Federico Fuentes, Caracas
Although final figures will not be known until April 24, the results of Bolivia's April 4 regional elections have ratified the continued advance of the "democratic and cultural revolution" led by the country's first indigenous President Evo Morales.
However, it also highlights some of the shortcomings and obstacles the process of change faces.
Initial results from the election for governors, mayors and representatives to municipal councils and departmental assemblies have confirmed the Morales-led Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) as the sole political force with strong support across the nation.
It follows the historic 64% vote to reelect Morales and the two-thirds majority MAS obtained in the Plurinational Assembly last December.
MAS was formed in the mid-1990s by key Bolivian indigenous and peasant organisations in order to create their own political instrument. Many of these organisations are at the heart of the indigenous-led revolutionary movement that overthrew two presidents between 2000-05, before electing one of their own in December 2005.
The Morales government has implemented key demands of the indigenous and peasant organisations by nationalising gas reserves, allowing the people to participate in the rewrite of a new constitution that dramatic expands indigenous rights, and stimulating an increased sense of pride and dignity among the long-oppressed indigenous majority.
All this in the face of stiff right-wing opposition that, with its stronghold in the east, used its control over a majority of governorships to attack the Morales government -- climaxing with a failed coup attempt in September 2008.
Electoral advances
Of the nine governorships, current results show MAS winning in six, with a seventh too close to call. This is an increase from the three it won in 2005.
This means MAS has not only strengthened its hold on the west and centre (consolidating its hold on La Paz and Cochabamba after revoking previous opposition governors), but also further weakened the decomposing right-wing opposition in the east.
MAS looks set to capture the eastern department of Pando, and possibly Beni. The opposition has held onto the eastern departments of Santa Cruz and Tarija, but MAS's all-out campaigning in the east (home to much of Bolivia's natural resources and a sizeable white middle class) meant it penetrated deep into opposition heartland -- increasing its vote in the region.
MAS also won a strong presence in the departmental assemblies. These are the first elected regional bodies to have the power to legislate within the bounds of the regional autonomy outlined in the new constitution approved in January 2009.
MAS also increased the number of mayoralties it controls nationally to around 200-220 out of the 337 -- up from the 101 won in the 2004 poll.
Another feature of the elections was the introduction -- although limited -- of traditional indigenous customs for selecting representatives from Bolivia's 36 indigenous nations to departmental assemblies.
Using rights enshrined in the new constitution, indigenous nations selected between two to five representatives for each departmental assembly.
Five of the 11 municipalities that voted in favour of indigenous autonomy in local referendums last December elected their own mayors and councillors according to traditional customs in the lead up to regional elections.
The decisions were then ratified at the ballot box on April 4. The other six decided to elect candidates directly.
Bittersweet victory
Highlighting MAS's impressive numerical victory, Morales said that elections "are like soccer, the goals are what matter". Yet the result was a bittersweet one that throws into sharp relief some of the internal challenges the process of change faces.
MAS's national vote was 51% -- less than the 64% it obtained in December and well short of the 70% Morales spoke of in his speech to close MAS's campaign in La Paz.
The impressive showing in the east, the result of both a concerted campaign and some dubious alliances, was dampened by the loss in Tarija, which sits on 80% of Bolivia's gas.
Having won the vote in Tajira in December, MAS was certain it could defeat the incumbent governor, a fierce foe of Morales.
Alliances formed by MAS with local elites, such as the MAS candidate for Santa Cruz city, a business owner and ex-member of the right-wing Podemas party, and the recent recruitment of ex-militants of the fascist Santa Cruz Youth Union failed to net goals.
Instead, MAS paid a political and ideological cost for its alliances, losing in urban poor areas such as Plan Tres Mil in Santa Cruz. Rejection of such deals led people in these areas to vote for other candidates.
In Pando, a decision to stand candidates that did not belong to the MAS allowed it to win the governorship and 10 of the 15 mayoralties. However, it means MAS will now have to contend with "MAS mayors" that came from the old traditional parties.
Most significantly, the belief that Morales' overwhelming popularity could be automatically transferred to MAS candidates, many of whom were imposed from above, and the disregard for alliances with other progressive forces or social movements, led to something unthinkable only a few months ago: the emergence of a new opposition, the centre-left Movement of Those Without Fear (MSM).
Within months, MAS went from having a solid alliance with the MSM, headed by former La Paz mayor Juan Del Granado, to breaking all ties with the MSM and accusing them of being "neoliberal", "conspirators" and "corrupt".
The special attention paid by Morales to the campaign for the mayor of La Paz, and the ferocious attack on the MSM (viewed by many MAS supporters as unnecessary) was not enough to secure victory in the capital, a MAS stronghold.
The MSM also won a surprise victory against the MAS in the race for the mayor of Oruro, confirming the trend in urban areas of voting for non-MAS candidates.
The MSM stood MAS dissidents angered by the imposition of non-MAS members as MAS candidates. This policy allowed it to win mayoralties in mining areas with an indigenous majority in the north of Potosi and even Achacachi -- a heartland of Aymaran indigenous radicalism where Morales scored 98% in December.
Formerly considered a party restricted to the middle-class areas of La Paz, the MSM now has a presence in more than 100 municipalities.
Discontent among MAS-aligned social movements and supporters led to defeats in other areas where Morales has near unanimous support. A newly created party, led by a coca growers' union leader and former MAS senator Lino Villca, won in six municipalities in the coca growing regions and the altiplano (high plain area) of La Paz department.
The MAS won in the combative million-strong city of El Alto, but its vote dropped from more than 80% to below 40%.
The surprise was the relatively unknown outsider Soledad Chapeton, whose vote of 30% represented a rejection of the impositions by local union leaders.
Dangers
La Paz based journalist Pablo Stefanoni said the comments of a local woman on Radio Erbol, that the "vote on Sunday in La Paz is a warning sign to the process of change", summed up the feelings of many Bolivians.
An April 7 editorial in the pro-government daily Cambio said the results showed "the necessity to strengthen the process of structural change ... consolidate the direct participation of the organised people in the definition of affairs of the Plurinational State and in doing so eradicate improvisation, internal problems and the personal ambitions of some militants in the process of transformation underway".
On April 6, Morales commented on the MAS's defeat in areas that only months ago voted overwhelmingly for him. Morales blamed internal problems and the personal ambitions of some party leaders "that drag with them a colonial heritage due to which they believes their turn has come to stand for an executive position".
Dionisio Condori, a leader of the powerful United Union Confederation of Campesino Workers of Bolivia, said: "Our candidates where not taken into consideration because some leaders fell into the game of removing them and imposing others who were not known in the municipality."
But it is not just the problem of questionable figures from outside the MAS being imposed as candidates. The MAS is dominated by the specific interests of the different indigenous and peasant unions that make it up.
Its role in local governments has traditionally been characterised by resisting neoliberal governments and strengthening the position of their organisations.
However, today these same unions are part of the governing party and these practices have often been replaced by inefficiency and improvisation rather than promotion of new participatory forms of local governance.
The challenge of converting MAS from more than a sum of unions into a collective force for change that can nurture the growth of new cadres and participatory forms of local democracy is more pressing than ever.
The rise of a new opposition may open up space for something that has been sorely lacking: an open public debate on how to deepen the transformation of Bolivian society.
Through such a battle of ideas, as opposed to the type of denunciations and unconvincing slanging matches seen so far, the process will be able to solidify and extend its support base.
In this way, it can open itself up to new sectors and pave the way for the kind of broad alliances with all sectors genuinely committed to change that are vital to safeguarding and deepening the process.
Raul Prada, the vice-minister for strategic state planning, argued this requires drawing up a "critical balance sheet with the grassroots, with our organisations, with the movements, with the neighbourhood committees, a balance sheet of what has occurred … and to listen to criticism.
"We need to return to the practice of something we have not done for some time: self-criticism and carrying out a deep and objective reflection."
Showing posts with label autonomies. Show all posts
Showing posts with label autonomies. Show all posts
The Multinational State and the People, an Unprecedented Construction in Bolivia
Ximena Soruco Sologuren
Translated by Marcelo Virkel
Republished from Upside Down World
In January 2009 Bolivians adopted a New State Political Constitution, in which converged many histories and memories that coexisted during different cycles: the crisis of political parties, representative democracy and the neoconservative economic model caused pleas for the nationalization of resources and social control that echoed the 1952 Revolution -when miners, peasants and the middle class mobilized against the anti-nation (the conservative miner State). But also the memory of the anti-colonial struggles that transcended and confronted the Bolivian nation-state emerged with an unprecedented force: Tomás Katari, Tupac Katari (1781), Zárate Willka (1899), Guarayan leader Andrés Guayocho (1887), the battle of Kuruyuki de los guaraníes (1892), the movement of the empowered leaders (1900-1930), the Indigenismo and Katarismo (1970s), the demand for land and territory by lowlands indigenous people (1990s), etcetera.
Evo Morales embodies the intersection of the national-popular scope that emerged from within the nation-state during the Chaco War (1932-1936) and condensed during the 1952 Revolution, and the anti-colonial scope, whose resistance began during the conquest's early years and had its highest point in 1781, with incidents that were profound -because they emerged from outside of the nation-state-, but have not been so geographically widespread during the two hundred years of republican history, until now.
Is this an unprecedented intersection, in the sense that both scopes have been running in a parallel way without touching? If so, what is this intersection in reality and what are the alternatives of political construction open to us nowadays? The uprisings we mention have never been “pure” since they took place within the colonial context to which the national context latter superimposed, a fact that continued and intensified old contradictions in new ways; but certainly there was more symbolic weight in one scope or the other depending on who was leading the uprisings and forming the alliances, and if they were indigenous or mestizo. However, both scopes had to face the “colonial-national situation” that had created the clutter, that is, individuals experiencing different (ethnic, class, gender) dominance conditions within the system, and whose relationship with one another was one of a chained (self)denial (everyone on top of and against each other).
Thus, the expressions of anti-colonial resistance opted for subordinated alliance strategies with mestizo groups, villagers, artisans, miners, workers, and intellectuals. These alliances could dissolve due to their internal contradictions, until reaching a state of total confrontation. Similarly, national movements needed to address and organize the indigenous people as subordinates in order to achieve the proposed changes. Although these mestizo alliances in the national-popular scope had better success because they built new political systems, they ended up reproducing the modern nation-state that continued the colonial and capitalist dominance: the Republic's Independence, the Conservative State of 1899, the Nationalist State of 1952, and the Neoconservative State of 1985.
What are the possibilities of building something unprecedented, that is, to break the routine of the historical determinations and the gradual racial dominance that appears with unequal insertions under capitalism and modernity? What kind of organization among the groups that make up the motley of Bolivia will allow the achievement of hegemony without domination, but with enough strength to build a new political system? The challenge of this historical period seems to be the transformation of the clutter or the national-colonial situation into a complex organization without domination, an intersection between the indigenous and national-popular scopes strong enough to build something unprecedented. Neither decolonization understood only as “restitution” of the indigenous cultural identities nor realization of the modernity's unfulfilled promises. But what then?
