extraordinary capacity to organize with which they have won such a grand conquest. That missing element would consolidate indigenous Bolivians not only as formidable combatants, but also as a thinking people capable of sustaining their own success.

Republished from Juan Carlos Zambrano's blog

Bolivia: Reflections on the TIPNIS conflict

BIF Special Briefing

The most recent BIF Bulletin (number 20, see below) traced the causes and development of the TIPNIS dispute, a conflict between indigenous peoples of the Territorio Indígena y Parque Nacional Isiboro Sécure and the government, over the course of a planned road through this protected region. The march, supported by the national indigenous lowland confederation (Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia - CIDOB) began from Trinidad, the capital of the Beni, on August 15. On September 25, it was violently dispersed by the police. The following day, President Evo Morales spoke on national television announcing that the road project would be suspended, at least until after a wider debate on the issue could be held. Meanwhile, the march continues towards La Paz.
The failure to work out a solution to the TIPNIS problem revealed a hardening of the positions on both sides of the argument. On one side, the Morales government sought to push ahead with the road project, which would connect Trinidad with Cochabamba, without carrying out a proper consultation with those likely to be affected. The need for consultation was specified in the new constitution, approved only two years ago. On the other side, the marchers and those supporting them were resistant to heed efforts to negotiate. On eight occasions, ministers had sought to reach a settlement as the march progressed. The last of these involved the foreign minister, David Choquehuanca, himself of indigenous background, who was briefly taken hostage by the marchers and used to force a way through police lines.
The conflict has received wide coverage both within Bolivia and internationally, giving rise to criticisms of the government’s stance. Rather than repeat these, here we seek to identify a number of deeper issues and concerns that arise.
Conflictive positions
Underlying the dispute are a series of different conceptions and understandings of what indigenous rights, particularly vivir bien (living well), are taken to mean. The rift between indigenous people of the TIPNIS and campesinos is serious. It calls into question the future of the Pacto de Unidad (unity pact) which brought together campesinos and indigenous peoples from the highlands and lowlands before Morales became president.
Indigenous organisations from both parts of the country, as well as campesino/settler organisations, worked together as the Pacto de Unidad in helping to draw up the new constitution. Indeed, the proposal to establish the Constituent Assembly stemmed from a march of lowland/highland indigenous people back in 2002. The new constitution highlights the “plurinational” nature of the Bolivian state (which incorporates 36 indigenous nations) and codifies indigenous rights more generally. Such rights include that of self-government and self-determination, collective landownership, community involvement in the economy, the need for prior consultation on matters affecting them (including where non-renewable natural resources are concerned), and the right to benefit from such activities.
Respect for such rights has been highlighted by Evo Morales in his various speeches in the international arena. The positions adopted by Bolivia in the United Nations discussions on climate change suggested that indigenous peoples in Bolivia were providing an alternative path in a post-modern world. At the same time, however, the Morales government is seeking to pull the majority of Bolivia’s population, much of it indigenous, out of poverty and exclusion. It is seeking to do so by redirecting income from natural resource exploitation to poorer parts of the population.
Since their ground-breaking 1990 march from Trinidad to La Paz, lowland indigenous groups have sought to develop recognition of their land and territory, on which they have hunted and gathered since time immemorial. In 2009 the three indigenous groups that historically have inhabited the TIPNIS gained title to over 1 million hectares there.
For highland campesinos and those who have migrated to the tropics in search of an improved livelihood (colonos), the jungle appears free for the taking. Beneficiaries of the 1953 agrarian reform, they tend to see their small plots as individual private property. The large landowners of the Beni and Santa Cruz, many of whom received huge tracts as grace and favour payments from the military regimes of the past, also see landholding in terms of private ownership.
This fundamental difference in view over the nature of landholding between the campesinos/colonos on the one hand and indigenous peoples on the other was what lay behind the dramatic stand-off in Yucumo. There, with several hundred colonos blocking the road, the TIPNIS march was brought to a halt. The colonos disagreed fundamentally with some of the marchers’ demands. The police were brought in to act as a buffer between both groups and to avoid violence breaking out between them.
As well as calling into question the Pacto de Unidad, the issue has also put huge strain on the government’s relations with both the CIDOB and the Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyo (CONAMAQ) which represents highland indigenous groups.
The role of the police
The role of the police in moving in on September 25 to break up the march raises questions about control over police actions. Who was responsible for this decision?
The Vice-minister of the Interior, Marcos Farfán, immediately denied any involvement in giving the order, as did the minister, Sacha Llorenti. Evo Morales himself has also denied prior knowledge of the intervention. Both Llorenti and Farfán resigned and were swiftly removed from office. Since September 25, it has become clearer that the police force may have taken the decision to disperse the marchers off its own bat. It is possible that they took this course of action because of the drubbing they had received the day before at the hands of the marchers, armed with spears. It is also possible that it reflects a deeper malaise. Earlier this year the police force lost control over personal identification and driving licences, both important sources of funding and status for police officers. It was certainly the case that Llorenti was in their sights as the author of these changes. Either way, the question of government control over the police (or lack of it) raises serious concerns going forward.
The role of the media
The TIPNIS dispute has also thrown into relief the role of the press in distorting events and using social conflicts to discredit the government. Initial reports claimed that a baby had been killed during the police intervention, along with seven to nine other deaths and many disappearances. It has since become clear that there were no deaths and, of the people who had escaped into the surrounding forest, all have been accounted for. The media coverage of events has played a major role in mobilising disapproval of the government. In some cases, it may have been just shoddy journalism, but there was almost certainly a conscious attempt to whip up hysteria.
A recent article in the weekly La Epoca newspaper by its editor Hugo Moldiz points to this being part of a systematic plan by opposition groups to denigrate Evo Morales and his government’s policies, with a view to undermining not only the president, but also the process of change. The media is most effective in reaching both the urban population and the middle-class, and it is amongst the middle class that discontent with the MAS government is most in evidence. Certainly the events of the last few weeks, and coverage of them by the media has helped to induce a sense of loss of balance and proportion.
The role of opposition
As was the case with the December 2010/January 2011 protests against the government’s fuel pricing policy (the gasolinazo), the TIPNIS conflict has been a boon for the opposition, which has lost much of the leverage it had enjoyed up to 2008. It is slightly ironical to see the fight for indigenous rights receiving backing from those, like elite groups in Santa Cruz, which had bitterly opposed the granting of indigenous autonomies only three years ago.
Opposition political leaders, such as Samuel Doria Medina (Unidad Nacional) and Juan del Granado (MSM), have benefited from the TIPNIS debacle in their attempt to build support in advance of the 2014 presidential elections. Both are currently seeking to profit from the government’s problems by encouraging people to vote null or void in the elections on October 16 to fill senior posts in the judiciary. They want to turn the elections into a plebiscite against the government. The election is planned as a first step to break the control of the judiciary by traditional elites.
The outcome of the TIPNIS dispute has triggered large mobilisations against the government in several of Bolivia’s larger cities. Organisations like the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB) and other social movements have come out in opposition to what they see as government policy. At the same time, there have been marches and declarations in support of the road through the TIPNIS, deepening the divides between different social movements. There are also many that have not proclaimed one way or the other. In rural areas in particular, support for Evo remains strong, even in the face of criticism of the government’s handling of the TIPNIS dispute.
Prior consultation going forward
The TIPNIS issue has brought into focus the nature of ‘free prior informed consent’, as set out internationally by ILO Convention 169. It is probably but the tip of the iceberg for many such disputes in the future, disputes which reflect different views of what ‘development’ is taken to mean. The Constitution lays down clearly the general principles for processes of prior consultation, making it obligatory for the state to carry out such consultation of indigenous peoples and their organisations where non-renewable natural resources on their lands are to be exploited. It ensures them that they will benefit from such activities. However, in line with international agreements and the Bolivian constitution itself, the recommendations that may arise from the process of consultation are not necessarily binding.
The Hydrocarbons Law of 2005 (and the regulations guiding it) lays down the need for consultation in the case of oil and gas exploitation, and the proposed new mining legislation (currently under discussion) includes prior consultation. Still, the details of how to carry out such consultations have yet to be clarified, and this may even require separate legislation.
Meanwhile, there are natural resources projects that are being proposed that cannot move forward and there have been de facto invasions of cooperative or small private mines by members of nearby communities.
Learning lessons
As with the ‘gasolinazo’ last December, there are some important lessons to be learnt if the process of change is not to be derailed:
  • The idea of vivir bien needs further discussion. What does it mean, and what kind of development model does it entail?
  • Faced with a politically motivated press, how best to maintain a critical approach to the sort of distortions it generates?
  • How to ensure wider debate and participation in the political process, even if this means delaying important policy decisions and then living with the consequences of these?
  • How protests are dealt with and tactics used by police need to be seriously re-examined and ways found to deal with crowd control without resorting to indiscriminate violence.

