Evo Morales’ Victory Demonstrates How Much Bolivia Has Changed
Federico
Fuentes, TeleSUR in English
Predictions
by pollsters and commentators that Evo Morales would easily win Bolivia’s
October 12 presidential elections were confirmed when the incumbent obtained
over 60% of the vote.
Most
however differ over why, after almost a decade in power, Morales’ Movement
Towards Socialism (MAS) continues to command such a huge level of support.
Their
explanations tend to focus on specific economic or political factors, such as
booming raw material prices or the MAS’s ability to control and co-opt the
country’s social movements.
However,
to understand why Morales will soon become the longest serving head of state in
a country renowned for its history of coups and rebellions, it is necessary to
start with an acknowledgement of the profound changes that Bolivia has undergone
during his presidency.
Economic transformation
For
some, the old saying “it’s the economy, stupid” neatly summed up the reasons
for Evo’s victory.
They
argue Morales simply rode the wave of high commodity prices, or promoted the ongoing
expansion of lucrative extractivist industries, irrespective of social or
environment costs, in order to use these funds to boost his popularity.
Yet,
these views ignore (or purposely conceal) a basic truth, namely that Bolivia’s
economic success is a direct result of the MAS government’s program for
economic transformation.
This
program has focused on weakening transnational control over the local economy
and diversifying the economy away from its position of dependency on raw
material exports.
A
key plank of this program was Morales’ 2006 decree nationalizing the
all-important gas sector.
Without
this move, any increased windfall from higher commodity prices would have
inevitably flowed out of the country, as it had under previous governments.
Instead,
the capture and dramatic internal redistribution of Bolivia’s gas wealth helped
fuel a huge surge in domestic demand, as ordinary people were lifted out of
poverty and finally able to attend to their basic needs.
In
fact, Bolivia’s record growth rates had more to do with a booming internal
market than with external demand, which actually had a negative affect on
growth during the global economic crisis.
Increased
revenue derived from nationalization also enabled the Morales government to
take steps towards making the local economy less dependent on raw material
exports.
The
government launched its industrialization program, which will soon see Bolivia
go from a position of importing processed gas to exporting liquefied petroleum
gas and other derivatives (for much higher returns).
Furthermore,
the redistribution of gas revenue to other productive sectors has facilitated
growth in non-extractive based industries.
This
is particularly true for those sectors that provide livelihoods for a majority
of the MAS’s social base, which is largely comprised of small-scale farmers,
cooperative miners, street vendors and those employed in family businesses or
micro-enterprises.
Economic
diversification has also meant that growth in manufacturing outpaced both the
mining and gas sectors last year.
The
idea that Morales’ success is the result of external or internal economic
factors such as high commodity prices or dependence on existing extractive
industries is as simple as it is wrong.
The
truth is that support for Morales is actually a result of the economic
transformation that has taken place in Bolivia.
Political revolution
Many
analyses also ignore the critical role that Bolivia’s indigenous and social
movements have played in revolutionizing the country’s political set-up.
While
the nationalization of Bolivia’s gas was officially decreed by the Morales
government, it was in fact the direct result of years of struggle by the
Bolivian people.
At
the heart of these struggles was the demand to nationalize the gas in order to
redirect this wealth towards meeting peoples’ needs.
Unsurprisingly,
opinions differ as to what exactly should be done with this wealth.
Given
the highly organized and mobilized nature of Bolivia’s popular classes, these
differences have often been contested in the streets. As a result, the second
Morales government (2009-2014) witnessed the highest rate of protests for any
government in Bolivian history.
Only
a tiny minority of these protests focused on issues to do with resource
extraction.
The
overwhelming bulk revolved around disputes over resource redistribution. This
includes protests over access to basic services through to the redistribution
of electoral boundaries and concurrent changes in funding allocation, and
mobilizations against particular economic measures (for example, attempts to
clamp down on contraband or impose taxes on cooperative miners).
The
record number of protests would seem to go against the idea that the MAS has
successfully co-opted Bolivia’s social movements. Yet, it also begs the
question: if the Bolivian population is staging more protests than ever, why
does Morales continue to maintain his popularity?
The
explanation lies in the fact that Morales’ election heralded much more than the
arrival of the first indigenous person to the presidential palace. It marked
the onset of a political revolution that has gradually seen Bolivia’s old
political elites dislodged from power and replaced by representatives from the
country’s indigenous peoples and popular classes.
For
this majority, the MAS government represents a safeguard against a return to
the Bolivia of yesteryear, run by corrupt, white elites. More than that, for
most indigenous people and social movements, the MAS government is “their”
government.
This
does not mean that the people have handed the MAS a blank check. Already on
several occasions the MAS government has been forced to back down on certain
policies due to popular pressure.
However,
none of these protests have posed a fundamental challenge to the MAS’s overall
vision for Bolivia, precisely because this vision is largely informed by the
struggles and demands of the people themselves.
Instead,
these conflicts have primarily been disputes over how best to make this vision
a reality.
The
MAS’s response to date has been to follow an approach of seeking dialogue and
consensus, retreating where necessary but always attempting to continue to
drive the process forward towards its goal.
Morales
constantly sums up this approach using the Zapatista slogan “to govern by
obeying”.
It
was this approach that enabled the MAS to come into the elections with the
backing of all of the country’s main indigenous, campesino, worker and urban
poor organizations and to ensure its thumping victory.
The
failure of opposition forces and critics to recognize or accept the fact that a
political revolution has taken place and important economic transformations are
underway explains why they are so far out of touch with the majority of
Bolivian society.
Bolivia’s
process of change is far from complete, and it may yet falter. It may also be
dramatically impacted by events in the region, for example a change of
government in neighboring Brazil.
For
now, however, Bolivians have once again overwhelmingly chosen to push forward
with their process of change.
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