The new Bolivian constitution raises this project -that still requires a political theory, an institutional engineering, and most importantly, the formation of new political subjetivities- of a multinational state. The preamble of the constitution recognizes these memories of resistance in order to build a new state: “The Bolivian people, of plural composition since the depth of history, inspired by past struggles; anti-colonial indigenous rebellion; independence; popular liberation struggles; indigenous, social and trade union marches; water and October wars; struggles for land and territory; with the memory of our martyrs, we build a new State.”
The alluded depth of history refers to the sources of resistance we had pointed out, both popular and indigenous; that is, it lies as a vertical rupture that crosses the layers of dominance: those of the colonial times that also burst into national cycles, and those of the national times that responded to the continual metamorphosis of dominance, but at the same time built new and shared senses of resistance.
But if the memory of the popular and indigenous past reactivates in the present as a power capable of paralysing the established order as it was by 2003 and building a new state as proposed in the constitution, an exercise of creation of alternatives appears. We think of this exercise as a relationship between people, state and pluralism that uses the nation-state as the general framework although reconfigured, because it considers the heterogeneity from an indigenous social and symbolic organization, that is, from a scope that is not modern.
The separation of scopes
The separation between what Zavaleta Mercado called “national-popular” and the anti-colonial rebellions occurred between the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but as a posteriori interpretation, that is, an interpretation made by the republican historiography that defined -under the frameworks of meaning at the time- which were and which were not pro-independence movements. The recognition of the struggles for independence in 1809 in what is now Bolivia, but which took place across the continent, separates from the anti-colonial indigenous tradition due to the concept of emancipation that it proposed. While Tupac Amaru and Tupak Katari were thinking about returning to a time prior to the Spanish colony, the pro-independence figures chose the project of the American Independence and the French Revolution: the establishment of a modern nation-state.
However, this separation is to be reviewed in our historiography -even the critical branch- because, for instance, Tupak Katari's rebellion cannot be considered only an attempt to return to a time before the Spaniards; it should be seen as the search to continue the civilizing development stopped by the conquest. But this continuity meant a rupture -even of the prehispanic tradition-, a democratization of the indigenous communities that broke not only the Spanish dominance but also the precolonial system of hereditary chiefs that had been included into the Spanish state machinery. It was not an archaic response, but something novel for the time. During this rebellion cycle in Upper Peru it was proposed that everybody “can rule through the king” and -probably for the first time- a rotation system to democratize the political power within the communities was installed -even before the French Revolution and without having had any contact with the independence ideas in the United States, since Tupak Katari did not speak or read Spanish, and therefore he could not have been familiar with such texts.
The profound questioning of this indigenous rebellion against the colonial and precolonial political systems, and its network of relations with the mestizo population was denied by the Creoles, who assumed (following the death and exclusion of popular pro-independence sectors) the leadership of the republic. Since then, the official perspective considered the cycle of indigenous rebellions as a “war of races” and not as a precedent for independence that aimed to achieve freedom from the colony, although with a scope that was different from the modern nation-state.
Following this early exclusion of the indigenous people, and until the second half of the twentieth century, a political system of citizenship for a Creole, literate, male and proprietor minority was built. This state lived off the tax imposed on indigenous people, enabled the usurpation of communal lands (which had even survived the Spanish colonial state) and, since the heyday of tin mining, joined the international market and system under construction through the exploitation of raw material and the disciplining of the workforce.
The 1952 Revolution, as a second national constituent moment, emerged under this context of dominance. The miners, sons of the tin capitalist enclave, managed to organize the indigenous people that had been mobilized to recover their land, and the middle class and urban workers who had been excluded from citizenship and the wealth they produced. The nationalization of mines, the declaration of universal citizenship, the destruction of ranches and the agrarian reform, and universal education had been achieved by the popular and indigenous movement, although it did not have its own political project. The revolution was offered to the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR), a political party that built a state capitalism, an agroindustrial bourgeoisie in the East, and an homogeneous nation through the mixing of races.
The colonial rule (denial of the indigenous people) and the capitalist domination (formal subsuming of labour and disruption of “precapitalist” economies) were reproduced in new ways. The indigenous community ended up being conceived as fragmented peasants with individual land deeds, hereditary fragmentation and consequent migration toward the cities; its new political form, the trade union, was corrupted by the military-peasantry pact. This political form legitimized dictatorial governments, the repression of miners and their insertion in the nation as mestizos, that is, the insertion required the denial of their origins and ways of life. The continuity of the state capitalism was only possible under military dictatorships that victimized the miner movement, privatized the land in the east of the country and, since 1985, dismantled the state enterprises. State capitalism, through dictatorship, ended in neoconservatism.
This history of social mobilizations that end up being functional to the dominance was repeated in this neoconservative cycle. The miner actor from the national-popular line had disappeared after the closure of the mines and the anti-colonial indigenous line was initially co-opted by the multicultural discourse. The privatization of state enterprises and of the Bolivian economy sought legitimization through multicultural social reforms, although these were subordinated to the transnational capital.
The end of the story in this country appeared as the abstract inclusion of the citizenship in diversity, individual and collective rights, standardized education -although bilingual. It was the image of a minimal state and of a nation as an amorphous mass of individuals organized by the markets, with the promised recognition of their economic, social, cultural and ethnic capitals as means of social advancement. In reality, producers and consumers numbered the fewest; the rest -in cities and in the countryside- were the indigenous people, and the poor and informal mestizos who could be disposed by the system.
The political crisis (that began in 2000 with the protest against the privatization of water, continued with the indigenous mobilizations against the excluding multiculturalism and the affirmation of both sides of Bolivia, and brought together all the indigenous and popular sectors behind the demand of gas nationalization), was the result of old and new unresolved contradictions. With different characteristics, the indigenous movement addressed and organized the popular sectors and faced its own political project: the construction of a multinational state.
How could the indigenous movement amalgamate other actors under a common project that was strong enough to topple the former order, overcome the opposition that was determined to end up in civil war and separatism, and adopt a new constitution? The long and painful path to the Constituent Assembly and the approval of the text demonstrate that, for the first time in republican history, the indigenous actor was able to organize the national-popular line with its scope of self-government in the construction of a new state. This unprecedented capacity of indigenous representation of the Bolivian nation (within the framework of a modern nation-state) had two conditions: the depletion of national representation, achieved by the decompopsition of the traditional national actors -mestizos and Creoles- and the rise of a new social relation within the clutter, viewed from the indigenous perspective. Let's see.
The depletion of national representation
The transformations in the political system that took place during the republican life were achieved through either popular or indigenous massive mobilizations; however, they always ended trapped in the reproduction of the colonial and capitalist contradictions. It seemed that while the questionings to the political system were made within the nation-state, the Creole mestizo leadership, that represented this political form since independence, was able to reposition in power. That is, despite the questioning of the elite actors (organized in conservative or protectionist versions, in regions as Chuquisaca and then La Paz, in different political parties), a new Creole-mestizo actor was able to channel the mobilizations and to achieve the representation of a national project.
Zavaleta Mercado uses the term “majestic paradox” to describe this “unprecedented ratification capacity of the ruling class across different state phases, immense social changes and even several modes of production. Thus, the same way a national revolution is similar to a bourgeois revolution made against the bourgeoisie, its own development places the factors at the service of the oligarchical-majestic reposition. The majestic charge is a true constant in the development of the history of Bolivia.”
However, something that could not have been foreseen until 2000, but had been born in the 1952 Revolution was the fact that this oligarchical-majestic reposition stopped being national-wide. When the MNR, and then Banzer's dictatorship gambled on the construction of a national agroindustrial bourgeoisie in the Bolivian East and a unifying miscegenation they did not imagine that this bourgeoisie would end up denationalized, unable to build a national project; in other words, there is a majestic recreation through regional, but not national miscegenation (cruceñidad -from Santa Cruz). That is why, although the political opposition to Evo Morales initially tried to organize several regions by demanding autonomy (the Media Luna -half moon-), it became a separatist project, a project to constitute a new nation-state.
This decomposition of the traditional national actor, and its inability to represent -not even in an apparent manner- a new national project, configures an unprecedented call to the indigenous actor to take charge of the nation. Based on the analysis we conducted, this call is the possibility of organizing actors under the national-popular scope (miners, workers, intellectuals, middle classes, teachers, regional identities) in a common project. This is the context of the rise of the multinational state.
Two important lessons of the history of social movements in the twentieth century are that there are no social laws or inevitable processes, that is, no changing process is guarantied; and secondly, that there is not only one actor -one collective actor is not enough to make transformations, especially in cluttered contexts as the Bolivian one where several ways of world organization, modes of production, constitution of subjetivities, political forms and heterogeneous (or not completely subsumed to capital) social densities coexist in contradiction. Thus, the multinational state is an attempt to build a political system that is able to coordinate these modes of world organization, these indigenous and non-indigenous cultures, beyond the capitalist colonialism. But this attempt, captured in the new state political constitution, is a starting point -not an ending point- that needs enough strength to become hegemonic, in the common sense of the majority, to be able to build a political institutionalization and to preserve in time (education). This strength is only possible if the indigenous actor does not think of itself as the only actor; in other words, if instead of becoming self-referential it is able to congregate other actors, worldviews, exclusions and needs, and so on, around the multinational state project.
Now the problem is that the organization of several actors in Bolivian history has taken place in moments of resistance -when the established order loses its legitimacy and becomes violent in its response to criticism- but gets weak and fragments once it has managed to construct a new political system. This happens also due to the fact that the moments of massive mobilization cannot be permanent because actors organized and mobilized around unifying questionings (nationalization of resources, land recovery) return to their private spheres, to their daily survival and specific demands. This demobilization allowed the majestic recreation in previous political cycles. So, what kind of aggregation would allow a more stable organization among several actors that could be maintained? We think that one possibility would be the coordination that has been done between the new multinational state and the autonomies as local communal and civic governments (in the regions). This constant organization, which does not consider the state as the synthesis of society, could be the contribution from the self-government indigenous scope.
However, before considering how we understand this scope, it is necessary to take up the lesson about the non-inevitability of history once more; not only because of the capability of reproduction that the dominance has, but also because it is possible to construct alternatives. I appeal to this lesson to avoid any static or dogmatic interpretation of the nation-state as a modern political form, dominant on its own right.
The modern nation-state -that had been born also from social revolutions against the Western feudal dominance, and from anti-colonial revolutions in the “Third World”- became the central political device to constitute the industrial capitalism world system, but today the nation-state (that sometimes even blocks globalization) is no longer needed by globalized financial capital. The global and local orders show this metamorphosis of capital, which tends to constitute strong political blocs and small political units that are defenceless against capital circulation.