Five Years of Evo

Pablo Stefanoni

Less than a decade ago, few people outside of Bolivia could name its president. Today, Evo Morales is not only a global figure; he is an icon for critics of globalization. During the peak of neoliberalism at the end of the 20th century, the Zapatistas in Mexico advocated “changing the world without seizing power.” Now, in the first decade of the 21st century, Evo Morales, Bolivia’s first indigenous president, embodies the desire to change the world while in power—borrowing Subcomandante Marcos’ concept, “to rule by obeying the people” (mandar obedeciendo), a phrase prominently displayed on billboards with the president’s image throughout Bolivia.

Evo Morales took office on December 18, 2005, with an astounding 54% of the vote. He immediately set into motion a nationalist project with two main agendas: the nationalization of oil and gas and a Constitutional Convention. With the first measure Morales proposed to do away with the “plunder of natural resources,” in the words of his party, the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS); the second sought to do away with “internal colonialism.” Bolivian indigenous movements often use this term to characterize the domestic persistence of the exclusion of the native peoples—the majority of Bolivians—and the covert violence that continued to smolder under the liberal-democratic principles of citizens’ equality. Morales thus appears like the David who confronts the “imperialistic” Goliath, an image that greatly explains his popularity both within Bolivia and abroad.

These developments have transformed Bolivia into a beacon for those who are searching for alternative models to capitalistic modernity and to the present economic crisis. The presence of native peoples as the principal actors in the actual process of change activates a series of imaginaries about an “other” who is capable of providing fresh perspectives, cosmovisions and alternative political, economic and social practices in the face of “Western decadence.” But when one looks at the situation more closely, it becomes much more complicated. Although it is certain that the majority of Bolivians are indigenous (62%, according to the 2001 census), it is just as true that a fierce desire for inclusive modernization emerges forcefully from deep within the Bolivian population. Evo Morales reactivates developmental imaginaries in which “living well” in terms of material welfare is more powerful than any spiritual or non-materialist guidelines allegedly inscribed in indigenous cosmovisions.

