Evo Morales Through the Prism of Wikileaks

Martín Sivak

A century ago, the U.S. ambassador to Bolivia suggested that coca-leaf consumption, a millenarian tradition among indigenous peoples, was the source of Bolivia’s problems. He proposed instead “plain American chewing gum for everyone.” The gum would be donated by U.S. companies and distributed by the embassy.

At the beginning of this century, another U.S. ambassador interpreted the 2002 elections in terms of the Wars on Terror and Drugs, calling for a massive vote against the coca-growers’ union leader, Evo Morales. This U.S. stance increased Morales’ share of the votes substantially, leading him unexpectedly to finish second. In the wake of the 2002 election, according to State Department documents, the U.S. embassy proposed strengthening opposition parties to offset the growing power in Bolivia of MAS, Morales’ party, calling him an “illegal coca agitator.” Neither the chewing gum strategy nor that of supporting political parties in decline managed to reduce coca consumption or dampen the popularity of Morales, who won the 2005 and 2009 presidential elections by a wide margin.

U.S. State Department documents, made public by Wikileaks and available on the website of Bolivia’s vice president (http://wikileaks.vicepresidencia.gob. bo), demonstrate that during Morales’ first presidency, the United States did not explicitly propose anything it could not achieve. The documents reveal what the United States was most worried about: the president’s anti-imperialist rhetoric: Cuban and Venezuelan presence and aid, the war on drugs, protection of U.S. investments in Bolivia—particularly in the mining sectorand the erosion of democracy.

In August 2007, a cable from the U.S. embassy in La Paz declared that democracy was “in danger,” adding that the support of democracy in Bolivia was the foremost priority. The embassy raised “serious questions” about Morales’ commitment to democracy—understood as separation of powers, checks and balances, an active political opposition and free press—“given his demonstrated impatience with compromise.” The cable defined him as a “leader with strong anti-democratic tendencies,” adding, “over the years he has been known to bribe, threaten and even physically intimidate anyone who stood in his way, including government officials, politicians and cocalero colleagues.” To the embassy, Morales’ project of change and renovation of the justice system exemplified his authoritarianism.

Thus, throughout the Wikileak documents, the United States appears as one of the last defenders of the ancien regime—that of pacted democracy and neoliberal reforms—which had been severely challenged in Evo Morales’ 2005 landslide election victory. Even groups that are moderately critical of Morales concede that the government has begun a process of putting into practice a plurinational state granting social inclusion and increased rights for indigenous and peasant sectors. In other words, democracy has been expanded.

This article attempts to point out the U.S. government’s difficulties in adjusting to new times and, above all, to what I call the “Bolivianization” of bilateral relations (I first used this term in “The Bolivianisation of Washington-La Paz Relations: Evo Morales’ Foreign Policy Agenda in Historical Context, in Evo Morales and the Movimiento al Socialismo in Bolivia, London: Institute for Study of the Americas, 2011).

Bolivianization

Starting with the 1952 National Revolution (nationalization of mines, universal suffrage and agrarian reform) to Morales’ inauguration, the United States’ grand narrative framed Washington-La Paz relations as part of the U.S. agenda—particularly the War against Communism, War on Drugs and War on Terror. After the turn of the century, the crisis of the regional neoliberal consensus marked the emergence in Bolivia of a radical political cycle with an ethno-cultural accent. This radical movement began with the 2000 Cochabamba Water War (the successful upheaval that prevented water price hikes by a multinational company, replacing it with a cooperative) and reached a peak with the Gas War in October 2003 (the rebellion against gas exports to the United States via Chile that forced President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada to resign). These radical protests introduced a new tone to the notion of national sovereignty and control of natural resources, which proved to be crucial in redefining the relationship with the United States.

The Morales administration has established a new domestic agenda strongly driven by these two wars, especially the Gas War, and by the cocaleros’ active rejection of U.S. intervention with coca crop eradication through the War on Drugs. The government has significantly reduced U.S. participation in the fashioning of public policy—especially in the areas of economics, defense and security, and in the war on drugs. It has rejected free trade agreements proposed by the United States and has proposed to Washington a bilateral relationship based on the communal concept of reciprocity.