This means that it is necessary to rethink the nation-state against capitalism and colonialism in the global context. Not doing so could result in a dangerous extrapolation (the mechanic application of the functionality of the nation-state for industrial capitalism to financial capitalism) that can be used by the right in Bolivia and Latin America. But we also believe that a way to rethink the nation-state is by overcoming the ethnocentrism that built it from a single and universal (bourgeois, proletarian, western) actor, and that projected the total homogenization of society by capital, and a single cultural and civilizing pattern.Translated by Marcelo Virkel
Republished from Upside Down World
A Formal Summons to World States by Indigenous First Nations and Peoples
Chimoré, Cochabamba , Bolivia
From the heart of
That, after 515 years of oppression and domination, here we stand; they have been unable to eliminate us. We have confronted and resisted the policies of ethnocide, genocide, colonization, destruction and plunder. The imposition of such economic systems as capitalism, characterized by interventionism, wars and socio-environmental disasters, a system that continues to threaten our ways of life as peoples.
That as a consequence of the neoliberal policy of domination of nature, the search for easy profits from the concentration of capital in a few hands and the irrational exploitation of natural resources, our Mother Earth is fatally injured, while the indigenous peoples are still being displaced from our territories. The planet is warming up. We are experiencing an unprecedented change in climate with ever-stronger and more frequent socio-environmental disasters, affecting all of us without exception.
That we are trapped in a great energy crisis, with the Age of Petroleum coming to an end, and without having found a clean alternative energy that can substitute for it in the necessary quantities to maintain that Western civilization that has made us totally dependent on hydrocarbons.
That this situation may be a threat that will leave us exposed to the danger that neoliberal and imperialist policies trigger wars for the last drops of the so-called black gold and blue gold, but may also give us the opportunity to make this new millennium a millennium of life, a millennium of balance and complementarity, without having to take advantage of energies that destroy Mother Earth.
That both the natural resources and the lands and territories we inhabit are ours for history, for birth, in law and for ever, and that the power to determine their use is fundamental to our ability to maintain our life, sciences, learning, spirituality, organization, medicines and food sovereignty.
That a new era is beginning, promoted by the original indigenous peoples, and bringing again times of change, times of Pachakuti,[1] in the times of the culmination of the Quinto Sol. [2]
That we welcome the adoption of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which is essential for the survival and well-being of the more than 370 million native peoples in some 70 countries of the world. After more than twenty years of struggle, it is responsive to our historical demand for self-determination of the peoples and recognition of ourselves and our collective rights.
The adopted Declaration contains a set of principles and norms that recognize and establish in the international regulatory system the fundamental rights of the Indigenous Peoples, those that must be the basis of the new relationship between the Indigenous Peoples, States, societies and cooperation throughout the world. In addition, therefore, to the other existing juridical instruments governing human rights, the Declaration is the new regulatory and practical basis for guaranteeing and protecting indigenous rights in various spheres and at various levels.
We call on the member countries of the United Nations and encourage the indigenous peoples to implement and comply with this important instrument of historical significance. We censure those governments that have voted in opposition to the Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples, and condemn their double standards.
That we pledge to support the historical effort being led by our brother Evo Morales, President of the Indigenous Peoples of Abya Yala,[3] in the construction of a new
Accordingly, the Indigenous Peoples and Nations of the world demand that the States fulfill the following mandates:
1. To construct a world based on the Culture of Life, in the identity, philosophy, world view and age-old spirituality of the original indigenous peoples, applying the aboriginal knowledge and skills, strengthening the processes of interchange and brotherhood among the nations and respecting self-determination.
2. To make national and international decisions to save Mother Nature from the disasters that are being brought about by capitalism in its decline, as manifested in global warming and the ecological crisis; reaffirming that the original indigenous culture is the only alternative means of saving our planet earth.
3. To replace the present models of development based on capitalism, commodities, the irrational exploitation of humanity and natural resources, the squandering of energy, and consumerism, with models that establish life, complementarity, reciprocity, respect for cultural diversity and the sustainable use of natural resources as the principal priorities.
4. To implement national policies governing Food Sovereignty as a principal basis of National Sovereignty, in which the community guarantees respect for its own culture as appropriate spaces and modes of production, distribution and consumption consistent with the nature of healthy pollutant-free foods for the entire population, eliminating hunger, because food is a right to life.
5. To repudiate schemes and projects for the generation of energy such as biofuel, which destroy and deny food to the peoples. Likewise, we condemn the use of transgenic seeds because it replaces our ancient seeding process and makes us dependent on agro-industry.
6. To recognize and re-evaluate the role of the original indigenous woman as the vanguard of the emancipatory struggles of our peoples in accordance with the principles of duality, equality and equity of relationships between men and women.
7. To adopt the Culture of Peace and Life as a guide for resolving the world’s problems and conflicts, renouncing the arms race, and to initiate disarmament in order to guarantee the preservation of life on this planet.
8. To adopt the just legal transformations that are necessary for the construction of systems and means of communication and information based on our world view, spirituality and communal philosophy, in the wisdom of our ancestors. To guarantee recognition of the indigenous peoples’ right to communication and information.
9. To guarantee respect for and the right to life, health and bilingual intercultural education, incorporating policies of benefit to the indigenous first nations and peoples.
10. To declare water to be a human right, a vital element and social property of humanity and not a source of profit. Likewise, to encourage the use of alternative energies that do not threaten the life of the planet, thereby guaranteeing access to all basic services.
11. To solve cases of migration between countries in a mutually responsible way, adopting policies of free circulations of persons in order to guarantee a world without borders in which there is no discrimination, marginalization and exclusion.
12. To decolonize the United Nations, and move its headquarters to a territory that dignifies and expresses the just aspirations of the Peoples, Nations and States of the world.
13. Not to criminalize the struggles of the indigenous peoples, or demonize or accuse us of terrorism when we reclaim our rights and advance our ideas on how to save life and humanity.
14. To release immediately the indigenous leaders imprisoned in various parts of the world, and in the first place Leonard Peltier in the
The struggle is unceasing, we will continue our resistance until our time comes. We proclaim the 12th of October the “day of commencement of our struggles to save Mother Nature”.
From our families, homes, communities, peoples, whether in government or without, we ourselves are determining and directing our destinies, we ourselves are assuming the will and responsibility to live well that has been bequeathed to us by our ancestors, to expand, from the simplest and least complicated to the greatest and most complex, to construct horizontally and mutually, each and every one, the culture of patience, the culture of dialogue and fundamentally the Culture of Life.
By the dead, the heroes and martyrs that lend meaning to our lives through their utopias and longings, we strengthen our identity, our organizational processes and our struggles to build the unity of the peoples of the world and to restore the balance, saving life, humanity and the planet earth.
We confirm our support for the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to brother Evo Morales for his ongoing and unconditional dedication to the good of humanity, the peoples, the planet and world peace.
Translated from America Latina en Movimiento for
[1] “Pachakuti is a Quechua word with multiple meanings. Literally meaning turning or returning (kuti) of the earth (pacha), it is translated alternatively as ‘new beginning’, ‘reawakening’, ‘revolution’, or ‘renovation’. ... It has replaced Tupaj Katari as the key symbol of indigenous resistance in the Andes, as demonstrated by its use in indigenous political parties’ names in Ecuador (Movimiento Unido Pluricultural Pachakutik) and Peru (Partido Inka Pachacúteq), as well as Felipe Quispe’s Movimiento Indígena Pachakutik. Pachakuti is also the name of a prominent 15th-century Inca leader who ruled during a time of territorial expansion (personal communication, José Antonio Lucero, 4 Dec. 2002).” – Donna Lee Van Cott, “From Exclusion to Inclusion:
[2] Literally, the Fifth Sun. See http://www.mexconnect.com/mex_/mysfifthsun.html.
[3] “Continent of Life”. See http://abyayala.nativeweb.org/about.html.
The Constituent Assembly that could not be
Pablo Stefanoni, Pulso
Although prepared to “sweeten” its reforms, the government has not found a way to implement them. The dilemma of the “revolution in democracy” is still unresolved.
In three months Evo Morales will celebrate two years in the Palacio Quemado, Bolivia’s presidential office. His political standing remains high, with polls showing about 60% popular approval of his management.
This mass support for his leadership is somewhat independent of the government’s day-to-day difficulties — which are many — and it is the “bad” ministers who still take the blame for those. The reasons for the popularity of this leader, still a cocalero or coca farmer, and of his agenda of people’s nationalism with a developmentalist and redistributionist gloss that makes up the ideology of most of his government, are no mystery. On the one hand, the nationalization of the gas industry, which a year and a half later continues to inspire dreams among the masses of overcoming economic backwardness and “being like Switzerland”. On the other hand, most poor Bolivians, mainly farmers, strongly identify with the “first indigenous President in the history” of the nation. All of this in the context of the favourable macro-economic situation, linked with the international boom in raw materials prices that has produced record exports. To which must be added the investment in infrastructural projects using the gas income captured by the State as a result of the nationalizations, and Venezuela’s cooperation — expressed, among other things, in the financing of municipal development projects. As well, to a large degree an economic policy which continues to be framed by neoliberal formulas of a monetarist nature that promote fiscal equilibrium and avoid the use of such economic variables as controlled inflation as instruments for the redistribution of the surplus.
Stalemate again?
However, if 2006 was the year of the major announcements and utopias, 2007 is becoming the year when the truth is revealed about the limits to further progress in a “reformism with reforms” and to laying the initial foundations for a new institutionalization and trying to salvage the Constituent Assembly, which is close to shutting down because of the harassment of the hardest elements of the Right (who never wanted it) but also because of the difficulties the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) has in spelling out its agenda for change. The government’s management is wilting under the heavy media barrage but there is also little sense of continuity and an absence of clear strategic criteria that would help to generate a program of firm and sustainable management. So the “disastrous stalemate” threatens to return (if it hasn’t already). None of the political currents are managing to impose their vision of the country — although they can exercise a veto — nor is there any consensus on seeking a compromise agreement. Despite the discrediting of the old conservative politics, it is still much more influential in Bolivia than it is in Venezuela, Argentina or Ecuador, owing to its regional roots.
The Constituent Assembly was initially proposed by the indigenous people of the lowlands (Eastern Bolivia) in 1990, but the demand took on a national character in the “water war” of April 2000 and even more with the “gas war” of October 2003 along with the demand for nationalization of the hydrocarbons industry. The Congress was formally convened in March 2006, but in its very first year of operations a structural problem in Bolivia became clear: the chronic difficulty in translating the people-oriented projects (often expressed in “refoundational” terms) into realistic and effective institutional proposals for political, economic and social change. In addition to the MAS’s relative inability to articulate the corporate demands of its component sectors, the conception of the new Magna Carta as a trade-union “list of demands”; the ambivalent influence of the NGOs in the absence of suitable cadres of the indigenous left; and the deep differences between the peasant and urban middle class components conspired against the “constituent power”, conceived as a step to going beyond the neocolonial and neoliberal Bolivia.