For many ReVista readers, Evo Morales is seen as one of a group of emerging “populist” leaders in South America, including Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, his Ecuadoran colleague Rafael Correa, the late Néstor Kirchner and his widow, current Argentine president Cristina Fernández, and the Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega. But this “meateating” left—as Peruvian writer Alvaro Vargas Llosa called it to distinguish it from the “vegetarian” (and good) left—is not homogenous. Morales’ leadership contains a heavy dose of popular selfrepresentation rather than messianic direction (in the countryside, peasants often comment, “he is one of us”). The International Monetary Fund itself has praised his macroeconomic policy for its prudence, and his social policies can be compared without any difficulty to those of the “moderate” Lula da Silva or his successor Dilma Rousseff in Brazil.

In the last five-plus years, Morales has consolidated his power in the midst of a violent dispute with the agro-industrial elite in the country’s eastern region, encouraging the mobilization of peasants and the popular urban sectors. The support he found on the streets also translated into votes: in August 2008, he was ratified in a “recall referendum” with 67% of the votes, and in December 2009, he was reelected with an unprecedented 64%.

Nevertheless, the celebrations of the government’s fifth-year anniversary in January 2011 were tainted. The aborted “gasolinazo,” a fuel hike of up to 83%, had been announced on December 26, 2010, by Vice President Álvaro García Linera while Evo Morales was in Caracas offering help for the floods. The surprise timing and tone of the announcement that gas and diesel subsidies would be eliminated—stirring memories of the neoliberal economic corrections of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s—sparked popular discontent against the government unprecedented in the era of Evo. Until that moment, protest had come from the conservative right; this time, it emanated from the strongholds of “Evoism”—Evo supporters themselves. As a result, a week later, before the discontent grew any stronger, Morales hastened to strike down his own decree. The Bolivian president repeated that the government was “obeying the people” and that although the measure was a necessary one, the social movements had made him realize that the moment was not right for its implementation. Nevertheless, price increases and the uncertainty created by the measure spawned a series of protests about the high cost of food.

Moreover, the mini-crisis made apparent the disconnect between the often eloquent grandstanding that referenced such concepts as communitarian socialism, and changes that had actually taken place—many of them modest—in the daily lives of Bolivians. Moderate successes in the fight against poverty, the implementation of social subsidy bonds and the construction of rural electrification and highways are undeniable accomplishments, but far from being an “anti-capitalist policy.” At the same time, the Bolivian state remains chronically weak, especially because it lacks qualified technocrats and institutional density. This deficit creates many obstacles to the government’s statist projects such as setting up state-owned factories. Official negotiations with small and large producers this year to seek production increases to bring down food prices and do away with scarcity of products such as sugar, along with the announcement of subsidies to oil companies, demonstrate that overcoming market mechanisms is a lot more complicated than what the government and the so-called “social movements” ever imagined.

Evo Morales is suffering from the effects of a “crisis of narrative.” Creativity appears to be declining in terms of thinking about measures with the same—or similar—political-symbolic impact as those taken in the first moments of the Morales administration. The last educational reform law passed with little public debate except among those directly affected (primarily teachers); the same holds for a universal health insurance bill that is being drawn up, and other necessary reforms to guarantee free health care to the majority of Bolivians who today must pay for care in low-quality hospitals—let alone what happens when a Bolivian needs specialized health care. Though these efforts are real, they have not produced a compelling narrative about the social effects of the Morales government.

The transformation is most profoundly noted in the change of elites, the massive inclusion of indigenous, peasant and common citizens in the state apparatus, in the changing self-perception of Bolivians and in the realm of international politics in which Bolivia has allied itself with countries such as Venezuela, Cuba and Iran after decades of uncritical submission to Washington’s dictates.

The purchase of a satellite from China, the bet on megaprojects such as petrochemicals, hydroelectric projects, mining and highways (including in the Amazon region) or the president’s close links with the Armed Forces attest to the different imaginaries in play that—because of the lack of debate among them—at times appear like an ideological mess that muddles together indigenism and hardcore development policies. Among these we may trace two general and schematic lines that could produce several possible combinations. One vision—the hegemonic one, in which Vice-President García Linera participates—proposes a strong state accompanied by “prudent” macroeconomic policies. Another tendency, more philosophical than practical in terms of public policy, is expressed in venues such as climate change summits and anti-summits, social movement forums and courses on political formation. This tendency projects a communitarian perspective, based on political, economic, and even judicial pluralism sanctioned by the new Constitution. The main advocate of this trend is Foreign Minister David Choquehuanca, who is highly regarded by the Aymaras of the Altiplano. The tensions between these two tendencies are particularly noticeable in the realm of the environment. While Bolivia has sought to play an international leadership and moral role in the climate summits, domestic policies regarding environmental defense or the struggle against climate change are inconsistent; the environmental costs of becoming a mining power once again—given the boom with its high prices—are not subject to public debate or even of fundamental concern to the government.

In this context, for the first time since arriving in office, Morales not only faces opposition from the knee-jerk right, but from the center-left Movement Without Fear, led by former La Paz Mayor Juan del Granado, a Morales ally until the beginning of 2010. With support from the urban middle class, especially in La Paz, members “without fear” have sought to cast themselves as a more democratic and institutional variation of the present process of change, “criticizing its errors and supporting its achievements.” To garner support, the movement seeks to capitalize on del Granado’s accomplishments as mayor, one of the best administrations in the country in the past decades.