The first symbolic step in this reciprocity was to require U.S. tourists to purchase a visa (Brazil does the same). At the same time, the government has established regional alliances with Cuba and Venezuela in the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA), and with the rest of South American countries through the trade agreements known as UNASUR and MERCOSUR. It has also signed trade agreements with China and Iran, among others.

The president’s anti-U.S. discourse—yet another novelty in bilateral relations—is the most frequent complaint of State Department officials, according to Wikileaks. “We also have to urge the Morales government to temper its rhetoric if it is indeed interested in improved bilateral ties,” says one of the documents. In another, Ambassador David Greenlee warns Vice President Alvaro García Linera that “anti-American remarks may damage Bolivia’s chances for an APTDEA extension.” (APTDEA grants trade preferences to Bolivia in exchange for its commitment to the War on Drugs; formally, it does not include the issue of “rhetoric.”) The cables maintain that Morales’ anti-U.S. stance is being used to cover up domestic problems, leaving out any question about historic reasons for such attitudes in Bolivia.

Echoes of Terrorism, Cold War and War on Drugs

Foreign policy has also been “Bolivianized” by how the Morales administration interprets the new U.S. intervention in Bolivia in terms of domestic dynamics, particularly the conflict between the elites in the Santa Cruz area and the national government. The Bolivian government asserts that the United States belonged to a broad coalition led by these elites that are bent not on saving Bolivia from Communism or terrorism, but from the MAS government agenda. The Morales government expelled U.S. Ambassador Philip Goldberg in September 2008, accusing him of being the leader of the opposition headquartered in Santa Cruz that seeks to overturn the government. Although no definitive proof supports this accusation, the government was able to create a narrative that enjoys a broad social consensus in Bolivia, in which the United States is seen as intervening at the heart of national politics.

In the days following the expulsion of the ambassador, relates one cable, then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the Spanish ambassador to the United States concurred that Morales was “out of his league.” Months later, in a confusing operation in Santa Cruz, Bolivian security forces killed a group of hitmen allegedly contracted by members of the regional elite to defend Santa Cruz or to obtain its secession from the country. The U.S. embassy’s version of the events, as revealed by Wikileaks, is that the Bolivian government itself hired some of these hitmen and tortured the two survivors of the operation. The source, whose name was blacked out on the document, earned the confidence of the officials, who titled their cable “Gob [government of Bolivia] involved in Terror.” In this fashion, the Morales administration received the label of “terrorist.”

The role Venezuela and Cuba play in the Bolivian government also has a dominant place in the Wikileak cables. A February 2, 2007 embassy cable is subtitled “One Place Where We Are Not Big Brother.” The cable charges that “Cuban and Venezuelan advice, interference, and assistance continue to be of serious concern. Cuban doctors and newly inaugurated hospitals bring medical care to isolated communities. Venezuela has agreed to purchase Bolivian soy, has provided microcredit financing to small businesses, has donated tractors to Bolivian farmers, and has funded community radio stations to broadcast the Gob’s messages…The Venezuelan programs receive frequent public acclaim from Bolivia’s poor.”

The presence of the supposed big brother who controls everything brings echoes of the Cold War. The “twins”—Cuba and Venezuela—have replaced the former Soviet Union as rivals to the United States for big brother status. Venezuela is seen as a guide and inspiration for Bolivian policy; a cable of August 2007 states, “Evo seems to be following in Chávez’s footsteps.” As an example, it cites a draft of the Bolivian constitution (“financed by Venezuelan and Spanish advisors”) that contains a clause for indefinite reelection. In the document entitled “Venezuela- Bolivia: how much fire behind the smoke,” Morales is described as acting like a “smitten school girl” when he appears in public with the Venezuelan leader.

Even though Chávez is Bolivia’s ally and offers the country economic assistance, his influence in political terms is much less than what people in Washington and even Caracas think. The notion of the mentor relationship, in any case, underestimates Morales more than it overestimates Chávez’s powers. This mentorship tries to explain the trajectory of the Morales government through the lens of Venezuelan and Cuban influence, completely overlooking the domestic reasons for the radical cycle that began in 2000.