The coup de grâce to agreement originated in the demand by one sector — always a minority — in Sucre, led by the mayor, Aydée Nava, to become again the seat of the Executive and Legislative powers (although it was sometimes that in practice). Obliged to meet in the “culta Charcas”,[1] the Constituent Assembly became a virtual hostage to the violent groups, headed by the university students, who under the banner of “full capital status” for Sucre and not a few racist insults (such as “If you don’t jump you’re a llama” during the demonstrations) pressed to introduce this theme into the agenda.
Sweetened reforms
In view of the increasing violence, it was decided to suspend the Assembly’s sessions for one month. This was the only way to calm things down and obtain an opening for an uncertain dialogue in an attempt to find a political agreement to bring about a new Magna Carta that, under the anticipated deadlines, would be drafted by next December 14. To avoid renewed confrontations, the government leaders appreciably toned down expectations in the Assembly. “Changing everything” became “constitutionalizing what has been done” by Evo Morales, including the introduction of “padlocks” to prevent the future privatization of natural resources. At the same time, there was a sweetening of controversial proposals such as the “fourth social power” — which became a sort of social forum outside the state structure — or the “plurinational State” which, in practice, will consist in a deepening of the municipal autonomies established in the 1990s.[2] The MAS rejected proposals for ethnic representation in a future legislative chamber that would, if adopted, have replaced the Senate — and this has alienated such ethnic organizations as the Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyo (Conamaq, the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu) or the Confederación de Indígenas del Oriente Boliviano (Cidob, the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Eastern Bolivia).
However, the reversion of unproductive latifundias to the State without compensation has been maintained, as is the recognition of departmental autonomy demanded by the so-called “half moon” led by Santa Cruz. But where the MAS can not yield, notwithstanding the opposition of the Right, is in the dispute over the indefinite re-election of the president — with the possibility of a recall referendum — which is key to the continuity of the present government. There are no stand-ins, and under the present Constitution, neither the President nor the Vice-President are entitled to a second term of office. The MAS objective now is to isolate the hard Right and reach an agreement with UN (Unidad Nacional) and the MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario). With those parties, the government leaders could obtain the two-thirds majority needed to avoid having controversial measures go to a popular vote for approval in the referendum provided for the final text of the new Magna Carta. But with each concession fewer Bolivians believe that this Constitution will in fact be adopted. Nevertheless, one possible interpretation of this evolution would be that it would advance the “pactista” or negotiating course favored by Vice-President Álvaro García Linera, which has been resisted for months by peasant representatives in the Assembly. Still to be resolved is whether this is a gradualist road — and with greater institutional density — to consolidate the process of change or a slowing down of the reforms and a short-sighted bet on governability (and re-election) in the context of the early elections under the new Constitution which, as Morales announced months ago, should be held in 2008.
Notwithstanding the talk about the “original” nature of the Constituent Assembly, the power was on the other side (and the legislation that created it, negotiated rapidly, was a constraint that is hard to undo). It is now clear that the MAS’s bargaining position is weaker than it was at the commencement of the Assembly, when the opposition had just suffered a huge electoral and political defeat. Right-wing personalities who then seemed out of the loop have returned, occupying spaces in the media with greater legitimacy than they had a few months ago.
Trials of the opposition
Still, the key to the “stalemate” is that the opposition’s actions are also displaying substantial limits. The recent civic strikes in “defense of democracy”, last August 28, and the weakening of the movement in Sucre[3] have revealed the fragility of the opposition. The violence exercised by assault groups like the Unión Juvenil Cruceñista [UJC – Union of Youth of Santa Cruz], in an effort to alter the balance of forces, triggered strong criticism, even from newspapers like La Razón, which characterized these militants as “fascists”. In addition to the photos of pro-autonomy youth running over a shopkeeper while they fled after looting a market stall, there was the postcard, circulated on the Internet, of two UJC members “patrolling” Santa Cruz on the roof of a red truck with swastikas prominently painted on its doors. On the other hand, Radio Erbol revealed that the workers in the Rico cooking oil plant owned by Branko Marinkovic, the president of the Santa Cruz civic committee and a promoter of the strike, were forced to work in the plant behind locked doors, even though “they were officially on strike”! Meanwhile, there was an obvious lack of compliance with the strikes in the barrios of the urban masses and the rural areas. In Santa Cruz, Tarija or Chuquisaca, the countryside continues to be an “Evista” bastion and a political counterweight to the local elites linked to the latifundist structure that survived and was consolidated after the 1953 agrarian reform.
In this context, a group of moderate personalities in Santa Cruz has published the manifesto “We are all Santa Cruz” in which they denounce the fact that “anyone who is not in heartfelt agreement with the official discourse that is supposedly characteristic of Santa Cruz, who does not endorse its violence, who do not accept its dogmas, is condemned to civil death.” These personalities are thus taking their distance from the Junta Nacional Democrática that is promoted by the civic and business committees in Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Tarija, Chuquisaca and Cochabamba and represented by [the political party] Podemos.
“October 17”
Notwithstanding the obstacles, it is clear that Bolivia is going through a turnover of elites that some well-to-do sectors read as the first breath of an “ethnic revenge” by the indigenous peoples. These groups of Spanish origin now recall that “in Bolivia we are all mestizos”, although some of their members are unable to contain their racist remarks. Referring to the stalemate in the Constituent Assembly, Manfredo Kempff, a former foreign minister and spokesman for [ex-dictator] Hugo Banzer, asked: “What could a collection of sheep-herders, cocaleros and road-blockers, suckled by the NGOs, have to offer the country? ... The Constituent Assembly has been very democratic, agreed. But it verges on irresponsibility to claim that illiterates can legislate.” Still, a quick “sociological” overview of Evo Morales’ cabinet produces an image that is far from Indian ethnofundamentalism: only the foreign minister, David Choquehuanca, identifies himself as Indian, and besides him there is the Minister of Justice, Celima Torrico, herself a cocalera farmer by origin. That is why some radical Indian intellectuals talk of the existence of a “white-dominated environment” that is distancing Evo Morales from his base “under an indigenous mask”.
A recent editorial in Pulso noted: “Behind these disconnects there are two political elites at work. One, which is on the rise under the banner of equality and wants to distribute wealth and power at a high institutional cost; and another, which resists under the banner of freedom and defence of institutionality. Bolivia is going through the umpteenth version of the dispute that has paralyzed it from the beginning: the struggle over an insufficient quantity of resources”. And García Linera himself argues that any process of transformations involves tensions and that he is hoping that “the counter-revolutionary Right will not appropriate the conservative space, where there is a democratic Right”.
The problem, as an old Argentine Peronista militant has said, is that “Evo, unlike Chávez, has not had his 17th of October.” The reference here is to the day in 1945 when hundreds of thousands of workers and slum dwellers from the deprived neighbourhoods of Buenos Aires took to the streets, almost completely spontaneously, to demand the release of Perón, who was being held by the military junta to which he had belonged. And the election is not decisive; the need is to transform the political-electoral majority into a new, lasting political hegemony.
The State is not the “synthesis of the general will” but a correlation of forces, which must be built. It is still favourable to the popular sectors, because of the inertia of the October agenda and the initial “heroic” actions of the government. But this will not be so indefinitely. Nor will the conviction that “history is on our side” do the job. Politics is a permanent fight for legitimacy.
The challenge, in any case, is how to move this process forward — peacefully, but without demobilizing the plebeian urges to refound Bolivia — a process tending to build a Republic that is more egalitarian than the one that has prevailed since the country was founded in 1825.
Translated from Pulso by Richard Fidler
Notes
[1] The colonial epithet for the criollo/mestizo minority that has pillaged the Republic, irrigating the history of Bolivia with Indian blood. See http://bolivia.indymedia.org/node/804/print. – Translator.
[2] In the municipalities with an indigenous majority, some “traditional customs”, such as communitarian justice, are respected, and if these are consistent with those of other municipalities they may give rise to “indigenous regions”.
[3] Radio Erbol showed that the number of hunger strikers was a third of what was claimed by the sponsors of “full capital status”.
Although prepared to “sweeten” its reforms, the government has not found a way to implement them. The dilemma of the “revolution in democracy” is still unresolved.
In three months Evo Morales will celebrate two years in the Palacio Quemado, Bolivia’s presidential office. His political standing remains high, with polls showing about 60% popular approval of his management.
This mass support for his leadership is somewhat independent of the government’s day-to-day difficulties — which are many — and it is the “bad” ministers who still take the blame for those. The reasons for the popularity of this leader, still a cocalero or coca farmer, and of his agenda of people’s nationalism with a developmentalist and redistributionist gloss that makes up the ideology of most of his government, are no mystery. On the one hand, the nationalization of the gas industry, which a year and a half later continues to inspire dreams among the masses of overcoming economic backwardness and “being like Switzerland”. On the other hand, most poor Bolivians, mainly farmers, strongly identify with the “first indigenous President in the history” of the nation. All of this in the context of the favourable macro-economic situation, linked with the international boom in raw materials prices that has produced record exports. To which must be added the investment in infrastructural projects using the gas income captured by the State as a result of the nationalizations, and Venezuela’s cooperation — expressed, among other things, in the financing of municipal development projects. As well, to a large degree an economic policy which continues to be framed by neoliberal formulas of a monetarist nature that promote fiscal equilibrium and avoid the use of such economic variables as controlled inflation as instruments for the redistribution of the surplus.
Stalemate again?
However, if 2006 was the year of the major announcements and utopias, 2007 is becoming the year when the truth is revealed about the limits to further progress in a “reformism with reforms” and to laying the initial foundations for a new institutionalization and trying to salvage the Constituent Assembly, which is close to shutting down because of the harassment of the hardest elements of the Right (who never wanted it) but also because of the difficulties the Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) has in spelling out its agenda for change. The government’s management is wilting under the heavy media barrage but there is also little sense of continuity and an absence of clear strategic criteria that would help to generate a program of firm and sustainable management. So the “disastrous stalemate” threatens to return (if it hasn’t already). None of the political currents are managing to impose their vision of the country — although they can exercise a veto — nor is there any consensus on seeking a compromise agreement. Despite the discrediting of the old conservative politics, it is still much more influential in Bolivia than it is in Venezuela, Argentina or Ecuador, owing to its regional roots.
The Constituent Assembly was initially proposed by the indigenous people of the lowlands (Eastern Bolivia) in 1990, but the demand took on a national character in the “water war” of April 2000 and even more with the “gas war” of October 2003 along with the demand for nationalization of the hydrocarbons industry. The Congress was formally convened in March 2006, but in its very first year of operations a structural problem in Bolivia became clear: the chronic difficulty in translating the people-oriented projects (often expressed in “refoundational” terms) into realistic and effective institutional proposals for political, economic and social change. In addition to the MAS’s relative inability to articulate the corporate demands of its component sectors, the conception of the new Magna Carta as a trade-union “list of demands”; the ambivalent influence of the NGOs in the absence of suitable cadres of the indigenous left; and the deep differences between the peasant and urban middle class components conspired against the “constituent power”, conceived as a step to going beyond the neocolonial and neoliberal Bolivia.