The government reacted to the movement by pressing charges against del Granado and current La Paz mayor Luis Revilla, a mechanism that in the past had allowed it to get rid of its principal conservative rivals. This year, the governor of Tarija (in the south of the country and the principal reservoir of Bolivian gas) was deposed and obtained political asylum in Paraguay; Leopoldo Fernández, the former governor of Pando, is still in jail waiting to be sentenced for the socalled Porvenir massacre in 2008, when pro-Evo peasants were allegedly ambushed by Fernández’ thugs in the isolated Bolivian Amazon region. And several former strong opposition leaders fled to the United States, among them Branko Marinkovic, the former pro-autonomy leader of Santa Cruz region, and former presidential candidate Manfred Reyes Villa. It is not clear, however, whether the government can get the same results with members of the moderate left, even if their movement is weak.

Morales faces a certain ideological stagnation. His second term has been marked with all the wear and tear that a second term implies. From this perspective, Morales’ future—he is planning to run again in 2014—will depend on his capacity to take charge of the process of change and to recover some of the mystique of his first term. Without a doubt, “change” has entered into its most prosaic moment, without great enemies in sight—which is an advantage and a disadvantage at the same time. The struggle against the “separatists” had managed to solidify the Morales ranks until 2008. Now Bolivians are expecting Morales’ sweeping discourse to be translated into better concrete conditions in their daily lives. They are expecting a revolution in their pocketbooks.

Pablo Stefanoni, journalist and economist, is the editor of Nueva Sociedad. Until February 2011, he was editor-in-chief of Le Monde Diplomatique Bolivia. He is the author of “Qué hacer con los indios...” Y otros traumas de la colonialidad.

Republished from ReVista

El Alto in Flux: Crossroads Between La Paz and the Altiplano

Xavier Albó

When I passed through El Alto de La Paz for the first time in 1954, I didn’t even notice. The city—just a few minutes outside of La Paz—consisted of just a few little houses and market stalls at the end of the immense altiplano. La Ceja (the “eyebrow”), reaching some 13,500 feet into the air, suddenly tumbles down toward the river and the city of La Paz, about a thousand feet lower, as if it were another Grand Canyon filled with buildings at the bottom, and on either side, little houses of unprocessed red brick virtually hanging off both sides.

Towards the end of the colony (1780- 81), this Ceja—the border of present-day El Alto—was already conspicuous for having sheltered thousands of Aymara rebels led by Julián Apaza (Túpaj Katari) and his wife Bartolina Sisa. From the vantage of the higher point, they laid siege to La Paz for six long months. Residents in La Paz endured famine and death until the rebels were routed by Spanish troops arrivng from Lima and Buenos Aires. That encircling of La Paz has remained deeply engraved in the collective unconscious, with guilt and fear buried within in the descendants of the besieged population, and as a model and battle flag for the Aymara people, despite the fact they were defeated.

In 1985, El Alto was declared a independent municipality. Since 2007, it actually numbers more inhabitants than the capital city (although El Alto is part of Greater La Paz). In 2011, it is likely that the population will reach a million, 300 times greater than its population in 1950. Although El Alto is already Bolivia’s second most populous city (after Santa Cruz) and although its human development index has improved from 0.59 in 1992 to 0.66 in 2005, it ranks in 47th place among the country’s municipalities, considerably lower than all the department (state) capitals and other smaller cities. But the city is changing. In the 1980s, most of the housing was only one story high. Now, there are more and more highrises, some in an art nouveau style particular to El Alto, in which the lower floors house stores, residences, extravagant event salons and, sometimes, luxurious chalet residences on the higher floors.

In the last census in 2001, 74% of El Alto’s residents defined themselves as Aymara, although only 48% spoke the language. Younger generations born or raised in the city have few incentives to use Aymara. Most alteños own their own lots and are constructing houses; the census also found much self-employment and many family-style businesses there.

El Alto has been strengthening an identity distinct from that of La Paz, which residents refer to as “La Hoyada”— the hollows. But together they make up the same metropolis, the largest in the country, so their interdependence is very strong. About 200,000 workers from El Alto travel down to La Paz every day in the thousands of minibuses that ply between the two cities. And another huge quantity of people travel on Sundays in the other direction to the 70-block 16 de Julio open air market that sells everything from needles to Volvos. If La Paz is the political heart of Bolivia, El Alto is still its lungs. The bureaucracy of La Paz is getting old; El Alto is an adolescent in the prime years. At important moments, La Paz and El Alto have united to function as a single body working together on the political future of the country.

But all this only represents half of the key role of El Alto. The other half is the city’s enduring ties to the Aymara altiplano. There’s been no census to determine how many El Alto residents also maintain a place in the countryside, but it is evident that, on the level of individual families, the bonds between city and countryside are very strong. With the exception of a few very inhospitable places, the altiplano has not emptied out, though it has somewhat stagnated, distributing members of its families between the country and the city, as if the city were another socially complementary productive niche (and one that is certainly privileged). This fluidity between city and country taps into the ancestral Andean strategy of combining access to different microclimates in order to guarantee survival.