The so-called War on Drugs is a central theme in Washington-La Paz relations since the 1980s. The United States sees the eradication of coca leaf as indispensable and for several decades managed to convince Bolivian governments to share this point of view. The Morales government has implemented a different policy: voluntary eradication of crops and social control (through the cocalero union) of the considerable legal production of coca leaf (a 40x40 plot of land per family and 49 acres in total). It has allowed less participation by the United States (in fact, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency was expelled on charges of conspiring against the Bolivian government). The government strategy has not impeded the growth of coca leaf production (about 75 acres—25 above the legal limit), but it has obtained good results in the area of interdiction, a fact recognized in the U.S. documents themselves.

The United States subtly questions the program of voluntary eradication, particularly noting that Morales talks of counternarcotics as a “shared responsibility,” and expresses its concern for the increased production of coca leaf and cocaine exports. At least in the cables revealed by Wikileaks, the United States does not blame Morales for the drug trafficking in Bolivia, as it alleged in the 1990s. It merely criticizes the government strategy.

The Morales government has looked for some continuity in the Washington-La Paz relationship despite significant ruptures. One example is an attempt to reclaim Bolivian certification (tariff preferences for Bolivian exports in exchange for progress in the so-called War on Drugs). But Bolivia was decertified a few days before the U.S. ambassador was expelled.

The second continuity is that Bolivia keeps receiving U.S. aid. The documents show that some $90 million were funneled to Bolivia through USAID to “further social and economic inclusion of Bolivia’s historically marginalized indigenous groups and to support democratic institutions and process, including decentralized governance…” The details of how this money was distributed are unavailable to both the Bolivian government and U.S. taxpayers.

The Morales government has insisted that the money should be channeled only through the Bolivian state, rejecting the possibility that local governments and non-government agencies receive these funds. In meetings with U.S. officials, as noted in the cables, Morales seems to be demanding that aid be unconditional, accusing the officials of conspiracy, while at the same time thanking them for their help during recent floods and alternately telling them that he has received thousands of letters from all over the country asking that USAID be expelled. It is a style that tends to disconcert officials from the United States and many other countries.

In a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon in August 2008, Morales asked for the extradition of former president Gonzalo “Goni” Sánchez de Lozada, who has been charged with responsibility for seventy deaths in the Gas War. “Send us back Goni and you will become the mayor of El Alto,” he told Shannon in perhaps the only joke contained in the documents. In November 2009, Shannon became U.S. ambassador to Brazil: everything indicates that the United States will not extradite Goni and Shannon will not govern El Alto.

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About Martín Sivak’s Evo Morales: The Extraordinary Rise of the First Indigenous President of Bolivia

• "Evo Morales is already a historic figure. The best known Bolivian since Bolivar, he is a political leader with a difference because he won office after years of popular mobilization with an unprecedented mandate for political, economic and cultural change. Evo's presidency is the product of mass struggle, but as Martin Sivak's vivid study shows, the president is also a remarkable man. Sivak has plainly gained unusual access through winning Evo's trust, and this is an understandably sympathetic study. But it is also independently-minded, insightful and attentive to the details that do not flatter. This true insider-account is indispensable for understanding 21st-century Bolivia, and it will unsettle a good many easy convictions on both sides of the fence." — James Dunkerley, author of Bolivia: Revolution and the Power of History in the Present
• "A vivid and moving portrayal of one of the most fascinating figures of our times, this book is also an entertaining romp through recent Latin American history. Like Morales himself, this intimate story of his life, from Aymara shepherd to powerful President, constantly surprises and enthralls us." — Ariel Dorfman, author of Death and the Maiden
• "Nearly five centuries after the Spanish conquest of Bolivia, race-based slavery still remains in force in many places in that high, wondrous country. This is why Evo Morales, along with the indigenous-rights activists, environmentalists and trade unionists who helped elect him, matter enormously for the health of democracy in the Americas. And I can think of no better guide to the hopes Evo represents, and the change he has managed to achieve, than Martín Sivak, one of Latin America's most respected non-fiction writers. Sivak's meticulously observed biography is important and compelling." — Greg Grandin, author of Fordlandia and Empire's Workshop
• For the Spanish Edition: "The narrative force of a novel and the seriousness of the best journalism." — Tomás Eloy Martínez, author of Santa Evita

Martín Sivak is the author of four books about Bolivia, including a biography of Hugo Banzer (El dictador elegido) and a portrait of Evo Morales (Jefazo, published in English as Evo Morales: The Extraordinary Rise of the First Indigenous President of Bolivia [Palgrave, 2010]. Sivak is completing a doctorate in Latin American History at New York University (NYU).