The coup de grâce to agreement originated in the demand by one sector — always a minority — in Sucre, led by the mayor, Aydée Nava, to become again the seat of the Executive and Legislative powers (although it was sometimes that in practice). Obliged to meet in the “culta Charcas”,[1] the Constituent Assembly became a virtual hostage to the violent groups, headed by the university students, who under the banner of “full capital status” for Sucre and not a few racist insults (such as “If you don’t jump you’re a llama” during the demonstrations) pressed to introduce this theme into the agenda.
Sweetened reforms
In view of the increasing violence, it was decided to suspend the Assembly’s sessions for one month. This was the only way to calm things down and obtain an opening for an uncertain dialogue in an attempt to find a political agreement to bring about a new Magna Carta that, under the anticipated deadlines, would be drafted by next December 14. To avoid renewed confrontations, the government leaders appreciably toned down expectations in the Assembly. “Changing everything” became “constitutionalizing what has been done” by Evo Morales, including the introduction of “padlocks” to prevent the future privatization of natural resources. At the same time, there was a sweetening of controversial proposals such as the “fourth social power” — which became a sort of social forum outside the state structure — or the “plurinational State” which, in practice, will consist in a deepening of the municipal autonomies established in the 1990s.[2] The MAS rejected proposals for ethnic representation in a future legislative chamber that would, if adopted, have replaced the Senate — and this has alienated such ethnic organizations as the Consejo Nacional de Ayllus y Markas del Qullasuyo (Conamaq, the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qullasuyu) or the Confederación de Indígenas del Oriente Boliviano (Cidob, the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of Eastern Bolivia).
However, the reversion of unproductive latifundias to the State without compensation has been maintained, as is the recognition of departmental autonomy demanded by the so-called “half moon” led by Santa Cruz. But where the MAS can not yield, notwithstanding the opposition of the Right, is in the dispute over the indefinite re-election of the president — with the possibility of a recall referendum — which is key to the continuity of the present government. There are no stand-ins, and under the present Constitution, neither the President nor the Vice-President are entitled to a second term of office. The MAS objective now is to isolate the hard Right and reach an agreement with UN (Unidad Nacional) and the MNR (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario). With those parties, the government leaders could obtain the two-thirds majority needed to avoid having controversial measures go to a popular vote for approval in the referendum provided for the final text of the new Magna Carta. But with each concession fewer Bolivians believe that this Constitution will in fact be adopted. Nevertheless, one possible interpretation of this evolution would be that it would advance the “pactista” or negotiating course favored by Vice-President Álvaro García Linera, which has been resisted for months by peasant representatives in the Assembly. Still to be resolved is whether this is a gradualist road — and with greater institutional density — to consolidate the process of change or a slowing down of the reforms and a short-sighted bet on governability (and re-election) in the context of the early elections under the new Constitution which, as Morales announced months ago, should be held in 2008.
Notwithstanding the talk about the “original” nature of the Constituent Assembly, the power was on the other side (and the legislation that created it, negotiated rapidly, was a constraint that is hard to undo). It is now clear that the MAS’s bargaining position is weaker than it was at the commencement of the Assembly, when the opposition had just suffered a huge electoral and political defeat. Right-wing personalities who then seemed out of the loop have returned, occupying spaces in the media with greater legitimacy than they had a few months ago.
Trials of the opposition
Still, the key to the “stalemate” is that the opposition’s actions are also displaying substantial limits. The recent civic strikes in “defense of democracy”, last August 28, and the weakening of the movement in Sucre[3] have revealed the fragility of the opposition. The violence exercised by assault groups like the Unión Juvenil Cruceñista [UJC – Union of Youth of Santa Cruz], in an effort to alter the balance of forces, triggered strong criticism, even from newspapers like La Razón, which characterized these militants as “fascists”. In addition to the photos of pro-autonomy youth running over a shopkeeper while they fled after looting a market stall, there was the postcard, circulated on the Internet, of two UJC members “patrolling” Santa Cruz on the roof of a red truck with swastikas prominently painted on its doors. On the other hand, Radio Erbol revealed that the workers in the Rico cooking oil plant owned by Branko Marinkovic, the president of the Santa Cruz civic committee and a promoter of the strike, were forced to work in the plant behind locked doors, even though “they were officially on strike”! Meanwhile, there was an obvious lack of compliance with the strikes in the barrios of the urban masses and the rural areas. In Santa Cruz, Tarija or Chuquisaca, the countryside continues to be an “Evista” bastion and a political counterweight to the local elites linked to the latifundist structure that survived and was consolidated after the 1953 agrarian reform.
In this context, a group of moderate personalities in Santa Cruz has published the manifesto “We are all Santa Cruz” in which they denounce the fact that “anyone who is not in heartfelt agreement with the official discourse that is supposedly characteristic of Santa Cruz, who does not endorse its violence, who do not accept its dogmas, is condemned to civil death.” These personalities are thus taking their distance from the Junta Nacional Democrática that is promoted by the civic and business committees in Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, Tarija, Chuquisaca and Cochabamba and represented by [the political party] Podemos.
“October 17”
Notwithstanding the obstacles, it is clear that Bolivia is going through a turnover of elites that some well-to-do sectors read as the first breath of an “ethnic revenge” by the indigenous peoples. These groups of Spanish origin now recall that “in Bolivia we are all mestizos”, although some of their members are unable to contain their racist remarks. Referring to the stalemate in the Constituent Assembly, Manfredo Kempff, a former foreign minister and spokesman for [ex-dictator] Hugo Banzer, asked: “What could a collection of sheep-herders, cocaleros and road-blockers, suckled by the NGOs, have to offer the country? ... The Constituent Assembly has been very democratic, agreed. But it verges on irresponsibility to claim that illiterates can legislate.” Still, a quick “sociological” overview of Evo Morales’ cabinet produces an image that is far from Indian ethnofundamentalism: only the foreign minister, David Choquehuanca, identifies himself as Indian, and besides him there is the Minister of Justice, Celima Torrico, herself a cocalera farmer by origin. That is why some radical Indian intellectuals talk of the existence of a “white-dominated environment” that is distancing Evo Morales from his base “under an indigenous mask”.
A recent editorial in Pulso noted: “Behind these disconnects there are two political elites at work. One, which is on the rise under the banner of equality and wants to distribute wealth and power at a high institutional cost; and another, which resists under the banner of freedom and defence of institutionality. Bolivia is going through the umpteenth version of the dispute that has paralyzed it from the beginning: the struggle over an insufficient quantity of resources”. And García Linera himself argues that any process of transformations involves tensions and that he is hoping that “the counter-revolutionary Right will not appropriate the conservative space, where there is a democratic Right”.
The problem, as an old Argentine Peronista militant has said, is that “Evo, unlike Chávez, has not had his 17th of October.” The reference here is to the day in 1945 when hundreds of thousands of workers and slum dwellers from the deprived neighbourhoods of Buenos Aires took to the streets, almost completely spontaneously, to demand the release of Perón, who was being held by the military junta to which he had belonged. And the election is not decisive; the need is to transform the political-electoral majority into a new, lasting political hegemony.
The State is not the “synthesis of the general will” but a correlation of forces, which must be built. It is still favourable to the popular sectors, because of the inertia of the October agenda and the initial “heroic” actions of the government. But this will not be so indefinitely. Nor will the conviction that “history is on our side” do the job. Politics is a permanent fight for legitimacy.
The challenge, in any case, is how to move this process forward — peacefully, but without demobilizing the plebeian urges to refound Bolivia — a process tending to build a Republic that is more egalitarian than the one that has prevailed since the country was founded in 1825.
Translated from Pulso by Richard Fidler
Notes
[1] The colonial epithet for the criollo/mestizo minority that has pillaged the Republic, irrigating the history of Bolivia with Indian blood. See http://bolivia.indymedia.org/node/804/print. – Translator.
[2] In the municipalities with an indigenous majority, some “traditional customs”, such as communitarian justice, are respected, and if these are consistent with those of other municipalities they may give rise to “indigenous regions”.
[3] Radio Erbol showed that the number of hunger strikers was a third of what was claimed by the sponsors of “full capital status”.
Manifesto to the Bolivian People
Summit of the social organisations of the indigenous, originario, campesino peoples and nations and the popular organisation of the cities of the Bolivia
The demand for a Constituent Assembly arose as a democratic and peaceful response by the working people, in the face of the genocide and massacres by Banzer, Tuto Quiroga, Sanchez de Lozada, the same ones who preferred to drown the homeland in blood or divide the country rather that lose their class and caste privileges.
It was the democratic vote of the people which guaranteed the convoking of the Constituent Assembly, it was the democratic vote which elected the constituent delegates, providing space for minorities and majorities, with the responsibility of uniting Bolivians, ending injustices and recognising the rights of the excluded and discriminated indigenous peoples.
That is why today, at the same time as telling Bolivia and the world that we are here, standing up with dignity and commitment in order to defend to Constituent Assembly, we call on all Bolivian people, workers and business owners, indigenous peoples and mestizos, citizens of the east and west, students, professionals, middle classes, neighbours, house wives and young people who love our beloved homeland to struggle, distribute, mobilise and defend the following 18 strategic points of the new Political Constitution of the State that will guarantee the democratic unity of the homeland, equality between people, the collective rights of the indigenous, originario, campesino peoples, the nationalisation of natural wealth and the widening of social rights.
1. A Unitary, Plurinational, Communitarian and Democratic State, where all peoples, cultures, languages, have the same rights, opportunities and are recognised in the same manner in front of the law, institutions and society. The
2. Plurinational Public Adminstration. All public functionaries should know the dominant indigenous language of the region where they work so as to be able to communicate with the peoples, the Spanish language, to be able to communicate with the rest of the Bolivians, and a foreign language, in order to be linked with the world.
3. A Unitary State with municipal, departmental, regional and indigenous, originario, campesino autonomies that guarantee the unity of the state, solidarity between regions and the democratic decentralisation of power.
4. The Nationalisation of Natural Resources, renewable and non-renewable, under the control and ownership of the Bolivian people. Never again will gas, petroleum, mining resources, water, land nor forests be the property of foreigners. All natural resources will be the property of Bolivian, for use by Bolivians, and for the benefit of Bolivians.
5. Sovereign Natural Resources. It is totally prohibited for non-state organisations to directly involve themselves in the administration, management, control and preservation of forests, parks and natural reserves, as well as biodiversity, all of which are under the control of the state.
6. Taxes on large fortunes. Those that have accumulated enormous wealth should pay larger taxes for the benefit of the most needy.
