The Culture of Democracy and Bolivia’s Indigenous Movements (Part I)

Robert Albro

Abstract - This article describes the participation of Bolivia’s indigenous movements in encompassing popular protest coalitions of the last five years. Pointing to the importance of cultural heritage in current social movement efforts to revitalize Bolivian democracy, this argument examines the importance of the ‘terms of recognition’ in the negotiation of the very meaning of democratic participation, between the traditional political class and popular protesters, but also within protesting coalitions. As both indigenous and popular traditions of struggle increasingly make common cause, Bolivia’s indigenous movements are providing the cultural resources that frame the terms of popular protest. At the same time, the terms of indigenous identity are also changing form, becoming more available to growing urban-indigenous and non-indigenous popular social sectors now willing to claim or reclaim an indigenous heritage. This article also explores key transnational and national networks now involved in this transformation of the terms of indigenous cultural heritage, making it the basis of an alternative democratic public in Bolivia.

---------------------------------------------------------------------

‘Looking back, we will move forward.’ Carlos Mamani Condori (1992), Aymara activist and historian

‘We need a space where the people can talk not about the past, but the future.’ Oscar Olivera (2004), social movement spokesperson

On 6 June 2005, Bolivian president Carlos Mesa resigned for the second time, citing his inability to govern while mired in another round of largescale social mobilizations that had paralyzed the country since mid-May. Mesa’s government was beset by over 800 protests during his year and a half in office (Dangl, 2005). The protests of May and June were touched off by the passage of a new hydrocarbons law that did not grant national control of gas reserves to the satisfaction of popular leaders. Sparring with police, approximately 15,000 people filled the Plaza Murillo in La Paz on 30 May. On 1 June mostly Aymara peasants blockaded access to La Paz. Meanwhile, in the city of Cochabamba, peasants and factory workers led a massive march through the city center. By 4 June all of Bolivia’s major highways were blockaded at 55 points throughout the country, bringing it to an economic stand-still and provoking an exasperated Mesa to step down.

As it has been since the first Water War of 2000, public assemblies convened by social movement leaders were instrumental in the run up to Mesa’s resignation, including a referendum on 23 May (see Gomez, 2005; Martin, 2005). After three weeks of strikes, marches, and road blocks, on the day of Mesa’s resignation hundreds of thousands of people converged on the center of La Paz, the capital city. And in what became a massive open-air forum (popularly called a cabildo abierto), the call went up to found a new ‘Popular Assembly’.[1] The proposed assembly would be composed of delegates from indigenous communities and urban neighborhood associations, along with worker, trade, and agrarian unions. Delegates would be elected in meetings of each grassroots organization according to their respective and preexistent ‘customary’ procedures (usos y costumbres).[2] The assembly’s first order of business would be to address two popular calls repeatedly raised in recent years: for the nationalization of Bolivia’s natural gas and for a referendum to redraft a national constitution that better represents the rights of the country’s indigenous majority. As I argue here, such efforts illustrate a deepening entanglement of indigenous with national-popular traditions of struggle (see also Hylton, 2005a). A former vice-president, Mesa himself came to power in October 2003 only after his predecessor, Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, fled the country in the face of outrage over bloody efforts to control similar protests throughout that year, resulting in at least 60 deaths and hundreds injured (see Ledebur, 2003: 2). It is estimated that a crowd of up to 500,000 people assembled in La Paz the day Sánchez de Lozada’s helicopter took off. Prior to his own resignation Mesa’s exasperation was apparent, as he declared the El Alto protests to be a ‘carnival of lunatics’ (Mamani, 2005). The recent travails and premature end of Mesa’s government exemplify the kinds of concerns cited in a 2004 report by the United Nations Development Program, titled ‘Democracy in Latin America: Toward a Citizen’s Democracy’, which somberly concluded that democracy in the region is at best ‘fragile’.[3]

The almost routine inability of presidents to finish out their elected terms of office in Bolivia, and elsewhere, has renewed debate over the status and meaning of democracy for the region’s popular majority. The landslide election to the presidency in December 2005 of Evo Morales – leader of the coca growers and one of Bolivia’s more militant social movements – has raised fears among foreign observers that Bolivia’s democracy is heading in the wrong direction. Until very recently the US State Department identi- fied Morales as an ‘illegal coca agitator’ and as the leader of the ‘radial MAS’ (his political party) – part of a pattern of labeling Bolivia’s indigenous- dominated social movements as ‘anti-systemic’ (Lindsay, 2005: 6).

Bolivia continues to be a litmus test for the ongoing success of democratization in Latin America. The phenomenal popularity of Morales, as leader of a movement long in the cross-hairs of the US-backed War on Drugs in Bolivia, makes it increasingly clear that the terms of democracy in this country mean different things to foreign and national policy-makers and to the grassroots groups that have been actively participating in the largescale protests of the last six years.

What are the democratic stakes in Bolivia? This is not as straightforward a question as former presidents would have us believe. In his analysis of contemporary Mexican democracy, Matthew Gutmann (2002: xviii) draws attention to the imprecise ‘elusiveness of the term democracy’, combining as it does a wide range of aspirations and multiple meanings. Observers of Bolivia’s current paroxysms describe the present crisis as competing concepts of democracy ‘locked in fierce combat’ (Hylton, 2005b). And protesting coalitions speak and act in the name of a ‘real democracy’, in their view betrayed by government caretakers. Bolivia’s predicament illustrates what James Holston and Teresa Caldeira (1998) have called ‘disjunctive democracy’, which draws attention to the daily experiences of democracy, its variable depth and uneven distribution, currently lived in Bolivia in unbalanced, irregular, and increasingly contradictory ways. Distinguishing the state’s caretakers from the state itself, the object of Bolivia’s current protests is to revitalize the very terms of democratization. As I develop here, this includes expanding criteria of recognition for inclusion in Bolivia’s democratic project, renovating the collective political subject of a national democratic process, and dramatically framing the cultural terms of this subject as a specific moral community.

Given the apparent exhaustion of the neoliberal state in Bolivia, along with political scientist Patrick Deneen (2004: 27–8), the present analysis of popular protest efforts seeks to redress the potential ‘presence of tragedy embedded in democratic overconfidence’ as a ‘cosmic optimism’ in principles of liberal democracy characterized by an absolutist and uncritical faith in a fully liberal and democratic future. At a moment of rejection of neoliberalism as state policy in Bolivia, the democratic alternatives of popular protest movements also self-consciously reject the ‘natural’ equation of the free market with democratic freedoms (Paley, 2001). In order to better appreciate the range of democratic aspirations in contemporary Bolivia, in what follows I examine contributions of Bolivia’s indigenous movements to encompassing popular mobilizations of protest in this country. I unpack how an Andean cultural heritage works as a constructive resource for the ‘democratic’ discourse and practice of Bolivia’s social movements, which seek to re-imagine and to realign the growing gulf between the experiences of actually existing democracy and the unrepresentative institution-building of democratization. I sketch out how cultural heritage is used as a political resource for popular coalition-building and in an effort by social movements to frame an alternative democratic public outside of Bolivia’s ‘politics as usual’.

Vicissitudes of neoliberal democracy

Eduardo Gamarra (1994: 10–11) has described the application of neoliberal democracy in Bolivia since 1985 as a negotiation between ‘technocrats, managers, and government officials’, on the one hand, and ‘distinct social sectors attempting to find a niche’ on the other. Reformists promoted a conception of democracy largely compatible with ‘effective and efficient management of the economy’ while the country’s popular sectors pursued the democratic promise of greater access to the policy-making process. These were different conceptions of democracy, with the goals of ‘order’ and ‘inclusion’ respectively. What Gamarra (1996: 97) labelled Bolivia’s ‘pacted democracy’ functioned through political party coalition building toward legislative majorities, institutionalizing a ‘largely executive centered’ and ‘undemocratic’ approach to governance with no room for ‘open debate about economic policy’. Political parties convened national ‘dialogues’, advertised as public referendums while functioning as a unilateral means to promote the policies of structural adjustment. Historically in Bolivia dialogue has been an executive tactic used to isolate social sectors from each other and to paper over the sharp fissures in democratic representation. During the 1990s, national dialogues organized by traditional political parties exhibited the form of dialogue without the function, as policy exchanges reproducing the ‘logic of forced negotiation’ (Laserna and Ortego, 2003: 5). Throughout this period, however, Bolivia’s pacted democracy illustrated a resilient ability to absorb diverse political interests into the formal political fold. But since 2000 when crises came to a head, the government has increasingly reverted to a ‘dialogue of rifles’, as one editorialist ironically noted (Puente Calvo, 2003).[4]

The general reaction to the upsurge of indigenous mobilization within Bolivia’s ‘traditional political class’ – as it is called – has been predictable. ‘Democracy’, they regularly warn, is ‘under siege’. This includes the charge that Bolivia’s recent upheavals have been driven by left-wing demagogues manipulating heterogeneous groups of the uneducated, poor, indigenous, and disillusioned (see Laserna, 2003). For unsympathetic international observers, this quickly turns into an account of protests dominated by the ‘perverse annual tradition’ of Bolivian ‘mobs’ (see Fantini, 2005). In a Washington Post editorial after his ouster, Sánchez de Lozada (2003) charged: ‘Mob rule overwhelmed respect for Bolivia’s democratic process.’ And since then the ex-president has kept up a steady drumbeat of allegations associating Bolivia’s social movements with unsavory and undemocratic foreign patrons, from Colombia’s FARC guerrillas or Venezuela’s Chávez to a resurgent Shining Path in Peru and to Cuba’s Castro (see Los Tiempos, 2005). Most recently he has insisted that Bolivia now runs the imminent risk of being transformed into a ‘new Afghanistan’ (see Bolpress, 2005), a comparison meant to suggest the potential disintegration of Bolivia into a fundamentalist narco-state. One sinister outcome of such charges has been a growing concern among US policy-makers that South America’s indigenous movements constitute a potential criminal and terrorist insurgency best dealt with through an expansion of the ‘war on terror’ (Feiler, 2004; González, 2005; Hylton, 2003). Equations drawn between foreign agitators, home-grown demagogues, and the threat of mob violence displace the agency of protest efforts from protesters themselves and eschew any need to acknowledge the self-consciously ‘democratic’ discourse and practice characteristic of the mobilization of Bolivia’s social movements. Bolivia’s traditional political class understands the promise of liberal democracy as the reigning fantasy of modern prosperity. This conviction is often expressed among Latin American elites, and well represented by one of the more vocal advocates of liberal democracy from South America, the celebrated writer Mario Vargas Llosa, himself an erstwhile presidential candidate in neighboring Peru. In a characteristic statement at an international seminar in Bogotá, Colombia, in 2003, titled ‘The Threats to Democracy in Latin America’, Vargas Llosa categorically singled out current indigenous movements as a threat to democracy because of ‘the political and social disorder they generate’. But he went further, insisting that indigenous movements are categorically ‘incompatible with civilization and development’.