Republished from ReVista

Bolivia: US embassy admits 'economic roots of social revolution'

By Federico Fuentes

Neoliberal policies “which have fed the growing political disaffection of Bolivia's majority poor, have helped fuel the country's rolling 'social revolution.'"

This was how a May 6, 2006, US embassy cable from La Paz recently released by WikiLeaks viewed the powerful wave of struggle that led to the election of Bolivia's first indigenous president, Evo Morales, in 2005.

This secret assessment came despite Washington publicly trumpeting neoliberal policies as the way to solve the problems of Latin America's poor.

In 1985, under the advise of US economist Jeffrey Sachs, the Victor Paz Estenssoro government opened up Bolivia’s economy to foreign transnationals.

A number of state-owned companies were privatised, including the crucial mining sector. Restrictions on foreign capital were removed and labour security undermined.

The US embassy admitted in its cable: “Notwithstanding the promises of politicians ... poverty was largely impervious to the liberal reforms of the late 80s and 90s.”

It noted the percentage of Bolivians living below the poverty line remained “virtually unchanged (over 60%) … and even increased during the economic crisis of 1999-2003”.

At the same time, neoliberal reforms “clearly failed to meet public expectations for increased incomes and jobs”.

“In fact, reforms had a palpably negative effect on jobs in the short term, immediately causing a 17 percent drop in public sector employment and triggering the dismissal of thousands of public sector miners when resource draining state-owned mining enterprises were shut down.”

In the countryside, neoliberalism's impact was even more with $966 in urban areas, the cable noted.

“According to INE,” the cable said, “90 percent of the population in urban areas have electricity, while only 29 percent do in rural areas”.

This led to mass migration, in which “between 1999 and 2003 over half a million people or 10 percent of the current urban population migrated to cities”.

One key destination was El Alto, previously an outlying suburb of La Paz. It mushroomed into one of the country's largest cities.

The cable said the “heightened expectations of newly arrived urban dwellers” in El Alto were critical to promoting an “increased sense of relative deprivation due to the wealth they see around them".

“So while ‘better off’ in an absolute sense than they were before, they increasingly view access to such services as water, gas, and electricity as a right that the political and social system owes them a right they are willing to take to the streets to demand.”

This helped transform El Alto into what the US cable described as “a central, volatile element in the successive crises” that forced the resignation of two presidents.

The US embassy cable noted that race was another critical dimension to social and economic inequality.

It said: “Most of Bolivia's majority poor, for example, are of mixed or indigenous origin. Many of the country's wealthiest families, by contrast, are of conspicuously European descent.

“These apparently race-based social and economic differences have exacerbated the sense of racial separation, and amount, in the view of some critics, to a kind of de facto economic apartheid.”

“Moreover,”, it said, “growing ethnic consciousness has fed increasing ‘indigenous’ resentment of the dominant ‘white’ minority and the political system that allegedly sustained it.”

Nonetheless, the US cable maintained that neoliberalism provided Bolivia with “macro-economic stability and a platform for increased private investment.”

The problem, according to the cable, was the widely held “perception that the large amounts of foreign direct investment Bolivia received between 1997 and 2003 as a result of privatization benefited the rich and not the poor”.

The cable, however, conceded: “This perception was not altogether inaccurate.”

The economic impacts of neoliberalism, combined "with the growing political disaffection of Bolivia's majority and largely indigenous poor into an explosive and still largely unresolved mix".

Beginning “with the infamous Cochabamba ‘water wars’ of May (April) 2000”, where protesters forced the government to reverse the privatisation of Cochabamba’s water system to US multinational Bechtel, further “massive protests … led to the ousting of President Gonzalo ('Goni') Sanchez de Lozada” in October 2003.

Goni's replacement, Carlos Mesa, was also forced to resign in June 2005.