7. Social and Communitarian Economy. The state will participate in the strategic sectors of the economy. The state recognises that private Bolivian investment is a factor in productive development, and that foreign private investment will be subordinated to national development plans, and that medium and small rural producers, agrarian communities and productive associations will receive state protection, economic support, credits, technology and infrastructure in order to guarantee the well being of society.
8. The state respects, guarantees and protects medium and small private property, and communitarian, cooperative and mixed property. Private property should guarantee that it plays an effective social function in the benefit of human beings.
9. Expropriation without indemnification of latifundio and its immediate distribution between producers and those from the countryside and city who are willing to produce for the benefit of society.
10. Re-election and revocation by popular mandate of any elected authority. Now, never again will authorities be immovable nor owners of their positions. The people are sovereign and the people can ratify or change their authorities when they so desire.
11. Election of all authorities of the Judicial Power to democratise, decolonise and nationalise the justice system. Now, never again will citizens be the objects of blackmail by a dehumanising, insensitive and abusive justice system
12. Recognition of communitarian justice as an alternative, complementary and ancestral form of solving differences and conflicts.
13. Racism is a grave crime against society and the state. All manifestations, public or private expressions of racism, of exclusion for ethnic, cultural, linguistic reasons will be criminally sanctioned.
14. Plurinational Parliament with only one chamber guaranteeing the same number of current representative for each department. No more chambers of elites and privilege.
15. In the fight against corruption, the state does not recognise the prescription of the crime and investigations can be retroactive. Widen the power of the state to investigate fortunes.
16. All goods implicated in acts of corruption will be confiscated by the state for the benefit of the people.
17. All Bolivian men and women, from birth until death, have the right to health service in equal conditions.
18. Total Elimination of illiteracy
Passed on tenth day of the month of September of two thousand and seven.
Social movements to defend 18 strategic points in their proposed new constitution
La Prensa, September 11
Fifteen social organisations, who represent the backbone of the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) and the government of President Evo Morales, publicly announced their “Manifesto to the Bolivian People” in which they call on all sectors to defend 18 strategic points in the new Political Constitution of the State, which foreshadows the expropriation of unproductive land, taxes on large fortunes and the confiscation of goods obtained via corruption.
The document presented during the Social Summit held in
The project does not recognise the prescription of crimes of corruption and signals that investigations can de retroactive.
All goods implicated in acts of corruption will be confiscated.
By approving the constitution proposed by these organisations, the state would have to define a tax on large fortunes, within the framework of a social and communitarian economy.
Here, the state would participate in strategic sectors of the economy, recognising private Bolivian investment as a factor in productive development.
Foreign investment would be subordinated to the plans of national development.
In regards to private property, the proposal established that the state would only respect, guarantee and protect medium and small private property, and communitarian, cooperative and mixed property, under the premise that is must guarantee a social function.
It established the expropriation without indemnification of latifundios [owners of large tracts of unproductive land], and its immediate distribution between producers and communities from the countryside and city that are willing to work the land for the benefit of society.
It emphasises the point which established the nationalisation of all renewable and non renewable natural resources under the control and dominion of the Bolivian people.
Moreover, it defines natural resources as “sovereigns”, completely prohibiting non-state organisations involving themselves directly in the administration, management, control and preservation of nature reserves, parks and forests, as well as biodiversity.
The social movements reclaim in their project for a new constitution that the state be defined as plurinational, communitarian and democratic where all the peoples, cultures and languages have the same rights, opportunities and recognition in front of the law, institutions and society. The objective of this type of state, according to the social movements, is the well being and decolonialisation of
In this sense, it propose the designation of a plurinational public administration, for which all public functionaries should know the majority indigenous language of the region in which they work to be able to communicate with the people, and Spanish to communicate with the rest of the Bolivians, and a foreign language to be able to link up with the world.
The indigenous people recalled that the demand of the Constituent Assembly arose in order to guarantee the democratic unity of the country, equality amongst people, the collective rights of the indigenous peoples, the nationalisation of natural resources and the broadening out of social rights.
The head of the MAS fraction in the assembly, Roman Loayza, assured La Prensa last night that the proposal presented yesterday by the social movements is included in the project for the new Political Constitution of the State that MAS is pushing in the Constituent Assembly and emphasised that his party backed the manifesto in all its points.
Four levels of autonomy
The document anticipates that the constitution will enshrine municipal, departmental, regional and indigenous and originario autonomies, that guarantee the unity of the Bolivian state, with solidarity between regions and the democratic decentralisation of the country.
The project of the social movements demands the re-election of the president and the revoking of popular mandates of any elected authority, the election of authorities for the judicial power and the recognition of communitarian justice in the districts where there is an indigenous majority.
It signals that racism will be considered a grave crime against society and the state.
It also proposed the designation of a plurinational parliament with only one chamber, guaranteeing the same number of current representatives for each department.
The document carries the signatures of the United Union Confederation of Campesino Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB), the Union Confederation of Coloniser of Bolivia (CSCB), the National Federation of Campesino Women of Bolivia “Bartolina Sisa”, the Confederation of Indigenous Peoples of the Bolivian East (CIDOB), the Confederation of Ethnic Peoples of Santa Cruz (CEPES), the Movement of those Without Land (MST), the Popular Civic Committee, the Federation of Neighbourhood Councils of La Paz, El Alto and Chuquisaca and the confederation of petty traders. As well, others that have signed included ex-mine workers, the Youth Organisations of Bolivia, the Students of the
Translated from La Prensa
Bolivia: political racism in question
Idón Moisés Chivi Vargas, August 28
Bolivia is living through a time of political transition where the verbal masks used prolifically by the television, radio, and press to cover up reality and, as [Uruguayan write Eduardo] Galeano would say, lie in what they say and lie even more in what they don’t say.
We live in a country where reality is one thing and what the media says is another, the media racism is a close relative of political racism, and it constructs a country where paradoxes have the perversity of showing us the world upside down.
In this context, born democrats are those with white skin; born dictators are the ones that have dark skin and that’s why:
Democracy is when the political minority govern; dictatorship is how the social majority govern.
Democracy is the savage market where the only ones that are saved are those than can and those that have the ability to; dictatorship is the search of a society of equals.
Democracy is beating Indians, mestizos or progressive intellectuals with impunity; dictatorship is when the Indian, or the mestizo, or the progressive intellectual does not allow this to happen.
Democracy is the failure of deliberative mechanisms to find the solution to a historic crisis; dictatorship is the success of these mechanisms.
Democracy is the infamous sell out of the nation to the transnationals; dictatorship is the recuperation of those resources for the nation.
Democracy is being an accomplice to the transnationals; dictatorship is to not be one.
Democracy is being an accomplice to the corrupt judges; dictatorship is justice for all.
Democracy is protecting the privileges of the powerful; dictatorship is not doing this.
Democracy is being the privileged owner of the state; dictatorship is when the state belongs to the entire nation
Democracy is telling lies; dictatorship is telling the truth
Democracy is the exacerbated racism of the white; dictatorship is the diversity of colours.
Democracy is the media justification of racial violence; dictatorship is preserving social peace.
This is because majestic democracy sustains itself on skin colour, on the most simple, and at the same time most grotesque and perverse, racism
This string of political facts is not fiction, rather the reality of a country that has decided to decolonise itself and put things in their rightful place. They are the reverse of what is occurring today.
Bolivia is facing the task of saving the Constituent Assembly, of saving democracy, the state of law and the plurinational republic.
The oligarchic minorities persist in the protection of old privileges, of old forms of impunity and infamous domination.
Bolivia is facing the challenge of giving to the world hope of renewing its paradigms of life.
The minorities have no other paradigms than those that scorn life and diversity.
The indigenous peoples of Bolivia are facing the task of being included in the Political Constitution of the State, just that.
The same privileged ones of always, are the same racists of always and their idea of democracy has the colour of their skin, violence as a culture of domination; that is the majestic paradox, it is the persistence of colonialism.
Everything that has happened up until yesterday in Bolivia, is part of a totally planned conspiratorial plot, we have denounced this in various previously published articles: “The Camba Nazion” (2004), “The proposal for autonomy and its racial nucleus” (2005), “Egalitarian and solidarity based autonomies vs. Camba Nazion” (2007), “Sucre, the full capital and the peak of rachitic racism” (2007) and “The full capital and the poverty of the arguments” (2007).
Parallel to this we have been closely monitoring the political evolution of the “Camba Nation” since 2002, and this is an ideological and political-military nucleus that marks out the line of action for the Pro Santa Cruz Civic Committee, the Chamber of Farmers of the East (CAO), the Confederation of Farmers of the East (CONFEAGRO), the National Association of Producers of Oils (ANAPO), the Cruceñista Youth Union, the Federation of Business Owners of Santa Cruz, the Fraternities and obviously, the citizens’ grouping, PODEMOS, whose historic roots can be found in ADN [National Democratic Action], with recycled elements from the MNR [National Revolutionary Movement], the MIR [Movement of the Revolutionary Left], the NFR [New Republican Force] and other less important fractions.
Currently the Camba Nation has control of the prefecture of the department, the Fiscal University and all of the private universities, which it can use to arm and design paramilitary tactics of persecution, clashes and physical offensives, and wage a social and media psychological war (see www.nacioncamba.net)
According to what PODEMOS senator Luis Vasquez Villamor pointed out on a state channel (20/8/2007), “the strategists of this grouping have worked out a political strategy of shifting the regional east vs. west conflict over the argument of autonomy, to a new west vs. west strategy through the debate over the capital”.
To confirm what was said, one week after the discussion on the capital began, groups of youth from the Camba Nation (Cruceñista Youth Union) travelled to Sucre with the aim of providing political military training to youth groups there (the same thing that they did in Cochabamba before the fatal January 11).
What is really infamous, and is already an insult to intelligence, is that today, the media fills it mouth with talk of democracy, having been the same ones who solidly protected the neoliberal model and the governments that support it.
What is indignant also, is that together with the rearticulation of the conservative right, we have seen the reappearance of their same babbling spokespeople, hypocritical media judges, tricky journalists and the accomplices to the murders of October 2003.
With this we can confirm the construction of a plot, which has as its political aim:
Destabilise the government
Destabilise the parliament
Ensure the failure of the constituent assembly
Protect its hard nuclei of power (judiciary, Constitutional Tribunal, judges council, National Electoral Court, civic committees and prefectures).
Weaken, fracture and destabilise the democratic road, which for the Camba Nation means, the return of the old schemes of party-based power, construct its own regional secessionist government, and with that the return of the old neoliberal Bolivia.
To avoid this dangerous predicament, Bolivian men and women, indigenous and non-indigenous, brilliant and honest intellectuals, business owners committed to their country, have the mission of carefully protecting the results we have had until now: Nationalisation, Decolonialisation, as the basis of the New Plurinational Bolivia.