Vargas Llosa’s many assertions about the anti-democratic nature of indigenous peoples in the Andes have deep, and well-publicized, roots in a specific kind of past. His point of view has been spelled out in the Vargas Llosa Report (unpublished, but discussed in Vargas Llosa, 1983), the result of a commission organized to investigate the deaths of eight reporters at the hands of highland peasants early in the Shining Path war, later the basis for his magical realist novel Death in the Andes (1997). The Peruvian anthropologist Enrique Mayer (1991) insightfully analyzed the Vargas Llosa Report, which described indigenous Peru as ‘traditional, archaic, secret, and frequently in conflict with official law’ (Vargas Llosa, 1983: 32). As Mayer shows, and as Vargas Llosa’s most recent comments continue to confirm, this ex-presidential candidate imagines the Andes in terms of two contained and largely antagonistic cultural worlds – an indigenous ‘deep’ Andes and a modern Andes in which a ‘culture of human rights and democracy’ thrives.[5] In Vargas Llosa’s version, a backward looking and collectively enacted ancestral or ‘customary law’ – in direct conflict with ‘official’ state law – insures that so-called traditional peoples in the Andes remain stubbornly, and ignorantly, opposed to modern democracy.

Vargas Llosa’s position has been reprised during recent struggles in Bolivia in a variety of ways. Analysts critical of the social movement effort have pointed to the ways that urbanites of indigenous descent ‘idealize the rural and communitarian tradition of their ancestors in order to oppose it to a present in which they have achieved less than they hope’ (Laserna, 2003). In a speech after his removal from office,[6] Sánchez de Lozada charged that Bolivia’s social movements ‘don’t believe in democracy’, and he contrasted orderly ‘representative democracy’ to an ‘authoritarian communalistic democracy’ that is based on the supposed ‘assemblies’ of Bolivia’s indigenous societies. For Sánchez de Lozada, liberal democracy currently is waging a battle for survival with ethnic ‘collas’ (highland Indians), a social sector that ‘rejects modernizing itself and which clings to archaic notions’ (Bolpress, 2005). This view also prevails in the official response to lynchings, a kind of vigilante ‘community justice’ which, according to police authorities, is carried out ‘under the supposed umbrella of customary law [usos y costumbres] and which deepens the loss of state authority’ (Los Tiempos, 2004), where this authority is epitomized by the orderly consolidation of state institutions.[7] Political elites, in short, refer to the collective indigenous politics of face-to-face assembly as a point of departure for characterizing marked cultural practice as decidedly undemocratic, located in a past with no productive relationship to a democratic present or future.

Multicultural state democracy and social movements

Yet throughout the 1990s the Bolivian state invested collective cultural claims with constructive potential, in part through legislative interventions of indigenous peoples themselves. Representing the South American Indian Council (founded in 1980), Tomás Condori (2001: 43–5) participated in the drafting and ratification of the International Labor Organization’s convention No. 169, concerned with indigenous and tribal peoples and adopted in 1989. ILO convention No. 169 calls for states to work toward the full realization of cultural rights, which includes state recognition of the authority of customary law. In 1994 and partly through the interventions of katarista historian Victor Hugo Cárdenas as vice-president, the Bolivian government followed suit, instituting a controversial Popular Participation Law (PPL) that offers new possibilities for social inclusion in terms of the constitutional redefinition of the nation as ‘multiethnic and pluricultural’. The PPL was a sharp break with Bolivian state cultural policies dating from the 1952 Revolution, which relegated any indigenous future to assimilation into a desirable culturally and ethnically mixed middle class, referred to as a mestizaje. Under this regime citizens’ rights conformed to the ‘model of the mestizo citizen’, which Rivera Cusicanqui (2004: 21) has described as an individual ‘consumer and producer of merchandize, a speaker of Spanish and an aspirant to a Western ideal of civilization’.

The PPL, however, granted full legal recognition to already existing traditional and popular local political organization and leadership, according to what are called a group’s ‘uses, customs, and statutory dispositions’ (usos y costumbres), or customary law. In the process the downsizing state handed over resources and decision-making to the local municipality. With the state’s recognition of ‘uses and customs’, the PPL has magnified the importance of cultural heritage as a basis to advance political and legal claims. Supported by related legislation, such as the 1996 update of Bolivia’s agrarian reform law recognizing the pre-existent claims of originario (highland Indian) and of indígena (lowland Indian) communal landholdings, the application of customary law through the PPL established legal precedent based on continuity with the past. But the combined political, legal, and performative implications of heritage make it more than just the ‘retrospective expression of culture’ (Brown, 2005: 43) for Bolivian protesters.

Specifically, Bolivia’s multicultural legislation depends upon an understanding of ‘heritage’ as ‘patrimony’ (patrimonio). The term – patrimonio – is often on the lips of Bolivia’s indigenous activists. Bolivia’s legal process of state decentralization grants local municipal ‘control over the exploitation of their patrimony’ (patrimonio propio), while also ‘promoting cultural development and the defense of autochthonous cultural values’ (Ley Orgánica de Municipalidades, article 39). The etymology of ‘patrimonio’ derives from the medieval Spanish legal parlance stipulating property inherited from one’s father. Specifying rules of family estate inheritance, for modern Bolivia patrimony refers to inherited legal jurisdictional rights over land. The combined effects of this state-driven multicultural legislation, then, has been to formulate ‘popular participation’ in terms of a correspondence of ‘customary law’ – assumed to be a unitary set of meanings and practices – to separate and discrete traditional cultural units labeled ‘territorial base organizations’. As a condition of state recognition, the ‘pastness’ of indigenous heritage potentially limits direct participation by indigenous peoples in the political realities of the present, by circumscribing their political relevance within what the state imagines to be the boundaries of their ancestral territories. Understood in this way, multicultural legislation illustrates the agency of the state in setting what Povinelli (2002: 3) has called the ‘limits of recognition’.

Bolivia’s recent developments, however, complicate this picture in a variety of ways, suggesting how indigenous and popular movements use international and state-based rights instruments to transform the meaning and ground of citizen participation. The terms of legal circumscription of indigenous identity – of the state’s own condition of political recognition – are being appropriated to new ends by protesting coalitions. And during the Water War of 2000 the rallying point for this multi-sector and largely urban movement was the defense of the traditional use and distribution of water as a collective cultural right based on usos y costumbres (see Albro, 2005a; Laurie et al., 2002), which it forced the government to recognize with a legal amendment. Customary law continues to inform large-scale protest efforts. Indigenous movements in Bolivia have sought to expand the state’s limited concept of ‘land’, understood simply as a factor in agricultural production, to a larger conception of ‘territory’ as the location for the social reproduction of collective identity. During the Gas War of 2003, protesters understood the defense of Bolivia’s gas as a question of the ‘recuperation’ of the country’s ‘national patrimony’. Such a claim rested directly on the precedent of the pre-existent ‘territorial sovereignty’ of indigenous people’s communal land holdings, a position most developed by Felipe Quispe and the national agrarian union, the CSUTCB. Quispe has consistently promoted a traditional conception of Aymara land use defined by a culturally specific relationship of ‘the people’ to the ‘land’, which Quispe refers to as usos y costumbres, including the soil, water, air, and subsoil resources (like gas). The insistent popular call for a new constitutional assembly to ‘refound’ the nation – perhaps the most frequently advanced demand over the last five years – specifies that representatives to the proposed assembly be elected directly through the usos y costumbres of a given group or organization (see CENDA et al., 2004: 2). Popular representatives frame the terms for a new constitution using the convening power of customary law.

In the last five years strife between Bolivia’s social movements and government caretakers has unfolded within the gap between the assertion and the recognition of the claims advanced by Bolivia’s popular sectors. This contentious gap is at once a space of cultural, political, and legal negotiation for different terms of recognition within the multicultural state. If Charles Taylor (1994) brought to our attention the importance of the ‘politics of recognition’ in multicultural states, recently Arjun Appadurai (2004) has suggested we pay more attention to the negotiated ‘terms of recognition’, in this case the instrumental potential of the legal authority of cultural heritage. Using Appadurai’s (2004: 62) parlance, in order to articulate new democratic aspirations, Bolivia’s social movements are staking a claim to ‘recover the future as a cultural capacity’. If we can point to the ways that law and the legal process help to constitute ‘the facts’ of cultural identities (see Cowan et al., 2001: 11), in this case the idiom of customary law, or usos y costumbres, has been used by Bolivia’s social movements to transform the limiting political precondition of ‘pastness’ to transcend a politics of irreconcilables through a dialogue between the state’s multicultural legislation and the expressive, instrumental, and constructive potential of local cultural practice.