A key issue on both uprisings was the “government's management of Bolivia's vast natural gas resources”.

These movements were firmly rooted among the poor, indigenous peoples of the west.

The cable noted these regions also voted overwhelming to bring Morales into power on a campaign platform to "nationalize Bolivia's gas industry, 'refound' the state in a Constituent Assembly, and transform the supposedly failed 'neo-liberal' economic order for the benefit of Bolivia's forgotten majority”.

Bolivia's "ongoing social revolution" continues to move ahead with this program. It has recuperated state control over gas, approved a new constitution and begun to move away from US-backed neoliberal policies.

Bolivia: US worked to divide social movements, WikiLeaks shows

By Federico Fuentes

WikiLeaks' release of cables from the United States embassy in La Paz has shed light on its attempts to create divisions in the social and indigenous movements that make up the support base of the country’s first indigenous-led government.

The cables prove the embassy sought to use the US government aid agency, USAID, to promote US interests.

A March 6, 2006, cable titled “Dissent in Evo’s ranks” reports on a meeting only months after Morales' inauguration as president in December 2005 with “a social sectors leader” from the altiplano (highlands) region in the west.

The social leader was said to have links with the radical federation of neighbourhood councils in El Alto (Fejuve), the coca growers union in Los Yungas and a peasant organisation in La Paz.

Many of these organisations, in particular Fejuve, spearheaded the wave of revolt that overthrew two pro-US neoliberal presidents in 2003 and 2005. It was also crucial to the election of Morales.

Despite viewing these sectors as “traditionally confrontational organisations”, then-ambassador David Greenlee believed that: “Regardless of [US] policy direction in Bolivia, working more closely with these social sector representatives” who were expressing dissent towards Morales “seems to be most beneficial to [US government] interests”.

Another cable from February 25, 2008 reports on a meeting then-US ambassador Philip Goldberg held with “indigenous leaders (particularly leaders of the eastern lowlands)”.

Most of Bolivia’s two largest indigenous peoples, the Aymaras and Quechuas, live in the highlands and central regions.

The east is home to the remaining 34 indigenous peoples. It is also home to the gas transnationals and large agribusiness.

The east was the focal point of right-wing movements that tried to overthrow Morales.

In the cable, great attention is paid to the “growing tensions” between Aymaras and Quechuas on one hand and the lowlands-based indigenous groups “who feel neglected by a self-proclaimed-Aymara, cocalero president”.

An October 17, 2007, cable titled “Indigenous cohesion cracking in Bolivia” reported that
a leader from the National Council of Ayllus and Markas of Qollasuyu (CONAMAQ), which groups together 16 rural indigenous organisations in the altiplano, told embassy officials the Morales government was simply using indigenous peoples for to promote its “goal of socialism [which] does not coincide with ‘true indigenous’ goals”.

The US embassy’s heightened interest in all things “indigenous” following decades of supporting governments that repressed and excluded them is explained in a February 6, 2007, cable.

In it, Goldberg said that “only a leftist government that includes indigenous interests … would have a chance to govern divisive Bolivia”.

Since “a right-wing government would likely lead to greater conflict”, the ability to reach out to indigenous leaders inclined to support US interests was necessary.

For this reason, Goldberg concluded his February 25, 2008, cable by stating that meetings with “indigenous leaders outside of the dominant Aymara and Quechua communities will provide useful information and demonstrate that the United States is interested in views of all indigenous peoples”.

An important tool used for reaching out to indigenous communities is USAID.

A January 28, 2008 cable said USAID social programs aimed at the “poorest and marginalized groups” would prove hard for the government to attack. The cable ends by saying USAID programs should “also seek to counteract anti-USG [US government] rhetoric…”

This was facilitated via funding to independent radio journalists to report on “the benefits of USG assistance to rural communities” and various workshops held in indigenous communities.

A June 15, 2009, cable revealed US concerns at its ability to achieve its aims by working directly with the government.

It noted “anti-US attitudes in key leadership positions” and “nationalistic bristling over being treated with ‘dignity’”.

The cable cited Bolivian government opposition to the US agricultural attache having veto powers over proposed programs.