Idón Moisés Chivi Vargas is part of the Presidential representation for the Constituent Assembly, REPAC
Translated from Bolpress
Bolivia’s Constitutional Assembly Temporarily Suspended: Conflict Trumps Compromise
Andean Information Network, August 24, 2007
On Aug 6, 2006 Bolivia’s Constitutional Assembly began to write a new constitution to restructure the government, reform education, and decide on controversial themes such as coca policy and regional autonomy and natural resources. At the conclusion of its one year mandate, the Assembly has generated over 700 proposed articles, but has not yet approved any.
Since its inauguration, a rapid succession of conflicts has held up the Assembly’s process. The debate over voting methods prevented the Assembly from moving forward for the first seven months of its mandate and more recently, a call to extend the Assembly through December was hotly contested. With each new challenge, protests escalate before reaching an eventual compromise. Although this pattern temporarily allowed the process to continue, it failed to resolve the far deeper issues the Assembly is meant to address.
Almost immediately after reaching a congressional agreement to extend its mandate the Assembly has hit another brick wall. This time the issue is not wholly an East versus West regional debate, but is a rather more complex --and largely economic-- argument over whether or not the capital of the nation should move from La Paz to Sucre. In this latest in a series of recurring conflicts, all sides involved seem less interested in compromise and more engaged in flexing muscle, forging alliances and aggravating friction. The clashes have led to the temporary suspension of the Assembly. Although rigorous national debate on many issues dispelled initial fears from the opposition and some U.S. officials that the MAS ruling party would use the assembly to impose its political agenda, it remains to be seen how the different sides of the conflict with deeply entrenched positions will be able to overcome their differences to move forward with this important process.
Congressional Compromise Extends Assembly’s Mandate
While varied and sometimes contradictory protests, both within the Assembly and nationwide, have slowed the process, both the majority MAS and opposition parties momentarily put aside their differences and found some middle ground. After a heated debate and with just three days before the assembly’s mandate was due to expire; the Bolivian congress approved an amendment extending the constitutional assembly through December 14, 2007 with an additional nine months to carry out referendums. To reach a compromise in the congress, MAS ceded to the Podemos (leading opposition party) demand to hold two popular referendums, one to approve articles the assembly fails to ratify by a 2/3 vote and another to approve the resulting complete text of the constitution. The new legislation also stipulates that the assembly must respect the results of the 2006 referendum and grant departmental autonomy to Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando and Tarija. Some analysts question whether Congress has the authority to legislate the continuing operations of the assembly.
Though they have not ratified any articles, twenty-one commissions set up to review and condense the over 7,000 proposals have reached consensus on 250 articles. The commissions have submitted 517 more in two forms, a majority and minority proposal. These articles deal with the more contentious issues such as land tenure, autonomy, and the role of the armed forces and police. Many of these controversies stem from long unaddressed issues that provoke recurring conflicts.
The next task for the Assembly is to cull out repetitive proposals and try to come to an agreement on the divisive issues. The Assembly now has until September 9, 2008 to carry out the popular referendums and present a constitution approved by the Bolivian public, concluding a process more than ten years in the making.
Capital Conflict Closes Assembly Indefinitely
The question of the location of the nation’s capital has generated a fervent regional debate in which the historical capital of Sucre, with the backing of lowland elites wants the seat of government to move from La Paz. The proposal was introduced by Podemos members from Sucre. Pro-Sucre factions argue that their city has a historical right to house the capital and that the income this would generate is much needed in the small city. Pro-La Paz groups point out the difficulty in moving all government functions to Sucre and the obvious prohibitive costs. Politicians, assembly members, and citizens are divided along regional, instead of party lines making this conflict even more complex.
The MAS majority in the Assembly voted to end debate about the capital issue last week, suggesting that the issue does not fall within their mandate. In response, Pro-Sucre Assembly members initiated hunger strikes in the assembly building and marches throughout the nation. There are currently over 250 hunger strikers, including two MAS Assembly members from Sucre. La Paz has also held rallies and marches against the move.
The central government sent police reinforcements to the city and groups from both sides, including the Ponchos Rojos, Chapare coca growers, and the Santa Cruz Civic Committee, have threatened to send members in order to “defend the Assembly” and “defend democracy.” The vice-president of the Santa Cruz Civic Committee stated that “the three institutions (civic committees, assembly and congress) are going to demand that the Assembly continue, as long as the Sucre as Capital issue is reintroduced.”[1] However, some political analysts speculate that the capital debate is a well thought-out political tactic designed by the opposition to derail the Assembly.
On Wednesday, protesting Sucre university students and civic leaders sacked the office of a MAS affiliated organization and mistakenly attempted to burn down what they thought was the home of a MAS assembly member, after they chased him there. The police have responded to these protests with tear-gas and rubber bullets. Sucre Mayor Aydeé Nava denied that marchers had provoked the conflict and complained that the police had retaliated because they were from La Paz and Oruro. A 24 hour city-wide shut down of Sucre began on Thursday.
The Assembly attempted to meet Wednesday but protests forced the Assembly President Silvia Lazarte to officially announce the suspension of plenary meetings. Citing security risks, Lazarte stated there is “No schedule nor date for a new decision…also, we don’t even have an officers meeting scheduled. Everything’s up in the air as a result of this abuse.”[2] There have been few suggestions of ways to resolve this latest impasse, though some MAS members have suggested a special committee be set up to deal with the issue.
Process
It is unlikely that the Assembly will be able to maintain its extended timeline due to heightening protests. If the process is able to move forward, debate on contentious issues will continue in mixed commissions who will attempt to consent to overall themes in order to eliminate some articles before they are brought before the entire Assembly. In order to place an article in the constitution, it must receive a 2/3 approval vote in a plenary session. Articles that do not achieve this approval will be sent to the public to decide in a popular referendum.
Assembly members from both MAS and Podemos expressed doubts that anything more will be agreed upon within the mixed commissions or the plenary. MAS representative Marco Carrillo stressed that “this is the first time the majority has power, that we’re equal,” so compromising isn’t the priority - ensuring the rights of Bolivians citizens, especially its indigenous citizens is. One Podemos representative stated that his party is “sure we will lose” to MAS every article that goes to referendum, but said they are unwillingly to compromise on the indigenous autonomy and community justice issues. When asked what would happen if they lose in the referendum, he said that there could be protests like we saw in January, where citizens battled in the streets of Cochabamba leaving three dead and hundreds wounded, “or worse.”[3]
Regional and Indigenous Autonomy
One of the most contentious themes in the Assembly is how to define and implement autonomy. Four lowland departments, the opposition strongholds, passed the 2006 regional autonomy referendum. The legally binding vote limits the Bolivian executive’s power by granting greater authority to departmental governments through decentralization measures, including direct elections for departmental governments. The vague wording of the initiative left the structure and details of this decentralization process to be defined in the Assembly.
The MAS proposal includes four levels of autonomy (departmental, regional, municipal, and indigenous) with equal status and subject to national laws. Podemos rejects the idea of parallel autonomies, and advocates only departmental autonomy.
Although MAS advocates for indigenous autonomy, some large umbrella organizations such as CONAMAQ (primarily from the highlands) and CIDOB (representing many lowland groups) have publicly expressed their displeasure with MAS's representation of indigenous proposals in the Constituent Assembly. In response to the MAS invitation to indigenous peoples to march in the Independence Day military parade, these organizations stated that the march would “irresponsibly exacerbate the political and social differences between highlands and lowlands that are becoming increasingly fractured” and that MAS was “overlooking the interest of the popular majority to favor partisan interests,” and that “political ties led to the relegation of indigenous proposals in the Assembly[4] A demand for the government and A.C. officers to begin dialogue with them by August 1, 2007 (So far there appears to be no progress on this front. Although they threatened “definitive extended protests in Sucre for which they would not assume responsibility for the outcome,” the announced measures did not occur.
Other Contentious Issues
· The National Vision Commission has not been able to decide on the new overall model of the state, nor a new economic model. MAS wants a “unitary, plurinational, and communal” state with the intention for everyone “to live well,” an Aymara cultural precept, but with a preference for elevating the status of poor and marginalized peoples. Podemos and other traditional opposition parties advocate federalist state, which they refer to as a “community of nations.”
· Friction continues between the Bolivian armed forces, who want to broaden their constitutional mandate to internal security (a traditional police mission) and guarantee the continuation of the military tribunal, and police who protested a proposal to limit its duties and income
· The structure of the Legislature, including choosing a unicameral or bicameral system, defining the number of representatives and how they will be elected is still yet to be defined. MAS has proposed a unicameral legislature composed of 70 at large (by region) representatives, 70 indigenous representatives and 27 departmental representatives. Podemos disagrees with having 70 indigenous representatives and wants to maintain two houses, 135 at large representatives in the congress and 27 senators, based on departmental population
· In the Judiciary committee there is a debate about how to introduce community justice and maintain the formal justice system at the same time. MAS supports the two types of justice as equal. Podemos rejects community justice as they fear it will be applied arbitrarily due to the unwritten nature of traditional community justice.
· The Rights and Guarantees committee has included a list of non-discrimination criteria including gender, age, culture, nationality, language, sexual orientation, gender identity, language, religion, political affiliation and philosophy, pregnancy, economic or social condition, disability, and level of education. The proposed articles guarantee water the right to water and forbids its privatization. Additionally, proposed articles protect private, individual and collective property rights. There is also a proposal to guarantee “the right to life from conception,” in essence a constitutional ban on abortion under any circumstance.
· The Citizenship Committee was unable to decide on the voting age. MAS wants to lower the voting age to 16, while Podemos wishes to keep it at 18 years old.
· The MAS proposal from the Executive Power Committee specifies that the president is elected for a five year term and may be reelected, but does not specify how many times. The Podemos proposal retains a five year term with the option to be reelected once after a “constitutional period.” Both proposals include articles defining how elected representatives’ mandates may be revoked.
Conclusion
The creation of a truly flexible and enduring democratic constitution, representing and protecting the rights of all citizens, will depend on the ability of elected representatives to creatively reach consensus and productive compromises that supersede political affiliations. Although the process has become increasingly chaotic and antagonistic, it reflects that Bolivians care deeply enough about the process to voice their opinions through protests and hunger strikes.
In spite of recurring frictions, a recent United Nation’s study found that 74% of the public will approve the constitution if the government, civic groups, prefects and social movement leaders cooperate. Though the process is flawed and frequently derailed, the Bolivian constitutional assembly continues to be one of the most viable scenarios for Bolivians to address longstanding fundamental conflicts. If the assembly fails to reopen, the results for Bolivia are unpredictable.
Notes
[1] La Razón. “La presión regional pone a la Asamblea bajo fuego cruzado.” August 21, 2007.
[2] La Razón. “Sucre frena la Asamblea y la deja con futuro incierto.” August 23, 2007.
[3] AIN interview with Podemos Assembly representative. August 11, 2007. Cochabamba, Bolivia.