The politics of association

If the admixture of social sectors, indigenous, or popular groups is not always the same, a shared politics of assembly (política asambleística) has become a potent unifying strategy of social movements in Bolivia since at least 2000, leading to the organization of successive multi-sector coalitions (García Linera, 2001, 2003). Re-establishing a popular capacity to intervene in the public life of the nation, coalition-building has facilitated the meeting of social sectors, logistical planning for collective mobilizations, shared drafting of statements and agreements, and restored a more direct connection between political deliberation and action in contrast to traditional political parties. Political theorist and current vice-president Álvaro García Linera (2004: 73) highlights the nested relationship between the broad-based protest efforts and these more local plenary organizations: The multitude is an association of associations in which each person who is present in the public act of meeting does not speak for himself or herself but rather for a local collective entity to which he or she is accountable. García Linera’s description of protesting coalitions as an ‘association of associations’ suggests an effort to bridge the vertical disconnect of the state with society – popularly expressed as a desconfianza (disenchantment) for the years of democratic consolidation – with the local experiences of the politically familiar, immediate, and everyday.

As Sian Lazar (2006) helps to make clear with her description of the central role of residential associations, worker, and trade unions in the mobilizations in El Alto during the Gas War of 2003, local associational life has been the experiential ground for collaborations among popular social sectors. As Lazar shows, neighborhood committees (or juntas vecinales) and trade unions (gremios) at once make direct claims on the state and serve as the means for the state to channel resources to the local level. These ‘base organizations’ can also substitute for the state as collective political subjects (2006: 197), as with the civic strikes that closed markets and the organization of autonomous defense committees in 2003 (see Hylton, 2004). As confrontations mounted in 2003 and again in 2005, local juntas, gremios, and sindicatos collaborated to organize barricades, vigils, and communal cooking. Rather than an exception, the coordinated mobilization of ‘base organizations’ is an intensified expression of the everyday organic life of neighborhood associations in El Alto, including routine participation in meetings, demonstrations, civic parades, and other collective responsibilities. People’s daily associational commitments add up to a popular experience of democratic participation significantly different from the typical assumptions of voting in a formal political party system.

Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui (1990) has written of the differences between what she calls ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘ayllu democracy’[8] in Bolivia, from the perspective of Norte de Potosí. For Rivera Cusicanqui, each works on a fundamentally different basis. Ayllu democracy operates as nested Chinese boxes, from the smallest residential unit (or cabildo), through intermediate levels, to that of a regional federation. Fundamental ayllu principles of community-based direct democracy include the requirement of service, a rotating leadership, extensive consultation, with the goals of communal consensus and an equitable distribution of resources (1990: 102–3). These principles, Rivera Cusicanqui is clear, are in direct conflict with those of liberal democracy, based on the individual citizen as both rational and proprietary, and as the logical subject of national economic advancement (1990: 117). Most importantly for our discussion is Rivera Cusicanqui’s assertion that organized agrarian unions, particularly since 1952, are ‘foreign, imposed structures which prolong and reproduce colonial forms of domination over the ayllus’ (1990: 109). If superficially comparable local associations, she tells us, ayllus and unions promote largely incompatible models of political subjecthood. This is a claim, however, that makes increasingly less sense for an expanding ‘urban indigenous’ experience (e.g. Riveros and Alvarado, 2001), where the popular affinities between local associations serve as a collaborative political starting-point. To understand the persistent fact of large-scale social mobilizations in Bolivia over the last five years, as I have argued elsewhere (Albro, 2005a), we should recognize the agency of a ‘plural popular’ subject rather than privilege any particular culture or class identity.

This includes recognizing the extent to which the ‘networks of solidarity’ of El Alto’s associational life articulate a ‘rural-urban Aymara’ experience, emergent out of the migratory history and largely unplanned rapid growth of El Alto (see Sandoval and Sostres, 1989). Pablo Stefanoni (2004: 2–3) has described how the protracted efforts by in-migrants to obtain basic services such as water, paved roads, electricity, and trash pick-up transformed juntas vecinales into an instrument for the ‘politics of vital necessities’.

Evolving from associations of renters and clients of government land grant programs in the 1940s and 1950s, the communitarian and territory based politics of in-migrating Aymara agriculturalists transformed juntas vecinales throughout the city’s rapid growth in the 1970s and 1980s. These included an ongoing affiliation with one’s community of origin, the use of the assembly, such principles of exchange as ayni (that is, the strict exchange of equivalents), and the usage of kinship and fictive kinship (or compadrazgo) to organize collective participation in neighborhood improvement projects. But now rather than a given community, these cultural terms of engagement are focused on the urban category of vecino (neighbor).

Juntas were once again transformed after 1985 with the arrival of ‘relocalized’ ex-miners and their experiences with the vanguardist tradition of the mining unions (Gill, 2000: 67–85). Far from being a unitary expression of the interests of distinct social sectors, El Alto’s base organizations compose overlapping arenas of encounter and dialogue for the historical and generational experiences of the associational politics of multiple social sectors, brought together in moments of protest.

These experiences encompass the local political institutions of rural Aymara communities with urban renters’ and trade associations, together with the experiences of radical mining unions, through an organic associational life that is commensurate with ‘Andean’ principles of leadership, accountability, community service, collective work, redistribution, and consanguinity.[9] Elsewhere I have described a similar convergence of diverse traditions of local association for the six coca grower federations of the Chapare, another central social movement protagonist of recent years (see Albro, 2005b). When characterizing Bolivia’s large-scale social mobilizations as the agency of a plural popular subject, I want to point to the translatable experiences of associational politics, which have brought the rural, the urban, indigenous heritage, and the leftist histories of popular labor movements, ex-miners, and ex-peasants, into constructive realignments of kinship, reciprocity, exchange, solidarity, and mutual recognition. The politics of assembly is a dialogical catalyst for cultural translatability and mutual recognition across comparable domains of popular experience, facilitating coalition-building across formerly distinct indigenous and popular struggles in the post-neoliberal period.

I do not want to minimize evident regional and rural–urban differences. But, to insist, as Rivera Cusicanqui does, on irreducibly different origins for ‘indigenous’ and ‘mestizo-creole’ political projects, and to interpret local union politics primarily as an extension of internal colonialism in Bolivia, makes it difficult to recognize the popular coalitional politics of the present. If not unaffected by problems of hierarchy, corruption, and the abuses of power, local associations employ a direct democracy that is transparent, horizontal, bottom-up, and non-hierarchical, with the right of all to speak (pedir la palabra). Whether or not these traits are always evident in practice, in principle they represent a more direct application of the popular will and an alternative to the failures of democracy as practiced through political parties. During Bolivia’s recent turmoil the ‘organic life’ of residential, indigenous, and trade associations has galvanized an alternative collective politics outside of the political party system and as a basis for cross-sector cooperation.

This is not the case only in El Alto. A union leader characteristically began a meeting I attended in Cochabamba in 2001 saying, ‘We are here to practice democracy. It is not a question of impositions. . . . We must talk, argue, ask, and reach agreement.’ Associational life figures so importantly as a model of and for popular broad-based coalitional efforts because it composes the most immediate experience of collective political action, serving as the ‘dialogical ground’[10] for multiple historical encounters with the negligent state and alternative considerations of ‘the desirable form of our collective life’, in the words of Oscar Olivera (Olivera and Lewis, 2004: 36). Bolivia’s popular majority conceives of participatory democracy as a dialogical public of collective interests. Far from antagonistic to this process, ayllu democracy is one constructive cultural resource available for breathing life into this restorative desire.

Robert Albro currently teaches anthropology at George Washington University and serves as Chair of the Committee for Human Rights of the American Anthropological Association. His current research explores the relationships between transnational indigenous and cultural rights advocacy networks, discourses of cultural citizenship, and global cultural policymaking.

Republished from Critique of Anthropology, 2006; Vol 26; No. 4, pp 387-410

-------------------------------------------------------------

Notes

[1] In part this call is a reference to Bolivia’s 1970–1 Popular Assembly government of radical general Juan José Torres, which attempted to establish an alternative popular government, led by radical mining unionism and consisting primarily of worker and peasant organizations. An effort to radically transform society from below, the 1971 Popular Assembly succumbed to ideological differences of the left, giving way to the dictatorship of Hugo Banzer (see Dunkerley, 1987: 155–72).
[2] Election by ‘usos y costumbres’ – where each social sector would elect a representative according to prevailing customary law for that sector – was also part of the proposals advanced by many groups for this year’s constitutional referendum.
[3] The UNDP report was not exceptional in this regard. Coining such terms as ‘democracy deficit’, ‘low intensity democracy’, and ‘democracy lite’, a veritable cottage industry of writers has proclaimed the inadequacies of democratic consolidation in Latin America
since the 1990s, declaring it to be ‘incomplete’, ‘shallow’, ‘skin-deep’, ‘hybrid’, ‘imperfect’, ‘illiberal’, ‘unconsolidated’, ‘paralyzed’, ‘unsettling’, ‘destabilizing’, ‘divided’, ‘inchoate’, and ‘disjunctive’ (e.g. Aguëro, 1998; Dresser, 2004; Holston and Caldeira, 1998; Paley, 2002).
[4] Carlos Mesa was an exception to this, repeatedly underscoring his refusal to commit the same error as his predecessor by using state violence to maintain social control. However, during a public statement on 21 June 2005
, Bolivia’s ambassador to the US emphasized that one of the first tasks of the new administration would be to ‘regain the state’s monopoly over the use of force’ ( Jaime Aparicio Otero, public address at the Inter-American Dialogue, Washington, DC).
[5] An analogous distinction between a ‘deep’ and ‘modern’ Andes
was the basis for a debate among Andeanist scholars in the early 1990s regarding the status of ‘lo andino’ (explicitly Andean belief and practice) in modern Andean nationstates (see Starn, 1991, 1994).
[6] Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, public address at American University, Washington
, DC, 5 November 2003.
[7] Daniel Goldstein (2004) has written extensively on the significance of lynching for the peripheral urban community of Villa Pagador in Cochabamba
, which he understands as a spectacular communicative performance by community members to contest their social marginalization from the benefits of urban life.
[8] The term ‘ayllu’ refers to a uniquely Andean ‘social, ritual, and political formation’ (Orta, 2001: 198). There are many definitions of the term. For a thorough summary of scholarship on this key Andean concept, see Weismantel (2006).
[9] As Lazar (2006: 194) and others have made clear, the democratic organization of local associations in Bolivia
also has authoritarian features, most evident in obligatory participation in protest actions. The fact that people can be fined if they do not participate is often used as evidence for the ‘undemocratic’ nature of local associations.
[10] For more discussion of the ‘dialogical ground’ of culture see Tedlock and Mannheim
’s (1995) excellent collection.