The concept of “resident” has emerged as a new and very important social category in the countryside; this is the name locals have developed for those who live in the city. Many of these citydwellers organize associations based on place of origin and keep strong ties with their home communities. Family celebrations help seal these ties through rituals that cement exchanges, rights and mutual obligations. These residents know that if they fulfill their sundry communal obligations— including holding communal offices and sponsoring patronal fiestas— they will maintain their rights to the land. With the 1994 Popular Participation Law, rural municipalities have obtained many more resources, and some El Alto residents also run for mayors and councilmen in their home communities. Quite a few rural municipalities even have a second informal seat in the city—which could be the urban home of the mayor—to attend to the needs of residents from the community paisanos.

The rural origins of many of El Alto’s citizens help us to understand the weight of the neighborhood boards known as “juntas vecinales,” from the street leaders and the board of each zone, neighborhood and area to the powerful Federation of Neighborhood Boards of El Alto known by its Spanish acronym as FEJUVE, which brings together more than 500 of these boards; they are the urban version of a rural community. Some neighborhoods were even originally formed by people from the same place or occupation (such as neighborhoods made up of miners). Over the years, even though people from other places came in, the neighborhood was usually controlled by a board whose membership reflected its origins. There is not a sector of El Alto that does not have some neighborhood association. Because of this community structure, even in the midst of the chaos of new neighborhoods that with only basic services are constantly springing up, El Alto does not seem to suffer the anomie that often afflicts other great urban concentrations in the continent.

In spite of many conflicts, sinecures and scams, these neighborhood boards are recognized by everyone as the local authority. Public works, services and even complaints to the municipal authorities or other public agencies about unfulfilled promises are all channeled through these boards. Many times, the juntas vecinales resolve neighborly disputes and organize to put an end to the bad deeds of thieves and gang members. Effigies are hung from lampposts to warn off anyone thinking about stealing. When someone new comes into the neighborhood, they are expected to win their right to living space by visiting the board with a few cases of beer as a gift.

Just like in the countryside, there are fiestas and celebrations going on all the time in El Alto. It is always surprising to see the number of both traditional and new salons for receptions, parties, dinners, dances or worship services. And in spite of the great number of meeting places, the streets are not only for walking. They are also a blatantly public place for celebrating, dancing, selling, blocking vehicles and protesting.

But a city is not quite a collective entity. Unlike in rural communities, there are many people who live in the same zone or even on the same street and do not know each other or participate in the neighborhood assembies. As in any city, relationships are not always based on physical proximity, but on other factors such as jobs, religion, youth groups and studies. Cellphones also facilitate these relations over distance. In this sense, we can talk about traces of anomie here as well.

Taking into account both perspectives—the city of anomie and that of solidarity—and in both directions—towards La Paz and away from it—the city of El Alto operates as an intercultural and catalyzing hinge between La Paz and the altiplano.

The characteristic of being a hinge, a bellows, a fork in the road, in Spanish, bisagra, has strengthened the political importance of El Alto, with back-and forth fluctuations. Since the return of democracy in the 1980s, the electorate has vacillated between rightist and leftist candidates, generally favoring the most populist tendency because of offers of public works and services.

The emergence of Evo Morales and the MAS party has led to an even stronger internal polarization between neighborhoods because of their distinct histories and options. On the one hand, El Alto is characterized as a great revolutionary city, with very ethnic overtones, particularly since October 2003. After the first road blockades came under Army fire in the countryside, El Alto became the great protagonist of the mobilizations. Its residents suffered the most losses of the 60 killed and 400 wounded by the Army’s violent repression; most of the unarmed victims had mobilized around October 12, El Día de la Hispanidad (the date on which Columbus Day is celebrated in the United States.)

After the bloody events, I accompanied a street funeral wake for a girl who had come from the countryside a few months earlier. The crowd helped me up to the terrace roof of her house, where she had stacked up two bricks to be able to see what was happening out there on the avenue. When she peered out, a war bullet pierced her head, leaving a large lock of hair on the other side of the terrace as a witness to its trajectory. A few blocks down the street, another wake was being held in a church for an unidentified youth and an old man whose bodies had been brought there in a wheelbarrow.

Such vicious repression did not make cowards out of the residents of El Alto. They were infuriated. Neighborhood boards organized thousands from El Alto who converged together like a great flood from different points in El Alto to the center of La Paz. It was like a sped-up reiteration of the 1781 anti-colonial action.

This time, many of the residents of La Paz were themselves quite sympathetic to the movement, and others—such as the mining cooperatives—lent direct support. The march was successful. Finally, the Army gave in. President Sánchez de Lozada resigned and fled the country. Since then, the cry of the people from El Alto, “El Alto on its feet, never on its knees” (El Alto de pie, nunca de rodillas) has become consecrated as a popular slogan.

However, other neighborhoods of El Alto simply did not participate. One of the main representatives of this group, the son of El Alto’s first mayor and now an important leader of the domestic opposition group known as Unidad Nacional (UN) considers that these activists described above reflect only “a minority of leaders” who “impose their intolerant decisions” and who “commit excesses in the name of healthy neighborhood corporatism.” After the events of October 2003, USAID—and other organizations—devoted much more money to the mayor’s office for streets and other basic infrastructure. Since 1999, the mayor’s office has been in the hands of populist Pepe Lucho Paredes, a former member of the MIR party (then in the government) who severed his ties with that party after the 2003 events. Paredes marched with the rebels from El Alto and later founded his own party, “Plan Progreso” (PP). In 2004, he was reelected with 53% of the vote, compared to 17% for the MAS candidate; a year later, in December 2005, while 77% of El Alto voted for Evo as president, Pepe Lucho narrowly won public office, as prefect, this time in an alliance with the rightist party PODEMOS, (although this time with a narrow difference with the MAS candidate, 39% vs 38%).