[4] La Prensa. “Los indígenas dan ultimátum al MAS por su autonomía.” August 1, 2007.
On Aug 6, 2006 Bolivia’s Constitutional Assembly began to write a new constitution to restructure the government, reform education, and decide on controversial themes such as coca policy and regional autonomy and natural resources. At the conclusion of its one year mandate, the Assembly has generated over 700 proposed articles, but has not yet approved any.
Since its inauguration, a rapid succession of conflicts has held up the Assembly’s process. The debate over voting methods prevented the Assembly from moving forward for the first seven months of its mandate and more recently, a call to extend the Assembly through December was hotly contested. With each new challenge, protests escalate before reaching an eventual compromise. Although this pattern temporarily allowed the process to continue, it failed to resolve the far deeper issues the Assembly is meant to address.
Almost immediately after reaching a congressional agreement to extend its mandate the Assembly has hit another brick wall. This time the issue is not wholly an East versus West regional debate, but is a rather more complex --and largely economic-- argument over whether or not the capital of the nation should move from La Paz to Sucre. In this latest in a series of recurring conflicts, all sides involved seem less interested in compromise and more engaged in flexing muscle, forging alliances and aggravating friction. The clashes have led to the temporary suspension of the Assembly. Although rigorous national debate on many issues dispelled initial fears from the opposition and some U.S. officials that the MAS ruling party would use the assembly to impose its political agenda, it remains to be seen how the different sides of the conflict with deeply entrenched positions will be able to overcome their differences to move forward with this important process.
Congressional Compromise Extends Assembly’s Mandate
While varied and sometimes contradictory protests, both within the Assembly and nationwide, have slowed the process, both the majority MAS and opposition parties momentarily put aside their differences and found some middle ground. After a heated debate and with just three days before the assembly’s mandate was due to expire; the Bolivian congress approved an amendment extending the constitutional assembly through December 14, 2007 with an additional nine months to carry out referendums. To reach a compromise in the congress, MAS ceded to the Podemos (leading opposition party) demand to hold two popular referendums, one to approve articles the assembly fails to ratify by a 2/3 vote and another to approve the resulting complete text of the constitution. The new legislation also stipulates that the assembly must respect the results of the 2006 referendum and grant departmental autonomy to Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando and Tarija. Some analysts question whether Congress has the authority to legislate the continuing operations of the assembly.
Though they have not ratified any articles, twenty-one commissions set up to review and condense the over 7,000 proposals have reached consensus on 250 articles. The commissions have submitted 517 more in two forms, a majority and minority proposal. These articles deal with the more contentious issues such as land tenure, autonomy, and the role of the armed forces and police. Many of these controversies stem from long unaddressed issues that provoke recurring conflicts.
The next task for the Assembly is to cull out repetitive proposals and try to come to an agreement on the divisive issues. The Assembly now has until September 9, 2008 to carry out the popular referendums and present a constitution approved by the Bolivian public, concluding a process more than ten years in the making.
Capital Conflict Closes Assembly Indefinitely
The question of the location of the nation’s capital has generated a fervent regional debate in which the historical capital of Sucre, with the backing of lowland elites wants the seat of government to move from La Paz. The proposal was introduced by Podemos members from Sucre. Pro-Sucre factions argue that their city has a historical right to house the capital and that the income this would generate is much needed in the small city. Pro-La Paz groups point out the difficulty in moving all government functions to Sucre and the obvious prohibitive costs. Politicians, assembly members, and citizens are divided along regional, instead of party lines making this conflict even more complex.
The MAS majority in the Assembly voted to end debate about the capital issue last week, suggesting that the issue does not fall within their mandate. In response, Pro-Sucre Assembly members initiated hunger strikes in the assembly building and marches throughout the nation. There are currently over 250 hunger strikers, including two MAS Assembly members from Sucre. La Paz has also held rallies and marches against the move.
The central government sent police reinforcements to the city and groups from both sides, including the Ponchos Rojos, Chapare coca growers, and the Santa Cruz Civic Committee, have threatened to send members in order to “defend the Assembly” and “defend democracy.” The vice-president of the Santa Cruz Civic Committee stated that “the three institutions (civic committees, assembly and congress) are going to demand that the Assembly continue, as long as the Sucre as Capital issue is reintroduced.”[1] However, some political analysts speculate that the capital debate is a well thought-out political tactic designed by the opposition to derail the Assembly.
On Wednesday, protesting Sucre university students and civic leaders sacked the office of a MAS affiliated organization and mistakenly attempted to burn down what they thought was the home of a MAS assembly member, after they chased him there. The police have responded to these protests with tear-gas and rubber bullets. Sucre Mayor Aydeé Nava denied that marchers had provoked the conflict and complained that the police had retaliated because they were from La Paz and Oruro. A 24 hour city-wide shut down of Sucre began on Thursday.
The Assembly attempted to meet Wednesday but protests forced the Assembly President Silvia Lazarte to officially announce the suspension of plenary meetings. Citing security risks, Lazarte stated there is “No schedule nor date for a new decision…also, we don’t even have an officers meeting scheduled. Everything’s up in the air as a result of this abuse.”[2] There have been few suggestions of ways to resolve this latest impasse, though some MAS members have suggested a special committee be set up to deal with the issue.
Process
It is unlikely that the Assembly will be able to maintain its extended timeline due to heightening protests. If the process is able to move forward, debate on contentious issues will continue in mixed commissions who will attempt to consent to overall themes in order to eliminate some articles before they are brought before the entire Assembly. In order to place an article in the constitution, it must receive a 2/3 approval vote in a plenary session. Articles that do not achieve this approval will be sent to the public to decide in a popular referendum.
Assembly members from both MAS and Podemos expressed doubts that anything more will be agreed upon within the mixed commissions or the plenary. MAS representative Marco Carrillo stressed that “this is the first time the majority has power, that we’re equal,” so compromising isn’t the priority - ensuring the rights of Bolivians citizens, especially its indigenous citizens is. One Podemos representative stated that his party is “sure we will lose” to MAS every article that goes to referendum, but said they are unwillingly to compromise on the indigenous autonomy and community justice issues. When asked what would happen if they lose in the referendum, he said that there could be protests like we saw in January, where citizens battled in the streets of Cochabamba leaving three dead and hundreds wounded, “or worse.”[3]
Regional and Indigenous Autonomy
One of the most contentious themes in the Assembly is how to define and implement autonomy. Four lowland departments, the opposition strongholds, passed the 2006 regional autonomy referendum. The legally binding vote limits the Bolivian executive’s power by granting greater authority to departmental governments through decentralization measures, including direct elections for departmental governments. The vague wording of the initiative left the structure and details of this decentralization process to be defined in the Assembly.
The MAS proposal includes four levels of autonomy (departmental, regional, municipal, and indigenous) with equal status and subject to national laws. Podemos rejects the idea of parallel autonomies, and advocates only departmental autonomy.
Although MAS advocates for indigenous autonomy, some large umbrella organizations such as CONAMAQ (primarily from the highlands) and CIDOB (representing many lowland groups) have publicly expressed their displeasure with MAS's representation of indigenous proposals in the Constituent Assembly. In response to the MAS invitation to indigenous peoples to march in the Independence Day military parade, these organizations stated that the march would “irresponsibly exacerbate the political and social differences between highlands and lowlands that are becoming increasingly fractured” and that MAS was “overlooking the interest of the popular majority to favor partisan interests,” and that “political ties led to the relegation of indigenous proposals in the Assembly[4] A demand for the government and A.C. officers to begin dialogue with them by August 1, 2007 (So far there appears to be no progress on this front. Although they threatened “definitive extended protests in Sucre for which they would not assume responsibility for the outcome,” the announced measures did not occur.
Other Contentious Issues
· The National Vision Commission has not been able to decide on the new overall model of the state, nor a new economic model. MAS wants a “unitary, plurinational, and communal” state with the intention for everyone “to live well,” an Aymara cultural precept, but with a preference for elevating the status of poor and marginalized peoples. Podemos and other traditional opposition parties advocate federalist state, which they refer to as a “community of nations.”
· Friction continues between the Bolivian armed forces, who want to broaden their constitutional mandate to internal security (a traditional police mission) and guarantee the continuation of the military tribunal, and police who protested a proposal to limit its duties and income
· The structure of the Legislature, including choosing a unicameral or bicameral system, defining the number of representatives and how they will be elected is still yet to be defined. MAS has proposed a unicameral legislature composed of 70 at large (by region) representatives, 70 indigenous representatives and 27 departmental representatives. Podemos disagrees with having 70 indigenous representatives and wants to maintain two houses, 135 at large representatives in the congress and 27 senators, based on departmental population
· In the Judiciary committee there is a debate about how to introduce community justice and maintain the formal justice system at the same time. MAS supports the two types of justice as equal. Podemos rejects community justice as they fear it will be applied arbitrarily due to the unwritten nature of traditional community justice.
· The Rights and Guarantees committee has included a list of non-discrimination criteria including gender, age, culture, nationality, language, sexual orientation, gender identity, language, religion, political affiliation and philosophy, pregnancy, economic or social condition, disability, and level of education. The proposed articles guarantee water the right to water and forbids its privatization. Additionally, proposed articles protect private, individual and collective property rights. There is also a proposal to guarantee “the right to life from conception,” in essence a constitutional ban on abortion under any circumstance.
· The Citizenship Committee was unable to decide on the voting age. MAS wants to lower the voting age to 16, while Podemos wishes to keep it at 18 years old.
· The MAS proposal from the Executive Power Committee specifies that the president is elected for a five year term and may be reelected, but does not specify how many times. The Podemos proposal retains a five year term with the option to be reelected once after a “constitutional period.” Both proposals include articles defining how elected representatives’ mandates may be revoked.
Conclusion
The creation of a truly flexible and enduring democratic constitution, representing and protecting the rights of all citizens, will depend on the ability of elected representatives to creatively reach consensus and productive compromises that supersede political affiliations. Although the process has become increasingly chaotic and antagonistic, it reflects that Bolivians care deeply enough about the process to voice their opinions through protests and hunger strikes.
In spite of recurring frictions, a recent United Nation’s study found that 74% of the public will approve the constitution if the government, civic groups, prefects and social movement leaders cooperate. Though the process is flawed and frequently derailed, the Bolivian constitutional assembly continues to be one of the most viable scenarios for Bolivians to address longstanding fundamental conflicts. If the assembly fails to reopen, the results for Bolivia are unpredictable.
Notes
[1] La Razón. “La presión regional pone a la Asamblea bajo fuego cruzado.” August 21, 2007.
[2] La Razón. “Sucre frena la Asamblea y la deja con futuro incierto.” August 23, 2007.
[3] AIN interview with Podemos Assembly representative. August 11, 2007. Cochabamba, Bolivia.
[4] La Prensa. “Los indígenas dan ultimátum al MAS por su autonomía.” August 1, 2007.
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