Evo & Chavez: Friends, not clones

Jun 7th 2007, The Economist

La Paz- When FIFA, the body that governs world football, decreed last month that international matches could not be played at altitudes above 2,500 metres (8,200 feet), Evo Morales must have been delighted. For once, Bolivia's president could apply his genius for political gesture to an issue that does not divide his countrymen. Mr Morales, a keen footballer, turned out for a few impromptu matches in La Paz's national stadium (altitude: 3,600 metres), cheered on by nearly all of Bolivia's 9m people. They see the FIFA ruling, which cites health worries, as an attack on their competitive advantage.

Many of Mr Morales's gestures in the 17 months since he took office as Bolivia's first-ever elected president of Andean Indian descent have been more divisive. His most popular policy, the nationalisation of oil and gas, has irritated foreign governments and investors. The “democratic revolution” he promises—a transfer of wealth and power from Bolivia's white and mestizo (mixed race) elite to the mainly Andean Indian poor—alarms the prosperous eastern provinces. He calls the media the “main adversary” of his government and wants to hold them accountable to the people. On June 5th the judiciary staged a one-day strike to counter a presidential assault on its independence.

In short, his opponents fear that Mr Morales is leading Bolivia down the path that his close friend, Hugo Chávez, has taken Venezuela: one of “21st-century socialism” and a presidential monopoly of power. “Chávez owns the Bolivian government,” says Jorge Quiroga, the leader of the opposition Podemos party.

Mr Chávez is clearly an ally and an inspiration for Mr Morales, but does that make him a model? His advisers insist not. “It's a mistake to think that Morales is a copy of Chávez,” says Pablo Solón, the government's foreign-trade envoy.

There are three reasons to think he may be right, none of which assume that Mr Morales would not enjoy wielding absolute power. First, while Mr Chávez is a former army officer who came to national prominence by leading a failed military coup, Mr Morales is the leader of a coca-growers' union and of a coalition of radical “social movements” whose protests brought down two previous governments. Mr Morales is now their unchallenged leader, but they will resist the idea that all change should come from the top down.

Second, Mr Morales confronts powerful regions headed by elected governors opposed to his plan to “refound” Bolivia. Finally, although natural gas has been a bonanza, its revenues are far more modest than Venezuela's oil billions. Bolivia cannot generate enough growth and jobs without private and foreign investment. In short, Venezuela is a one-man show but governing Bolivia demands alliances.

Mr Morales himself seems unsure of where he is heading. His ready acceptance of Venezuelan patronage and his raids on independent institutions feed suspicions. In April 2006 Mr Morales signed up to Mr Chávez's “Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas”, a managed-trade agreement and anti-American alliance also involving Cuba. Venezuelan aid has poured in. It pays for scholarships, a campaign to distribute identity cards and the cheques that Mr Morales hands out to mayors for local development in the Altiplano, Bolivia's vast western plateau. More aid is promised for a network of community radio stations and the upgrading of the main state television station.

Mr Morales also has Mr Chávez's penchant for subverting rival centres of power, but perhaps less talent for it. Take the latest clash with the judiciary. This began when the Constitutional Tribunal ruled that four Supreme-Court justices temporarily appointed by the president should yield their seats. Mr Morales called for the tribunal's impeachment. The judiciary staged its first-ever strike to resist the government's attempt to “throw out the Bolivian judicial system and implant a totalitarian regime,” said a statement by the Supreme Court.

In January Mr Morales's supporters tried to unseat the governor of Cochabamba, the country's third most-populous province, for proposing a referendum on autonomy. Three people died in violent clashes. The incident pushed the governor closer to the four opposition-led eastern regions that had already backed autonomy in a 2005 referendum.

These skirmishes are part of an improvised revolution with uncertain aims. The vice-president, Álvaro García Linera, recently called for a “broadening of elites” and “room for both capitalist and post-capitalist development”. What opponents see as an assault on democracy, the government sees as purging vestiges of “anti-democratic” tendencies.

Greater clarity should soon come from a constituent assembly that is writing a new constitution (another device used by Mr Chávez to consolidate his power). Mr Morales's Movement to Socialism (MAS) proposes to redefine Bolivia as a “unitary, pluri-national, communitarian” state that gives pride of place to three dozen indigenous “nations”. These groups would control territory and natural resources and would be represented as communities in a single-chamber legislature alongside individual citizens. Private enterprise would be protected when it “contributes to economic and socio-cultural development”. A fourth “social power” would oversee the traditional three.

This smacks of corporatism, not democracy. The opposition objects to dividing Bolivia ethnically, and to the abolition of the Senate, where small provinces have political weight. The MAS has a majority in the assembly but not the two-thirds required to approve a new constitutional text. Samuel Doria Medina, the leader of a centrist opposition party, thinks compromise is possible. Indigenous “nations”, for example, could become wispier “nationalities”, he says.

In some moods the government seems open to compromise. “We don't want a constitution approved by 60 or 70% of the country but rejected by the rest,” said Mr García Linera. The final text, due by August 6th, will be subject to a referendum and then to interpretation by the courts, which Mr Morales does not yet control. What he may really be angling for is an end to the current rule that bars presidents from consecutive terms, so that he could run for re-election under the new constitution next year and again in 2013. In return, he would accept the opposition's demands for regional autonomy, says Carlos Toranzo, a political analyst.

Such deal-making would not be out of character. In January, Mr Morales dropped a campaign for the assembly to approve constitutional articles by simple majority after this provoked huge protests in the eastern regions. With the United States, he has arranged a wary, and perhaps temporary, truce. Some 40,000 jobs, mainly in the poor western highlands, depend directly on American trade concessions, now up for renewal. The United States, eager to avoid rupture, is overlooking Mr Morales's enthusiasm for coca, the raw material for cocaine. Recently, he joined the American ambassador to open a newly-illuminated road tunnel— something it is hard to imagine Mr Chávez doing.

But charging ahead when he can, and retreating when he must, is not a strategy for governance. The inexperienced, often inept, government has achieved little beyond boosting ethnic and national pride, and gas royalties. Bolivia is enjoying multiple windfalls, from high commodity prices to remittances and debt forgiveness. Even so, the economy grew less than the Latin American average last year, points out Gonzalo Chávez of the Catholic University in La Paz. More than half the population is poor, four-fifths of workers labour in the informal economy and emigration continues. Mining and gas apart, private investment is a negligible 2-3% of GDP. Yet in April Bolivia said it would withdraw from an international arbitration panel that investors use to resolve disputes. If he does not create good jobs, no amount of constitutional gimmickry will sustain Mr Morales's current popularity.

MAS looks to "accommodate" mestizos

El Deber, May 29

The Movement Towards Socialism decided in Cochabamba to further include mestizos in its project for the Political Constitution of the State in order to make agreements with the opposition possible and to win support for its presidential re-election campaign. According to the explanation given by Raúl Prada, one proof of the desire to be more inclusive of mestizos is that the definition of plural sovereignty has been modified.

Up until the reunion in Cochabamba, MAS had presented a project of articles in the Vision of the Country Commission in which it had established that sovereignty resided with the indigenous peoples, originarios, campesinos and in the intercultural population.

Now, within this concept the current declaration in the constitution is maintained, in the sense that sovereignty resided in the people, but with the clarification that it is made up of “originario peoples and nations, indigenous peoples, campesinos and cultural diverse populations”.

According to Prada, this affects the consequences of what it means to have a plurinational state, given that it is only recognising one collective subject, which is the Bolivian population, and not the indigenous nations and peoples that conform it. “They asked us to best include the mestizos in the constitution,” he said.

He also admitted that there is a certain confrontation of ideas between the assembly delegates and advisors that belong to the Grupo Comuna, and those that belong to the non-government organisation Centro de Estudios Jurídicos e Investigación Social [CEJIS, Centre of Juridical Studies and Social Investigation].

Another leading representative of MAS assured that one of the neurological points of the Pacto de Unidad [Unity Pact] proposal would also be left out: the right to the reconstitution of indigenous territories like they were before colonialism. They assure that pro-government analysis indicates that it could put in risk the territorial unity of the country, given that nations like the Aymara, Quechua and Guarani are located in more than one South American country.

For his part, Carlos Romero, president of the Land and Territory Comission explained that the Pacto de Unidad came to Cochabamba with the proposal that natural resources should be indigenous property and that in order to exploit non-renewable resources there needed to be a binding consultation with the indigenous people.

Nevertheless, the pro-government bench decided that natural resources are the property of the state and that non-renewable resources that are located within indigenous territories should be utilised for their benefit.

The issue in which there was complete agreement was the re-election of Morales, which in reality is seen as an election, given that they consider that there will be a constitutional rupture regarding the 2008 elections, which means that if Morales wins the elections it will not count as a re-election.

There was no decision made regarding the Congress

The discussion over whether the Congress will be bicameral or unicameral remains open within MAS. Despite the fact that the Pacto de Unidad and the majority of the pro-government bench support a unicameral system, the representatives of the Legislative Power Commission proposed that the bicameral system be maintained, but in place of a Senate made up of departmental representatives, it should be made up of indigenous, originario, campesino and intercultural representatives.