Evo Morales and MAS have continued to dominate the political stage in El Alto: in December 2009, they gained control of more than two-thirds of the new Plurinational Legislative Assembly, with El Alto reelecting the president and his congressional representatives by an astounding 87%, since the four previous years had been filled with bonanzas, subsidies and comparative tranquility.

But cracks began to appear, and by April 2010 the MAS won the mayoralty with a mere 39% of the vote. In the streets, people were talking about having to choose between a “ratero” (thief ), refering to the MAS candidate who finally won, accused of corruption and a “cholero” (a man who goes after “cholitas”), referring to the MSM candidate who years before had been implicated in a scandalous affair. But in the election the biggest surprise was the unknown 30-year-old Soledad “Sole” Chopetón (UN), whose polls were showing at two percent in February but on April 4, garnered 30 percent of the vote—a very respectable second place. A significant number of El Alto residents opted for Sole, because she emphasized that she was a warmi (woman), young and on the fringes of traditional electoral politics.

At the end of 2010, the Evo government surprised everyone with a decree that immediately raised gasoline prices by a whopping 83% without enacting significant compensatory measures for the majority of the population. The president invoked the problem of contraband as a justification for the measure, but even if his reason was probably valid, the gas price hike set off huge increases in transportation and food prices. Huge mass protests erupted, even in those sectors that had been very loyal to Evo’s political process, including El Alto. Only a few of the leaders of the popular movements (mostly in rural areas) accepted his reasoning. But the disenchantment, protests and loss of credibility were so generalized that Evo, one hour before the celebrations of the New Year, revoked the decree in person, declaring the necessity of “governing by obeying the people.” His new stance was that the measures continued to be necessary, but that neither the moment nor the way of putting them into practice were opportune. In the short run, everything calmed down and New Year’s fireworks also celebrated the reversal of the measure. Yet prices of most goods could not be rolled back, nor did it appear possible to return to a state of unconditional love for Evo and his government. Now not only the opposition was marching—much of the popular sector rediscovered that the old style of protests such as marches and road blockages still got them what they wanted.

In April 2011, the previously weakened Bolivian Workers’ Union (COB) called for an indefinite general strike. Its main demand was higher salaries, especially in the areas of health and education. On the hidden agenda of certain leaders was a desire to strengthen their organization internally in the wake of union elections. The workers ended up with some pay increases, but not as much as they had asked for. In this sense, the government was strengthened more than the COB.

Significantly, all the street demonstrations with their noisy miners’ explosives and inevitable confrontations with the police affected only the city of La Paz, although a few of the marches originated in El Alto and included teachers from that city. This time, El Alto was quiet and most schools kept their doors open, unlike the situation in La Paz. “Why?” I asked a group of youth. They answered, “Here, only a few people earn a salary.”

Thus, in spite of government efforts to reverse the unfavorable new situation of higher prices and prevalent protests, Pandora’s box appears to have been opened. It may be impossible to close it.

Xavier Albó is a linguist, anthropologist and Jesuit priest who has lived for many years in El Alto.

Republished from ReVista

Evo Morales Through the Prism of Wikileaks

Martín Sivak

A century ago, the U.S. ambassador to Bolivia suggested that coca-leaf consumption, a millenarian tradition among indigenous peoples, was the source of Bolivia’s problems. He proposed instead “plain American chewing gum for everyone.” The gum would be donated by U.S. companies and distributed by the embassy.

At the beginning of this century, another U.S. ambassador interpreted the 2002 elections in terms of the Wars on Terror and Drugs, calling for a massive vote against the coca-growers’ union leader, Evo Morales. This U.S. stance increased Morales’ share of the votes substantially, leading him unexpectedly to finish second. In the wake of the 2002 election, according to State Department documents, the U.S. embassy proposed strengthening opposition parties to offset the growing power in Bolivia of MAS, Morales’ party, calling him an “illegal coca agitator.” Neither the chewing gum strategy nor that of supporting political parties in decline managed to reduce coca consumption or dampen the popularity of Morales, who won the 2005 and 2009 presidential elections by a wide margin.

U.S. State Department documents, made public by Wikileaks and available on the website of Bolivia’s vice president (http://wikileaks.vicepresidencia.gob. bo), demonstrate that during Morales’ first presidency, the United States did not explicitly propose anything it could not achieve. The documents reveal what the United States was most worried about: the president’s anti-imperialist rhetoric: Cuban and Venezuelan presence and aid, the war on drugs, protection of U.S. investments in Bolivia—particularly in the mining sectorand the erosion of democracy.

In August 2007, a cable from the U.S. embassy in La Paz declared that democracy was “in danger,” adding that the support of democracy in Bolivia was the foremost priority. The embassy raised “serious questions” about Morales’ commitment to democracy—understood as separation of powers, checks and balances, an active political opposition and free press—“given his demonstrated impatience with compromise.” The cable defined him as a “leader with strong anti-democratic tendencies,” adding, “over the years he has been known to bribe, threaten and even physically intimidate anyone who stood in his way, including government officials, politicians and cocalero colleagues.” To the embassy, Morales’ project of change and renovation of the justice system exemplified his authoritarianism.

