Bolivian government authorizes workers to take over closed or abandoned firms
Richard Fidler, La Paz, Life on the Left
On October 7, President Evo Morales issued a government
decree that allows workers to establish “social enterprises” in businesses that
are bankrupt, winding up, or unjustifiably closed or abandoned. These
enterprises, while private, will be operated by the workers and qualify for
government assistance.
Morales issued Supreme
Decree 1754 at a ceremony in the presidential palace marking the 62nd anniversary of
the founding of the Confederación General de Trabajadores Fabriles de Bolivia
(CGTFB – the General Confederation of Industrial Workers of Bolivia). The
Minister of Labour, Daniel Santalla, said the decree was issued pursuant to
article 54 of Bolivia’s new Constitution, which states that workers
“in defense of their
workplaces and protection of the social interest may, in accordance with the
law, reactivate and reorganize firms that are undergoing bankrupty, creditor proceedings
or liquidation, or closed or abandoned without justification, and may form
communitarian or social enterprises. The state will contribute to the action of
the workers.”
In his remarks to the
audience of several hundred union members and leaders, President Morales noted
that employers often attempt to blackmail workers with threats to shut down
when faced with demands for higher wages. “Now, if they threaten you in that
way, the firm may as well go bankrupt or close, because you will become the owners.
They will be new social enterprises,” he said.
Labour Minister Santalla
noted that the constitutional article had already been used to establish some
firms, such as Enatex, Instrabol, and Traboltex, and that more such firms could
now be set up under the new decree.
Business spokesmen
predictably warned that the new provisions would be a disincentive to private
investment and risk the viability of companies.
Santalla also said that
firms that do not comply with their workforce obligations under the law will
lose preferential mechanisms to export their products to state-managed markets.
And he cited some recent cases in which the government had intervened in
defense of workers victimized for their attempts to form unions. In one such
case last month, Burger King, the company was fined 30,000 Bolivianos ($4,300
US), ordered to reinstate the fired workers and to recognize the union.
In the following article
Alfredo Rada, Bolivia’s Deputy Minister of Coordination with the Social
Movements, draws attention to some important developments within the country’s
labour movement and suggests some means by which the unions can be more
effectively incorporated within the “process of change” being championed by the
government of the MAS-IPSP, the Movement for Socialism – Political Instrument
for the Sovereignty of the Peoples. My translation from the Spanish.
-- Richard
Fidler
* * *
The working
class and the political process in Bolivia
Five months ago, I was in
Tarija participating in a forum debating the political process in Bolivia, a
process we call the Democratic and Cultural Revolution. One of those attending
asked me whether it was possible to deepen this revolution, to make it an
economic and social revolution, without the participation of the working class.
My immediate response was no, that to consolidate a period of transition to the
construction of a new form of communitarian socialism it was absolutely
necessary that the workers participate within the revolutionary social bloc
that has managed this process of transformations starting in 2000 in the
so-called water war, when the overthrow of neoliberalism began.
It was a very relevant
question since at that moment, in May of 2013, the mobilizations over the
Pensions Act called by the leadership of the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB –
Bolivian Workers Central) in opposition to the government of Evo Morales were
at their height.[1] Strongly influenced by ultraleft political tendencies
organized around the self-described “Partido de los Trabajadores” [PT --
Workers Party], the COB committed a monumental error in mobilizing their ranks
with fevered speeches calling for replacing Evo with “another government,” as a
leader of the urban teachers in Santa Cruz put it.
This maximalist orientation
led the COB inexorably to defeat, since the strike and the mobilizations never
met with popular support and in the end the union leadership had to retreat in
virtual disarray. The diversion that led to the defeat originated in the
characterization that the ultraleft makes of the present government as
“bourgeois and pro-imperialist,” a simplistic deceit peculiar to the political
currents of an excessively classist and workerist ideological mould that blocks
them from understanding the varied nature of the Bolivian social formation,
which can only be analyzed in terms that combine nation and class.
The present process of
change is made up of a dynamic deployment of social class struggles within
capitalism that are combined, sometimes in a contradictory way, with the historic
struggle of the indigenous nations against the internal capitalism. That is the
dialectical nature of this process, in which the anticapitalist and
anticolonialist structural tendencies expressed in the political action of
exploited classes and oppressed nations make possible the revolutionary
transformation of the economic relations of exploitation, the political
relations of exclusion and the cultural relations of oppression. Yet there is
always the risk that this course of transformations, as a result of external
pressures, internal fragmentation or programmatic concessions, will become
exhausted or reversed.