Neither has a decision been made on if there will be 140 electorates. According to Raúl Prada, it was noted that if the proposal in which 70 representatives are elected by indigenous traditions and customs and 70 by universal vote is maintained, it could give the impression to the population that MAS wants to monopolise power.

Experts called on to orientate discussion on autonomy

The discussion in the Autonomy Commission has not moved beyond the current logjam. Yesterday, with the objective that the directorate could find a path towards some deliberations, it was decided to resort to the social movements and national experts to advise and better orientate the debate.

With the aim of avoiding that discussion continues dilating over types of autonomies, competencies, and the different conceptions of autonomy that each of the pro-government and opposition members hold, the directorate of the commission accepted that it needed help to resolve the entrenchment evident after the presentation of the two opposing proposals, that of the pro-government supporters and the opposition. From MAS the position emerged that the participation of organisations such as campesinos, CIDOB [Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Bolivia], APG [Assembly of the Guarani People], Conamaq [National Council of Ayllus and MArkas of Qullasuya], and the Federation of Municipal Associations as well as invited experts such as Xavier Albo and Jerjes Justiniano, was vital.

The opposition, to not be left behind, proposed the participation of the Comité pro Santa Cruz [Pro-Santa Cruz Committee] and authors Juan Carlos Urenda, Carlos Hugo Molina and Franz Barrios

Translated from El Deber

Mining Policy in the Morales Administration: Reactivation and Conflict (Part II)

An Emerging Mining Policy for Bolivia

Andean Information Network, June 9, 2007

On May 1, 2007, one year after the “nationalization” of the hydrocarbons industry, Bolivian President Evo Morales declared all Bolivian territory a public mining reserve and reasserted state jurisdiction and control over all minerals, metals, precious and semi-precious stones. The state mining company, Bolivian Mining Corporation (COMIBOL) now administers all mineral wealth except concessions granted before the decree. The decree also requires that the National Geological and Technical Mining Service complete a study previously unexplored and prospected areas to give the government and COMIBOL a more precise assessment of the vast mineral wealth within the nation’s borders. The decree prohibits granting further concessions, and freezes those currently under negotiation until a study can be completed.1

Future mining concessions eliminated; pre-existing concessions remain intact

While stopping short of fully nationalizing the industry, the decree clearly asserts state control over all mineral wealth in the national territory and continues the process of “recovering control” of Bolivia’s natural resources, a key element of the President’s 2005 electoral platform. However the original interpretation of the decree has shifted. Mining Minister, Luis Alberto Echazú, stated foreign and domestic private mining companies will be required to enter into joint ventures with COMIBOL, the state mining company, and that concessions will no longer be granted to private companies. “Future concessions have been modified; they are going to have to sign a contract with COMIBOL. We’re not going to grant private concessions.”2

The May 1 decree should not modify previous concessions and other private investments, They will not have to renegotiate contracts, nor enter into a joint venture with COMIBOL. Echazú affirmed, “Those who are already working in [Bolivia] will continue working under the same conditions.” Therefore, the operations of U.S. based Apex Silver Mines and Couer d’Alene Mines, that plan to initiate production in the coming year, should not be affected by the May 1 decree.

However, what remains unclear is whether the ongoing petitions for concessions will be affected by the decree. At one point Minister Echazú held out the possibility that these concessions would only be delayed until the completion of the study. With regard to future private investment in the mining sector Morales reiterated his mantra “Bolivia wants partners, not masters.” According to Morales, these contracts “will allow investors to recover their investments, but they will also to have to make an economic contribution to the state."

The Four Pillars: An Emerging Mining Policy for Bolivia

In the aftermath of the Huanuni conflict3 and the prolonged negotiations over “nationalization” and new terms for foreign investment, a somewhat ambiguous mining policy has emerged. Like the hydrocarbons nationalization, this policy attempts to maintain foreign investment necessary to upgrade and develop the industry, while providing greater economic benefit to the state. Unlike the hydrocarbons industry, the need to placate the powerful and volatile cooperative miners has led to modifications in initial implementation plans.4 The Morales government has outlined four general policy points for the reform and “nationalization” of the industry:

1. “Recovering” the nation’s minerals: Asserting the state’s control of over all aspects of the mining industry - exploration and prospecting, exploitation, extraction, refining, and sale of the nation’s mineral wealth.

2. Re-writing the Mining Code: The current code was written in 1997 when Bolivia’s governments implemented neo-liberal economic policies beneficial to transnational companies and a few wealthy Bolivians when the mining industry was still on shaky ground.
The Morales administration seeks to accomplish two main goals in writing a new mining code:
a. Change the tax structure determined by the existing law in which companies paid a total of $67 million in taxes in 2006, when net profits were $600 million. The Bolivian government plan would increase the current 35% tax on profits to a 50 percent tax on net profits.5
b. Give COMIBOL the right to manage and run mines without the current restrictions on the state company, and instead require private companies interested in operating in Bolivia to enter into a 50-50 partnership with COMIBOL.

3. Upgrade the industry in two fundamental areas:
c. Technology: Since there has been little investment in the industry since the mid-1980’s, the Morales government would require that any investor share technology with the state company and help upgrade the technological capacities throughout the industry.
d. Training for cooperative and artisan miners: The government plans to invest more in training programs for the majority of the miners who use “artisan methods.” considered both inefficient and more polluting than newer technologies. The 1997 Mining Code mandates training for miners, but very few have benefited from the programs.

4. Popular participation: the Morales administration has said that it will invite “all stakeholders” to the table as Bolivia develops the mining industry, including those representing local communities and environmental interests. As in many other countries, the Bolivian mining industry has damaged the environment and left local communities impoverished. Indeed some the poorest and most polluted communities in Bolivia are located in mining areas.

The Morales administration does not expect the new mining code to pass easily, given that the opposition holds a slight majority in the Senate. The marketing and investment director of the Mining Ministry, Freddy Beltran, explained, “The idea of the opposition is to not allow anything to pass that comes from the government, therefore, of course we will have a tough battle there (in the Senate).”6 Furthermore, while the Morales administration has done its best to accommodate the cooperative miners, this group has consistently opposed any proposed tax hikes.7

The voice not heard: Mining and the environment

Outside of Huanuni a sludge-filled river trickles from the COMIBOL plant at the base of the Posokoni tin mine, where independent miners attempt to extract any remaining tin. The communities downriver no longer plant or graze their animals along the river bank due to the pollution. Many documented cases of environmental contamination from mining exist. Local organizations and the Oruro Departmental government have expressed concern about the Kori Kollo mine, operated by Inti Raymi, a subsidiary of Newmont Mining Company. A study by a professor at the Oruro Technical University identified extensive environmental damage including “seeping and leakage of cyanide in several places (around the mine) and many years of water overflow from the evaporation and filtration ponds, the dispersion of toxic dust, the acceleration of the process of soil salinization, the movement of heavy metals and increased sediment in the Desaguadero River.”8 This contamination has severely affected the water supply and farming in the region.

While the Morales administration has said that environmental groups will play a role in policy development, environmental advocates are skeptical the Morales administration has the political will and capacity to implement a mining policy that offers greater environmental protection.
They fear that within a government looking to create jobs and generate tax revenues, the voices of environmentalists challenging this vision and ecologically harmful mining practices are seldom heard, especially over the dynamite blasts of cooperative miners. 9

Threats against environmentalists and local community leaders

Environmental advocates have been threatened as a result of their work supporting local communities suffering the negative environmental impacts of mining operations. On February 8, 2007 a group of men forcibly entered the offices of Centro de Ecologia y Pueblos Andinas (CEPA), a NGO supporting local communities and the environment in Oruro. According to a statement released by the organization, they tried to “to pressure CEPA to abandon its work with communities that demand a transparent environmental audit (of the Kori Kollo mine).” CEPA directors said that the group threatened several colleagues as well as a leader representing communities in the Desaguadero River watershed and Uru Uru and Poopó Lakes. They also threatened break into and vandalize CEPA’s offices. 10


El Mutún: the Sleeping Giant

El Mutún, a small mountain chain in the Santa Cruz Department along the Brazilian border, is one of the largest iron ore deposits in the world, containing an estimated 40 billion tons of medium-grade ore and 10 billion tons of manganese. In June 2006 the Bolivian government received only one bid, from India’s Jindal Steel and Power, to mine and develop half of the iron reserves for a 40 year period. According to a Jindal press release they will invest $2.1 billion in the first eight years developing a steel and power plant for processing the ore and making value-added products including long steel products, sponge iron, and pellets. During the next several months, Jindal agreed to the Morales administration’s terms of a 50-50 profit split with COMIBOL. The Bolivian government agreed to provide a discount on natural gas as the power source for the steel production facility - the Santa Cruz-Sao Paulo gas duct passes within 20 kilometers of El Mutún. However, for eight months negotiations between the two stalled because the government and Jindal could not agree on the reduced gas rate11 and on who should pay for the surrounding infrastructure.

The Giant is still sleeping…

Finally, on March 1, 2007 Jindal and the Bolivian government came to an agreement over the gas rates and infrastructure costs. The agreement required Jindal to provide documentation of the administrative, financial, and technical situation as well as paperwork verifying the legal registration of the company in India and their statutes within 45 days in order to sign a definitive contract. The government threatened to nullify the agreement if Jindal failed to comply.

However, as the deadline passed the government claimed that Jindal submitted only a photocopy of one the 14 required documents. The Indian Ambassador, Armind Sharma, assured the government that they are preparing the additional documents. Sharma claims that any “discrepancies in questions of form” that appear in the documents result from the translation.12 In early May the Mining Minister, Luis Alberto Echazú, asked the people of Puerto Suarez, the town that stands to benefit the most from the exploitation of El Mutún, to pressure Jindal to complete the bureaucratic requirements. The same day, citing the potential benefit to the nation, President Morales granted another extension. The extension would give Jindal until the first week in July to present the required paperwork.