Thus, throughout the Wikileak documents, the United States appears as one of the last defenders of the ancien regime—that of pacted democracy and neoliberal reforms—which had been severely challenged in Evo Morales’ 2005 landslide election victory. Even groups that are moderately critical of Morales concede that the government has begun a process of putting into practice a plurinational state granting social inclusion and increased rights for indigenous and peasant sectors. In other words, democracy has been expanded.

This article attempts to point out the U.S. government’s difficulties in adjusting to new times and, above all, to what I call the “Bolivianization” of bilateral relations (I first used this term in “The Bolivianisation of Washington-La Paz Relations: Evo Morales’ Foreign Policy Agenda in Historical Context, in Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo in Bolivia, London: Institute for Study of the Americas, 2011).

Bolivianization

Starting with the 1952 National Revolution (nationalization of mines, universal suffrage and agrarian reform) to Morales’ inauguration, the United States’ grand narrative framed Washington-La Paz relations as part of the U.S. agenda—particularly the War against Communism, War on Drugs and War on Terror. After the turn of the century, the crisis of the regional neoliberal consensus marked the emergence in Bolivia of a radical political cycle with an ethno-cultural accent. This radical movement began with the 2000 Cochabamba Water War (the successful upheaval that prevented water price hikes by a multinational company, replacing it with a cooperative) and reached a peak with the Gas War in October 2003 (the rebellion against gas exports to the United States via Chile that forced President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada to resign). These radical protests introduced a new tone to the notion of national sovereignty and control of natural resources, which proved to be crucial in redefining the relationship with the United States.

The Morales administration has established a new domestic agenda strongly driven by these two wars, especially the Gas War, and by the cocaleros’ active rejection of U.S. intervention with coca crop eradication through the War on Drugs. The government has significantly reduced U.S. participation in the fashioning of public policy—especially in the areas of economics, defense and security, and in the war on drugs. It has rejected free trade agreements proposed by the United States and has proposed to Washington a bilateral relationship based on the communal concept of reciprocity.

The first symbolic step in this reciprocity was to require U.S. tourists to purchase a visa (Brazil does the same). At the same time, the government has established regional alliances with Cuba and Venezuela in the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), and with the rest of South American countries through the trade agreements known as UNASUR and MERCOSUR. It has also signed trade agreements with China and Iran, among others.

The president’s anti-U.S. discourse—yet another novelty in bilateral relations—is the most frequent complaint of State Department officials, according to Wikileaks. “We also have to urge the Morales government to temper its rhetoric if it is indeed interested in improved bilateral ties,” says one of the documents. In another, Ambassador David Greenlee warns Vice President Alvaro García Linera that “anti-American remarks may damage Bolivia’s chances for an APTDEA extension.” (APTDEA grants trade preferences to Bolivia in exchange for its commitment to the War on Drugs; formally, it does not include the issue of “rhetoric.”) The cables maintain that Morales’ anti-U.S. stance is being used to cover up domestic problems, leaving out any question about historic reasons for such attitudes in Bolivia.

Echoes of Terrorism, Cold War and War on Drugs

Foreign policy has also been “Bolivianized” by how the Morales administration interprets the new U.S. intervention in Bolivia in terms of domestic dynamics, particularly the conflict between the elites in the Santa Cruz area and the national government. The Bolivian government asserts that the United States belonged to a broad coalition led by these elites that are bent not on saving Bolivia from Communism or terrorism, but from the MAS government agenda. The Morales government expelled U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg in September 2008, accusing him of being the leader of the opposition headquartered in Santa Cruz that seeks to overturn the government. Although no definitive proof supports this accusation, the government was able to create a narrative that enjoys a broad social consensus in Bolivia, in which the United States is seen as intervening at the heart of national politics.

In the days following the expulsion of the ambassador, relates one cable, then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the Spanish ambassador to the United States concurred that Morales was “out of his league.” Months later, in a confusing operation in Santa Cruz, Bolivian security forces killed a group of hitmen allegedly contracted by members of the regional elite to defend Santa Cruz or to obtain its secession from the country. The U.S. embassy’s version of the events, as revealed by Wikileaks, is that the Bolivian government itself hired some of these hitmen and tortured the two survivors of the operation. The source, whose name was blacked out on the document, earned the confidence of the officials, who titled their cable “Gob [government of Bolivia] involved in Terror.” In this fashion, the Morales administration received the label of “terrorist.”

The role Venezuela and Cuba play in the Bolivian government also has a dominant place in the Wikileak cables. A February 2, 2007 embassy cable is subtitled “One Place Where We Are Not Big Brother.” The cable charges that “Cuban and Venezuelan advice, interference, and assistance continue to be of serious concern. Cuban doctors and newly inaugurated hospitals bring medical care to isolated communities. Venezuela has agreed to purchase Bolivian soy, has provided microcredit financing to small businesses, has donated tractors to Bolivian farmers, and has funded community radio stations to broadcast the Gob’s messages…The Venezuelan programs receive frequent public acclaim from Bolivia’s poor.”