Turning to the conflict
with the COB, following its dénouement the government set itself the task of
rapidly mending its relationship with the working-class sectors while at the
same time the rank and file workers began to settle scores with the ultraleft
leaderships within the unions. That is what has just occurred in the Sindicato
Mixto de Trabajadores Mineros de Huanuni [Combined Union of the Mining Workers
in Huanuni], an emblematic organization because that district, located in the
western department of Oruro, has the largest proletarian concentration in the
entire country. Its 4,500 miners more than a year ago had elected a union
leadership radically opposed to the government. This leadership led in the May
strike, the blockade of roads in Caihuasi and the blowing up of a bridge
located in that locality. Today, weakened and isolated, that ultraleft that was
perched for some time in the Huanuni union has ended up being removed by a mass
general meeting of the workers, who also decided to approve the construction of
a new political pacto de unidad [unity agreement] with the government of
Evo Morales.
No doubt such repositioning
within the workers movement will have a major impact on the future of the PT
since that political instrument has now lost its backbone; the effects will
also be felt in the orientation of the Federación Sindical de Trabajadores
Mineros de Bolivia [Federation of Mining Workers of Bolivia] and in the COB
itself.
Let’s look at another
industrial sector, that of the construction workers. This is one of the fastest
growing sources of employment owing to the expansion in public and private
investment in new building construction. Everywhere in Bolivia’s cities you can
see building and housing complexes under way, and with them the hiring of many
workers as casual or piecework labour. But the unions in this sector are weak
and dispersed, partly because their leadership tends to be controlled by the
big construction companies but also because of the sparse regulation exercised
by the state.
This submissiveness of the
unions began to change at the most recent national congress of the
Confederación Sindical de Trabajadores en Construcción de Bolivia [Bolivian
Construction Workers Union Confederation], which met in the city of Santa Cruz.
The construction workers elected a new union leadership and set their sights on
the mandatory organizing of all the building workers, teachers and assistants,
replacing oral agreements with the bosses with collective labour contracts in
all construction projects. This will also be a means of overcoming the
situation of “informal workers” that is one of the worst legacies of
neoliberalism in a country in which less than 20% of the workers are unionized.
Manufacturing workers have
been one of the hardest-hit sectors, decimated by the massive layoffs
euphemistically labelled “relocations” by Supreme Decree 21060 of August 1985.
The manufacturing sector was subsequently subjected for almost two decades to
the labour flexibility policies of neoliberalism in order to reduce payloads
and increase the profits of capital.
Today the manufacturing
sector is undergoing a rapid reorganizing of the unions that has helped to
strengthen the Confederación General de Trabajadores Fabriles de Bolivia
[General Confederation of Manufacturing Workers of Bolivia]. Yet to be
consolidated is the organization of new unions, particularly in the cities of
El Alto and Santa Cruz, the two major concentrations of industrial factories in
Bolivia.
The importance given to
reincorporating workers in the process of transformations around a common
programmatic agenda with the Morales government lies not only in the fact that
it will help to bring together a strong labour base of support, but also that
it will strengthen the anti-imperialist and revolutionary tendencies in the
process. The programmatic agenda to which we refer could address the following
aspects: (1) a new General Labour Law which, while preserving the advances
already in the present law, will grant new rights to the workers; (2) a natonal
campaign of massive union organization in all industries that are unorganized;
and (3) the strengthening of the social and communitarian sector of the
economy, in alliance with the nationalized state sector.
Alfredo Rada is
Bolivia’s Deputy Minister of Coordination with the Social Movements.
[1] The COB demanded an
increase in state pensions to 8,000 bolivianos ($1140) annually for miners, and
5,000 bolivianos ($715) for other sectors. The government offered 4,000 and
3,200 bolivianos respectively ($600/$470), saying that any more would risk the financial
sustainability of its pension scheme.
The conflict saw miners,
teachers and health workers take to the streets of La Paz, while roadblocks and
strikes took place across the country. Police were deployed to break up
blockades in Cochabamba and La Paz, leading to several arrests and injuries,
while workers at the state-run Huanuni mine joined the La Paz protests,
paralysing tin production and costing several million dollars.
Other social sectors in
Bolivia organised counter-marches in favour of the government. Representatives
of the Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia
(CSUTCB), and the Confederación de Mujeres Campesinas y Originarias Bartolina
Sisa marched in La Paz to reject the blockades and mobilisations organised by
the COB, while coca workers also protested in favour of the government in
Cochabamba. At a rally in La Paz, Morales strongly criticised the COB leaders,
accusing them of being at the service of imperialism, capitalism and
neoliberalism.
After 16 days of protest, COB
leaders agreed to lift the strike for 30 days to allow time to analyse a
government offer to reform the current pensions system. Union leaders
negotiated for several days in La Paz with officials from the labour and
finance ministries, during which the union lowered its demand on pensions to
4,900 bolivianos for miners and 3,700 bolivianos ($700 and $530 respectively)
for other sectors. It remains to be seen whether permanent settlement can be
reached. (Source: “Strikes and blockades organised by trade unions in pension
protest,” Bolivia Information Forum, News Briefing May-June 2013)
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1 comment:
Bolivia rising is an excellent source of information and analysis for those of us not involved with Bolivia on a daily basis. And I find that it is not dogmatic, open to critique, which is rare in the left world.
Keep on truck´in
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