Iron ore has not been mined in Bolivia in any significant quantities and this project has the potential to make Bolivia significant steel and iron producer at a time when there is a growing demand. The government expects that the project will create 6,000 jobs directly and generate $200 million per year in tax revenues.

Nationalization of the Vinto Foundry

On February 9, 2007 President Morales nationalized the Vinto Foundry outside of Oruro. Seventy percent of the tin smelted at the foundry comes from the Posokoni mine in Huanuni. Originally built in 1971, COMIBOL sold off the foundry in the “capitalization process” in the 1990’s to ex-President Sánchez de Lozada’s COMSUR for “the price of a dead hen.”13 In 2004 Glencore International of Switzerland paid $200 million dollars for COMSUR shares in Bolivia and an additional $90 million for the Vinto Foundry.14 The government initially said it refused to compensate Glencore for the foundry, because its sale had been illegal. After the company threatened a lawsuit, this initial tough stance seems to have softened, and the government and Glencore are currently negotiating a settlement. On April 23, 2007 the government agreed to provide Glencore the tin it needed to honor its existing contracts.

President Morales warned that other former COMSUR properties that once belonged to Sánchez de Lozada would also be “re-nationalized.” He stated the government would maintain existing jobs at the foundry. The Morales administration also plans to invest $10 million to upgrade the facility because private investors did not follow through with agreed upon capital investment. As a result, the foundry operates at only about half-capacity and Bolivia exports the mineral concentrates to be cast abroad. Control of the foundry will allow Bolivia to export ingots – a mass of metal in convenient shape for storing, shipping or shaping. On May 7 the state television station broadcast the first shipment of 200 tons of tin ingots produced at the foundry since its nationalization. The government calculates that this shipment alone should generate over $25 million dollars with a state earning of $1.5 million in the form of the Complimentary Mining Tax.

Implementing a new mining policy is a balancing act that makes the nationalization of the hydrocarbons nationalization look like a stroll through the park. The effort faces multiple impediments, including the sometimes contradictory visions and expectations of the Bolivian government, private investors and cooperative miners. The cooperative miners are vocal about protecting their interests to a Morales administration that does not want 40,000 angry miners marching through the streets of La Paz. Although cooperative miners want to limit foreign mining companies’ access to mines to guarantee higher income they feel they deserve, they also stand to benefit from the technology and training that a stronger COMIBOL or foreign investors could provide. However, the bigger question may be whether the Morales administration can attract the kind of foreign investment it needs to develop its vast mineral resources while prices remain high and the industry more profitable. Just how much mineral wealth there is in Bolivia also needs to be determined in order to develop long-term investments and plans to best utilize the nation’s natural resources while protecting the environment.

First published at AIN

The Andes Braces for a New Soccer War

Jean Friedman-Rudovsky, May 31, Time

Imagine the NFL deciding that Green Bay could no longer host professional football games. Sorry, Cheese-heads, but extreme cold is dangerous and unfair to visiting teams. Now envision Wisconsin's reaction, enlarge it to a national scale, and you'll have some idea of the sentiment in Bolivia since last Sunday. That's when the soccer's world governing body, FIFA, announced a ban on staging international matches at altitudes higher than 2,500 meters (about 8,200 ft.) because of the health risks posed to players unaccustomed to the altitude. The decree rules out home games in at least five stadiums in Bolivia, two in Peru, one in Ecuador and one in Colombia.

"Absurd!"; "Degrading!"; "An attack on our people and way of life," are just some of the responses heard in La Paz from President Evo Morales and local soccer officials all the way down to street vendors. Within hours of the ruling, Bolivia had mobilized, holding emergency cabinet meetings and press conferences, and launching mass letter-writing campaigns.

Thousands of children flooded out of La Paz schools early Wednesday morning chanting "Let us play!," while police units did aerobics in the park. President Evo Morales and his "team" (cabinet members and former Bolivian pros who often join him in friendly matches against local teams in rural villages) played a quadruple-header, including three games in the 11,735-ft.-high national stadium. Many of the spectators sported a T-shirt depicting a victorious Morales standing on a soccer field above the words "Bolivia is Soccer"; on the back, "No to the Veto; Yes to Sports!"

Commentators on the streets sensed a conspiracy: "It's those Brazilians," noted taxi-driver Juan Gonzales, even though the ruling came from FIFA President Joseph Blatter in Zurich, reelected this week to a third consecutive term in office. "They and the Argentines pressured FIFA because they don't like that they lose sometimes when they play in Bolivia."

The mighty Brazilians have certainly suffered more than their fair share of upset defeats in Bolivia's thin air. In 1993, their national team lost here to Bolivia — the first time in history that Brazil lost in a World Cup qualifying round; and in 2000 it happened again. This year, Brazilian club team Flamengo lost to Bolivia's Real Potosi in a match played at 12,000 feet, with a number of Flamengo players needing oxygen treatment to recover after the game. So the Brazilians have not hidden their joy at the new FIFA ruling.

Bolivians also point out that the medical report on which FIFA based its decision is not exactly solid science. Rather than demonstrating that high altitude poses a threat to players, according to Bolivian news reports on the report, it admits there is little real health risk and that altitude acclimatization is so personal that generalizations can't be made.

"High-altitude international soccer competition has never caused a player serious health problems and it certainly has never killed anyone," notes Bolivian sports medicine specialist Dr. Guillermo Aponte. "On the contrary, high heat and humidity has cost several lives. If FIFA really wanted to protect players they wouldn't be focusing on altitude."

Health, though, is only part of the issue. In La Paz, where one flight of stairs can feel like 10, it's impossible to deny the home-court advantage. Still, high-altitude Bolivian home teams lose just as much as they win.

The other affected countries, plus Uruguay, Paraguay and Venezuela, have demanded the ruling's reversal. But Morales' government has made the battle a political priority, resuscitating the international Committee in Defense of the Altitude (first created in 1996 when FIFA tried to ban games above 3,000 meters but revoked the decision because of mass protest). And it's not a lost cause: FIFA has allowed that if the Latin American regional soccer federation can, before the June 15 FIFA executive committee meeting, produce medical evidence proving that high-altitude play is not a health risk, the decision will be repealed.

Meanwhile, the unifying effect of the soccer snub certainly has its political advantages. "We can use this to overcome our regional differences," commented 16-year-old Sandra Reyes, reflecting on the east vs. west internal conflict that threatens to tear apart her country.

"Yeah! We've got to unite by all playing more soccer," sang the chorus of teenagers surrounding Reyes. Clad in their school's soccer uniform, the youngsters had just spent the day watching their President take several long shots on goal.

Democracy and Constitutional Reform: Rewriting the Constitution in Bolivia and Venezuela

Sujatha Fernandes, June 06, ZNet

After gathering proposals during a six-week trip around the country, members of Bolivia’s National Constituent Assembly met on April 30, 2007, to present the proposals and draft recommendations for synthesizing these proposals into a new constitution. As in Venezuela, where a new constitution followed the swearing in of leftist president Hugo Chávez, hopes were high for constitutional reform in Bolivia that could alter entrenched inequalities and facilitate the inclusion of indigenous majorities into society.

But more than nine months after this process was initiated in Bolivia under President Evo Morales it has become delayed by debates over procedure, weakened by the exclusion of social movements, and bogged down in partisan conflicts. Is it possible for radical change to be achieved through constitutional reform? How does the Constituent Assembly in Bolivia compare to Venezuela’s? These are important questions to consider, especially as other leftist leaders in the continent such as Ecuador’s Rafael Correa are embarking on a similar process of rewriting the constitution.

The demand for a constituent assembly in Bolivia originally came from indigenous social movements in the east of the country who sought greater participation in decisions about land use and ownership, distribution of natural resources, and development policy. This demand for an assembly was taken up by social movements who participated in several protests and campaigns in the early 2000s against the privatization of water (the Water Wars) and for the nationalization of gas (the Gas Wars). After successive governments were forced to resign and Morales was elected in December 2005, he initiated the process of rewriting the constitution. There were demands for new articles to address issues of land distribution, resource management, and regional autonomy, among others. On July 2, 2006, there was a nationwide election of the 255 assembly representatives, who would be in charge of rewriting the constitution.

The failure of Morales’ supporters to gain a majority during the July 2 elections of the constituent assembly introduced certain constraints for progressive forces from the start. Morales’ party Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement Towards Socialism, MAS) won 135 seats, which was 35 seats short of the two-thirds required in order to control the assembly. Further, the exclusive control by political parties over the electoral process meant that social movements leaders not belonging to political parties were left out of the assembly. In order to participate, social movement organizations needed to gather 15,000 signatures, fingerprints and identification numbers in the space of a few weeks, while political parties were automatically included on the ballot. Key movement leaders such as Oscar Olivera, who played an important role during the 2000 Water Wars, were not even included on the ballot. Requests from indigenous organizations to elect representatives to the assembly according to their own customs were rejected; the indigenous leaders who were elected belong to MAS or other political parties.

In August 6, 2006, the Constituent Assembly was sworn in. For six months, the Constituent Assembly was not able to achieve anything, as it was caught up in a procedural debate about voting, that was finally resolved on February 14, 2007. As the assembly now embarks on the deliberation process, it will also be strongly divided along partisan lines, as a two-thirds vote is required in order to approve each of the articles, and MAS and its aligned parties do not have these numbers. Many are concerned that MAS will be forced to water down its proposals in order to seek support from the opposition parties and fulfill the required two-thirds vote.

By contrast, the rewriting of the constitution in Venezuela, which began in August 1999, was not hampered by a divided assembly, as Chávez supporters won 125 out of the 131 seats in the assembly. Like in the Bolivia case, political parties dominated the Venezuelan Constituent Assembly. Chávez’s Movimiento Quinta Republica (Fifth Republic Movement, MVR) and allied parties who formed the Polo Patriotico (Patriotic Pole), won 120 of the seats. In order to speed up the process of deliberation, the assembly met in 22 commissions rather than a larger plenary. The new constitution was completed over the next few months and approved by referendum in December 1999.