The presence of the supposed big brother who controls everything brings echoes of the Cold War. The “twins”—Cuba and Venezuela—have replaced the former Soviet Union as rivals to the United States for big brother status. Venezuela is seen as a guide and inspiration for Bolivian policy; a cable of August 2007 states, “Evo seems to be following in Chávez’s footsteps.” As an example, it cites a draft of the Bolivian constitution (“financed by Venezuelan and Spanish advisors”) that contains a clause for indefinite reelection. In the document entitled “Venezuela- Bolivia: how much fire behind the smoke,” Morales is described as acting like a “smitten school girl” when he appears in public with the Venezuelan leader.

Even though Chávez is Bolivia’s ally and offers the country economic assistance, his influence in political terms is much less than what people in Washington and even Caracas think. The notion of the mentor relationship, in any case, underestimates Morales more than it overestimates Chávez’s powers. This mentorship tries to explain the trajectory of the Morales government through the lens of Venezuelan and Cuban influence, completely overlooking the domestic reasons for the radical cycle that began in 2000.

The so-called War on Drugs is a central theme in Washington-La Paz relations since the 1980s. The United States sees the eradication of coca leaf as indispensable and for several decades managed to convince Bolivian governments to share this point of view. The Morales government has implemented a different policy: voluntary eradication of crops and social control (through the cocalero union) of the considerable legal production of coca leaf (a 40x40 plot of land per family and 49 acres in total). It has allowed less participation by the United States (in fact, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency was expelled on charges of conspiring against the Bolivian government). The government strategy has not impeded the growth of coca leaf production (about 75 acres—25 above the legal limit), but it has obtained good results in the area of interdiction, a fact recognized in the U.S. documents themselves.

The United States subtly questions the program of voluntary eradication, particularly noting that Morales talks of counternarcotics as a “shared responsibility,” and expresses its concern for the increased production of coca leaf and cocaine exports. At least in the cables revealed by Wikileaks, the United States does not blame Morales for the drug trafficking in Bolivia, as it alleged in the 1990s. It merely criticizes the government strategy.

The Morales government has looked for some continuity in the Washington-La Paz relationship despite significant ruptures. One example is an attempt to reclaim Bolivian certification (tariff preferences for Bolivian exports in exchange for progress in the so-called War on Drugs). But Bolivia was decertified a few days before the U.S. ambassador was expelled.

The second continuity is that Bolivia keeps receiving U.S. aid. The documents show that some $90 million were funneled to Bolivia through USAID to “further social and economic inclusion of Bolivia’s historically marginalized indigenous groups and to support democratic institutions and process, including decentralized governance…” The details of how this money was distributed are unavailable to both the Bolivian government and U.S. taxpayers.

The Morales government has insisted that the money should be channeled only through the Bolivian state, rejecting the possibility that local governments and non-government agencies receive these funds. In meetings with U.S. officials, as noted in the cables, Morales seems to be demanding that aid be unconditional, accusing the officials of conspiracy, while at the same time thanking them for their help during recent floods and alternately telling them that he has received thousands of letters from all over the country asking that USAID be expelled. It is a style that tends to disconcert officials from the United States and many other countries.

In a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon in August 2008, Morales asked for the extradition of former president Gonzalo “Goni” Sánchez de Lozada, who has been charged with responsibility for seventy deaths in the Gas War. “Send us back Goni and you will become the mayor of El Alto,” he told Shannon in perhaps the only joke contained in the documents. In November 2009, Shannon became U.S. ambassador to Brazil: everything indicates that the United States will not extradite Goni and Shannon will not govern El Alto.

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About Martín Sivak’s Evo Morales: The Extraordinary Rise of the First Indigenous President of Bolivia

  • "Evo Morales is already a historic figure. The best known Bolivian since Bolivar, he is a political leader with a difference because he won office after years of popular mobilization with an unprecedented mandate for political, economic and cultural change. Evo's presidency is the product of mass struggle, but as Martin Sivak's vivid study shows, the president is also a remarkable man. Sivak has plainly gained unusual access through winning Evo's trust, and this is an understandably sympathetic study. But it is also independently-minded, insightful and attentive to the details that do not flatter. This true insider-account is indispensable for understanding 21st-century Bolivia, and it will unsettle a good many easy convictions on both sides of the fence." — James Dunkerley, author of Bolivia: Revolution and the Power of History in the Present
  • "A vivid and moving portrayal of one of the most fascinating figures of our times, this book is also an entertaining romp through recent Latin American history. Like Morales himself, this intimate story of his life, from Aymara shepherd to powerful President, constantly surprises and enthralls us." — Ariel Dorfman, author of Death and the Maiden
  • "Nearly five centuries after the Spanish conquest of Bolivia, race-based slavery still remains in force in many places in that high, wondrous country. This is why Evo Morales, along with the indigenous-rights activists, environmentalists and trade unionists who helped elect him, matter enormously for the health of democracy in the Americas. And I can think of no better guide to the hopes Evo represents, and the change he has managed to achieve, than Martín Sivak, one of Latin America's most respected non-fiction writers. Sivak's meticulously observed biography is important and compelling." — Greg Grandin, author of Fordlandia and Empire's Workshop
  • For the Spanish Edition: "The narrative force of a novel and the seriousness of the best journalism." — Tomás Eloy Martínez, author of Santa Evita

Martín Sivak is the author of four books about Bolivia, including a biography of Hugo Banzer (El dictador elegido) and a portrait of Evo Morales (Jefazo, published in English as Evo Morales: The Extraordinary Rise of the First Indigenous President of Bolivia [Palgrave, 2010]. Sivak is completing a doctorate in Latin American History at New York University (NYU).

Republished from ReVista