Despite the dominance of political parties over the constitutional process in Venezuela, the process was fairly fluid, and there was space for the participation of diverse social organizations and groups. Women’s groups organized to elect women-friendly candidates to the Constituent Assembly and they lobbied to include articles pertaining to sexual and reproductive rights. Many of those elected to the assembly had been human rights advocates under previous governments, and they incorporated a broad concept of human rights as both civil rights and social rights of public health, education, and welfare.

Indigenous groups and urban social movements were given a role to play in the drafting of the Venezuelan constitution. Three seats on the assembly were reserved for indigenous leaders, and these leaders were responsible for the section on indigenous rights, which recognizes the existence of indigenous communities, and guarantees their right to demarcate their own territory. Urban social movements, community radio organizations, Afro-Venezuelan groups and others all formulated proposals. Many of the progressive changes incorporated into the new constitution reflected struggles that had been waged for several decades by a range of social movements. These included self-management, citizen participation, and the principle of co-responsibility.

One of the notable features of the constitutional process in Venezuela was the impact that it had in everyday life and subsequent social struggles. Mass copies of the constitution were printed and made available to the population, who carried around their copy with them, invoking relevant articles at opportune moments. When residents in the popular parish of San Agustin occupied the Teatro Alameda on April 13, 2004, they made constant references to the constitution, as giving them the right to take over spaces that are not being used and convert them into centers for the community. One resident said, “When we did this occupation it was peaceful, by the norms of the constitution.” The residents were broadly interpreting Article 70, which states: “There are medium for the participation and protagonism of the people in the exercise of their sovereignty, in the political…and in the social and economic: the instances of citizen attentions, self-action, cooperatives in all forms including financially, savings banks, community enterprises and other associative forms guided by values of mutual co-operation and solidarity.”

The mention of participation and protagonism in the Venezuelan constitution has provided the impetus for these kinds of occupations, which have also taken place in other parishes such as La Vega and 23 de Enero. On April 13, 2002, when Chávez was restored to power after a coup attempt, the residents of La Vega briefly occupied a police module. A few years later, in the sector La Cañada, of 23 de Enero, the militant organization Coordinadora Simón Bolívar (CSB) organized together with residents of the sector to take over the local unit of the Metropolitan Police. After years of harassment, repression and abuse by the local police, it was an empowering act for the activists and residents of La Cañada to take over this locale and turn it into a cultural center. The takeovers are not expropriations, in the sense that it is the people rather than the state who are occupying the installations. But nevertheless, changes in the constitution have given people the impetus to engage in these kinds of occupations and activities.

Indigenous groups in Venezuela have also embarked on a process of demarcation of their ancestral lands, as mandated in the constitution. Under Title II, “Of Geographic Space and Political Division,” there is a Chapter VIII, entitled, “The Rights of Indigenous People.” According to Article 119 of this chapter, the State recognizes indigenous peoples and communities, and their “originary rights over the lands that they have ancestrally and traditionally occupied and which are necessary to develop and guarantee their ways of life.” Following this constitutional guarantee, the Law of Demarcation was passed in 2001, allowing for a stage of self demarcation or mapping of ancestral lands by indigenous communities themselves, which would then be ratified by a process of official demarcation. In the Amazon region, this process has been strongly driven by indigenous communities. In July 2004, I met with the Piaroa community nearby to Puerto Ayacucho, and I observed their fifth meeting of several days duration to construct a map of Piaroa territory to submit to the government for ratification.

But the degree to which the government can enforce constitutional principles remains to be seen, especially where established interests are at stake. In cases where indigenous ancestral lands are owned by the government, the transfer will be easier, but in cases where that land is owned by private businesses or criollos (whites), it will likely be a long and protracted process of conflict and confrontation. Likewise, the new constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, or creed and guarantees equality before the law. But as the Fundación Afro-Venezolana (Afro-Venezuelan Foundation) has pointed out, since President Chávez has come into power, there have been 1,154 examples of racist messages in the mostly opposition controlled media. Yet not a single individual or media corporation has been penalized under the law.

The act of rewriting the constitution is certainly not a new phenomenon. Latin American countries have been through many constitutions and reforms of the constitution. But rewriting the constitution has taken on special significance across Latin America during this moment as the bearer of hopes for a changed social and political order. After years of technocratic decision making by economic and business elites, and limited constitutional reforms enacted in previous decades, the prospect of a Constituent Assembly offers hopes for democratic participation of a broader range of social groups. In cases such as Bolivia’s gridlocked constitutional process, it dramatizes the antagonistic worldviews about democracy and development, that are not limited to Morales versus the opposition, but include the dynamic tension between political parties and grassroots social movements. The successes of the Venezuelan Constituent Assembly offers hope for Bolivia’s embattled assembly, and more fledgling processes in Ecuador. But it also points to the long road that lies ahead for bringing about social change.

Mining Policy in the Morales Administration: Reactivation and Conflict

President Morales has announced plans to commence a new era in Bolivian mining in 2007. The year 2006 saw the highest mining revenue since 1985 and exports jumped from $346 million in 2005 to over $1 billion in 2006. Increased demand for minerals, in large part c from China and India, has revitalized the Bolivian mining sector. Price increases on the world market for Bolivia’s most profitable metals – zinc, silver, tin, and gold – has heightened hopes that mining can again become a dominant industry, as it had been for most of the nation’s history. If the reactivation of the industry and tax reform can be structured and implemented effectively, the current mining boom could benefit most Bolivians for the first time.

The Morales administration has promised that greater mining income, in addition to increased hydrocarbon revenues, will fund social and health programs for citizens throughout Bolivia. However, the potential profit gains and greater state control have both raised expectations and anxieties of other interested groups. Private mining companies anticipate that skyrocketing demands for minerals will bring increased profits but fear that the state will expropriate their investments through the nationalization process. Communities most affected by mining, some of the most polluted and impoverished regions, hope that the reactivation of the mining sector and greater state control will guarantee greater benefits for their communities. Environmentalists worry that without greater environmental protection, exploitation of new mines will worsen water contamination and other environmental conditions in the world’s eighth most biologically diverse country.

The diverse groups of miners are also struggling, amongst themselves and with the government, to determine who will receive the rights to work in the mines and on what terms. This update on cooperative miners is the first in a three part series on
Bolivia’s mining sector from the Andean Information Network.

Part I - Cooperative Miners in the Nationalization Process: Explosive Politics


Written by Andean Information Network, 29 May 2007

On May 1, 2007, one year after the “nationalization” of the hydrocarbons industry, Bolivian President Evo Morales declared all Bolivian territory a public mining reserve and reasserted that all minerals, metals, precious and semi-precious stones are under the jurisdiction and power of the State mining company, Bolivian Mining Corporation (COMIBOL), excluding concessions granted before the decree.

While stopping short of fully nationalizing the industry, the decree clearly asserts state control over all mineral wealth in the national territory and continues the process of “recovering control” of Bolivia’s natural resources, a key element of the President’s 2005 electoral platform. However, unlike the “nationalization” of the hydrocarbons industry, which enjoyed widespread support throughout Bolivia, this decree raised the hackles not just of private mining interests, but of Bolivia’s cooperative miners, a powerful and vocal political force that has emerged over the last twenty years.

Within this context, the concerns of Bolivia’s more than 50,000 active cooperative miners have been making the headlines. After working through two decades of low mineral prices cooperative miners believe they deserve to benefit from soaring prices. Indeed, while some miners continue to struggle to make ends meet, as a result of today’s mineral prices others are making up to 200 times the Bolivian minimum wage. They fear that state control and foreign investment to upgrade the industry will rob them of these increased earnings.

Significant disagreements between miner groups, the government, private companies, and local communities, have resulted in the resignation of two Mining and Metallurgy Ministers in six months, mass demonstrations on the streets of La Paz, and violent conflicts, including a two day conflict at Bolivia’s largest tin mine resulting in 16 dead and 115 injured.

“Capitalization” weakens industry and increases mining cooperatives

Bolivian mining is no longer a simple negotiation between the state and private mining companies. Today the voice of cooperative miners as well as a widespread call for government control over natural resources has complicated the scenario and created new pressures for the Morales administration and the mining industry. In 1985 COMIBOL shut down hundreds of mines, fired 30,000 miners (as well as thousands of workers in company-run schools, stores, and health clinics). As a result, the company became a merely administrative entity. With scarce employment opportunities many of the laid-off miners formed cooperatives that continued to work the few remaining functioning mines. The privatization of the industry in the mid-nineties further drained the historic strength of the state miner’s union and turned COMIBOL into an even weaker administrative entity.

As the mining industry slowly rebounded through the 1990’s, cooperative miners became perhaps the most important players in Bolivia’s mining sector. Many small cooperatives or “artisan miners,” use rudimentary mining techniques and earn modest wages. However, some cooperatives have grown into medium operations with the assistance of investors who buy into the cooperative. Today, cooperative miners belong to the largest union, the National Federation of Mining Cooperatives of Bolivia (FENCOMIN) and form the backbone of Bolivian mine workers. A smaller group of miners are still employed by the state, work for COMIBOL and make up the Federation of Mining Workers of Bolivia (FSTMB).

Cooperative miners are often criticized for using antiquated extraction technology that contaminates the environment. Cooperatives employ thousands of children, composing up to half of the workers in some cooperatives. Motivated by a desire to make a fast buck they extract as much mineral as quickly as they can, thus shortening the life of a mine and creating unsafe mining conditions.

Miner activism dominated the Bolivian Workers Union (COB) after the 1952 revolution and served as the primary resistance to dictators such as Hugo Banzer. Cooperative miners have followed this tradition and do not hesitate to take to the streets to defend their interests – often successfully. At times these protests have resulted in violent confrontations and even deaths, such as the conflict over the Posokoni mine.

Huanuni: the “Ground Zero” in Bolivian mining

The largest tin mine in Bolivia, Posokoni, is located in Huanuni, in the Oruro department. This mine is the epicenter of the conflict between cooperative miners and the Morales administration as it attempts to reassert state control of the mining industry. On October 5 and 6, 2006, sixteen people died and 115 were injured in violent conflicts that erupted between cooperative miners and COMIBOL miners in a dispute over access to the richest veins in the mine.

Many believe that this conflict resulted from government inaction to resolve mounting tensions between the two groups. The state company regained control over the mine in 2002 after its primary private investor, RBG Resources (formerly Allied Deals) of Great Britain, declared bankruptcy. As tin prices increased to the highest levels since 1985, cooperative miners demanded access to the richest, deepest tin veins from COMIBOL. The state company argued that foreign investment was necessary to improve technology and efficiently exploit this part of the mine.[1] This announcement denied cooperative miners access to the coveted veins and led them to threaten a mine takeover if a mutual agreement could not be reached.

Violent clash between miners

Tensions mounted throughout 2006 as negotiations between cooperative and COMIBOL miners stalled. The Mining Minister Walter Villarroel, who facilitated the talks regarding reactivating the mining sector and overhauling the mining code, garnered widespread criticism because of his connections to the cooperative miners.[2] Finally, in October the violence erupted when cooperative miners attempted to take over Posokoni and COMIBOL miners turned out to defend their stake in the mine. During the two days of violence in Huanuni, members of the same family – some COMIBOL employees and some cooperative miners - threw dynamite and makeshift bombs at each other. Although cooperative miners outnumbered the COMIBOL workers 5,000 to 1,000, the overwhelming majority of both the dead and injured were cooperative miners.[3]

Immediately following the violence, Guillermo Dalence replaced Villarroel, whom COMIBOL miners blamed for the conflict, as Mining Minister. Dalence is a former COMIBOL miner and leader of the COMIBOL miners’ union (FSTMB). President Morales decreed that Posokoni and several surrounding mines would be completely controlled by the Huanuni Mining Company, a COMIBOL subsidiary. Cooperative miners who wanted to work the mine therefore needed to become employees of the state mining company. He also said that the government would help to rebuild the community, including hundreds of homes that were partially or fully destroyed during the violence.

Two of the four mining cooperatives working at Posokoni before the conflict agreed to become state employees. The remaining two cooperatives continued to fight for access to the mine and, in the weeks following the decree, blocked the highway between Oruro and Cochabamba. When police attempted to lift the blockade the protesting cooperative miners took a police officer hostage, strapped dynamite to his body and detonated it. The resulting injuries killed him.

Legal challenge to the Huanuni decree

On March 9, 2007, a National Unity (UN) party senator filed a petition with the Constitutional Tribunal charging that the transfer of Posokoni to state hands violates the constitution. The Mining Code prohibits from directly engaging in mining operations without a partnership or leasing the mine, to a cooperative or a private company for exploitation.[4] Concerned that the Tribunal, perceived to be aligned with the neoliberal governments that proceeded Morales, 4,000 state COMIBOL miners protested in front of the Constitutional Tribunal building in Sucre in April. During the protest a group of miners blew the doors of the Constitutional Tribunal open with dynamite, injuring two police officers.

In response the Constitutional Tribunal called for the government to guarantee its safety from threats and attacks from any groups attempting to violently coerce them. The president of the Constitutional Tribunal dramatically stated that as a result of the lack of security the tribunal was “fatally wounded.” The government spokesperson accused the UN senator of trying to stir up another conflict between the cooperative and COMIBOL miners and stated “the only way to avoid a repetition of these acts and another conflict between cooperative and [COMIBOL] miners is that the congressman withdraw his demand.”[5]

Aftermath of Huanuni

For the first nine months of the Morales government the constructing a new mining policy took a back seat to other issues such as hydrocarbons and the constitutional assembly. It appears that Morales administration was only compelled to intervene after 16 people died and 115 were injured. However, critics suggest that the Morales administration’s failure to address the crisis in Huanuni was an attempt to exacerbate mounting tensions in order to justify the reassertion of state control of the industry. In addressing the crisis, the government would be able to reign in the political power of cooperative miners, ease the introduction of increased mining taxes and carry out its nationalization plans.

Mining tax debate generates further conflict

Although the cooperative miners lost ground in the Huanuni conflict as a result of the firing of the Mining Minister, an ex-cooperativist, and a more direct state management of one of Bolivia’s most valued natural resources. Yet, the cooperative miners continue to be a force to reckon with for this government. In January 2007 the Morales administration began a campaign to increase national taxes on the mining sector. According to 2006 statistics, increased international demand and prices for Bolivian metals and minerals led to exports exceeding $1 billion (US) and net profits of around $600 million. The same year, in compliance with the Mining Code, companies paid only $67 million in taxes.[6] The government argued that the mining industry should be paying $300 million, or approximately 50% on the net earnings from both private investors and mining cooperatives.

Once again, cooperative miners flexed their political muscle and on February 6, 20,000 cooperative miners “shook up La Paz.” They marched through the streets in protest of the tax hike, detonating over 200 sticks of dynamite in less than two hours. The cooperative miners argued that they are not big private mining corporations and should not have to pay more taxes. The government accused the cooperative miners of supporting of private interests and said that all parties must pay more in order to help develop Bolivia and end poverty. Still, in an apparent concession, President Morales himself sat down for bilateral negotiations with them and reached an agreement. The agreement had three major points:

1. Both parties agreed on the principal that “whoever earns more, pays more” in order to protect smaller cooperatives from paying the same amount of taxes as large operations.

2. The cooperative miners agreed to create mechanisms to improving fiscal oversight – an important concession given the loose structures of the cooperatives.

3. The government gave two of the six seats on COMIBOL’s Board of Directors to cooperative miners which will also include two representatives each from the government and the COMIBOL miners’ union (FSTMB).

The Bolivian press criticized the Morales administration for giving into the pressure of the cooperative miners. However, the agreement temporarily eased relations between cooperative miners and the government. In March 2007 Morales abruptly replaced Mining Minister, Guillermo Dalence, with his vice minister, Luis Alberto Echazú. The Morales administration gave no official reason and the move upset COMIBOL miners and leaders of the Bolivia Workers Union who claimed that nationalization of the industry would be stalled.[7] On the other hand, the cooperative mining leaders praised the change and said that they expected to have better relations with Echazú, a metallurgic engineer and former consultant to mining unions.

Mining code outdated

Despite repeated calls for a new mining code and for a comprehensive government policy beginning in 2003, the last three administrations did little.[8] In contrast, the Morales government has proposed a partial nationalization of the mining sector and reasserted the public ownership of the mineral wealth of Bolivia. These proposals have been met with strong resistance by the cooperative miners who suffered through lay-offs and low prices for years. They fear that their increased income as a result of the boom will be taken away by the state and are prepared to defend their interests. It is still unclear how attempts to reshape mining policy will play out, but given the major differences between the various actors in the mining sector could make the not-so-easy nationalization of the hydrocarbons look like a walk in the park. Still, the Morales administration continues to demonstrate a desire to please the cooperative miners. Recently, they invited FENCOMIN leaders to “dialogue and review together” the May 1st decree in response to renewed threats to take to the streets.

First published at Andean Information Network


Notes

[1] Anderson, Steven T. “The Mineral Industry of Bolivia,” US Geological Survey Minerals Yearbook. 2004, p. 12.
[2] President Morales appointed Villarroel minister in return for leading cooperative miners in supporting his 2005 campaign.
[3] AIN interview with church and human rights workers and other witnesses in Huanuni.
[4] ANF. “El Gobierno le resta autoridad al Tribunal.”
April 28, 2007.
[5] The 1997 Mining Code, following neoliberal economic policies which dictated that state-run companies be sold to private investors, was designed to attract foreign direct investment in the mining industry at a time when mineral prices were half or less than what they are today.
[6] Bolpress. “Mas de 20 mil mineros hacen temblar a
La Paz:.” February 6, 2007. The Complimentary Mining Tax (CMT) is the principal tax paid on royalties in the mining industry. According to the Mining Code of 1997 mining companies pay a Corporate Income Tax (CIT) that is accredited to the CMT. The CMT is like a “prepayment” of the income tax. So, for example, if a company pays $100 CMT and their CIT is $120 then they are credited $100 through the CMT and pay only an additional $20. If the CMT is higher than their CIT then companies pay the total amount of the CMT and do not pay an additional amount for the CIT. See also Ley 1777: El Código Minero, Titulo VIII, Capitulo III, Art. 100. and “BOLIVIA: Mining Industry Sector Analysis 2006 International, U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service and U.S. Department of State.”
[7] The press reported that Dalence, who attended the installation of his replacement and was photographed congratulating him at the ceremony, offered his resignation after returning from an unauthorized trip to Cuba where he met with the mining ministers from Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, the other three countries who form the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas. President Morales, who ran on an anti-corruption platform and was in the midst of dealing with charges of corruption within MAS, was apparently bothered by the Dalence’s failure to go through the bureaucratic process authorizing his trip.
[8] Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, president from 1993-1998 and 2002 -2003, owned the majority of 5 concessions and a foundry through his company COMSUR, the largest Bolivian owned private mining company. The 1997 mining code was written during his first administration and approved by him, despite a clear conflict of interest. His successor, Carlos Mesa, had no political base, was consumed with a hydrocarbons law among other things, and thus had no way of addressing such politically volatile issues. After
Mesa’s resignation in 2005 the head of the Constitutional Tribunal, Alejandro Rodriguez, became interim president until elections were held in December 2005. Also see La Patria. “La minería revivió el 2006 con las buenas cotizaciones de los minerales.” March 14, 2007.

Bolivia Rising