Government officials' recent talk of expelling USAID for their subversive activities may pose a more immediate threat to US imperialism realising its goals in Bolivia.

WikiLeaks reveals extent of 'US spying:' Bolivia

CANCUN: Leftist Bolivian President Evo Morales said Thursday that WikiLeaks had revealed the extent of "US spying" on the Andean nation and he did not regret expelling the US ambassador two years ago.

"We realize what US spying has been, before US President Barack Obama, after Obama... it confirms what we had strongly denounced," Morales told a news conference at a UN climate summit in Cancun, Mexico.

"I don't regret having expelled the ambassador of the United States. From that moment, there have been no coup attempts."

Morales kicked out US Ambassador Philip Goldberg in September 2008, accusing him of conspiring against his government.

Shortly afterward, the Bolivian leader also expelled the US Drug Enforcement Administration.

Morales also said that regional relations were unharmed despite secret US diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks showing the United States had sought cooperation from Bolivia's neighbors, such as Brazil and Argentina.

"It won't bring any confrontation between (regional) presidents," Morales said.

Washington has been critical of Bolivia's foreign policy alignment with Cuba and Venezuela, and its overtures to Iran, as well as its coca leaf cultivation for traditional and medicinal uses.

Bolivia last week denied it had agreed to allow Iran to exploit its uranium deposits, as shown by some of leaked memos.

Bolivia hosts WikiLeaks 'mirror'

LA PAZ, Bolivia (AP) — Vice President Alvaro Garcia Linera has posted all U.S. diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks that pertain to Bolivia on his official website.

He told reporters Wednesday he wants people to know the "barbarities and insults" of what he called Washington's "interventionist infiltration."

As Wikileaks' own sites come under attack, sympathizers have created "mirror" sites that duplicate them partially or in full.

Bolivia's leftist leaders expelled the U.S. ambassador in 2008, accusing him of conspiring against it.

Garcia's site includes two quotes:

"The truth will set you free," from the New Testament.

And from WikiLeaks' founder Julian Assange: "Every organization rests on a mountain of secrets."

NOTE: the website is available at http://wikileaks.vicepresidencia.gob.bo/

Bolivia: New Text by LCA Chair is Imbalanced, All Voices Must Be Heard

In a press conference this morning at the COP16 climate negotiations in Cancun, Ambassador Pablo Solon of the Plurinational State of Bolivia said that a new text released yesterday by the Chair of the working group on Long-Term Cooperative Action is imbalanced, and excludes the proposals of Bolivia and many other developing nations. The main differences, Solon indicated, must be ironed out in negotiations among countries rather than unilaterally decided by a Chair.“Debates should continue on the negotiating text that includes the proposals of all parties,” Solon said.

Ambassador Solon enumerated some of the proposals by Bolivia that have been left out: a consideration of the impact of war on greenhouse gas emissions, respect for human rights and the rights of indigenous peoples in climate policy, the creation of a declaration on the rights of Mother Earth, a definition of forests that does not include plantations, rejection of new market mechanisms that treat nature as merchandise, and the creation of a climate justice tribunal.

Solon did note that one essential proposal by his delegation remains: a 50% reduction of domestic emissions by developed countries by 2017. He pointed out that this position is very much in line with that of most developing nations in the G77 and China, where the minimum demand is for a 40% reduction.

In response to accusations that Bolivia is blocking progress in Cancun, Solon said that his proposals are motivated simply by the desire to prevent the kind of disastrous rise in global temperatures that would condemn humanity to death.

“We have come to seek an accord for humanity and nature in its totality… The most current research indicates that 300,000 people die each year due to natural disasters. You’re playing with human lives,” Solon said.

Solon indicated that the recent revelation on Wikileaks that countries were pressured by the US government to associate themselves with the Copenhagen Accord was no surprise to the Bolivian delegates. Along with Ecuador, Bolivia had $3 million dollars of climate finanace withdrawn by the US in April 2010 as a result of refusing to sign the Copenhagen Accord.

“It confirms what we’ve been saying all along… That is not a climate negotiation, it’s an imposition. We will not be bought,” Solon said.

The Bolivian negotiator also indicated his intention to remain at the table during the entire course of the talks this week. “We will never close ourselves off from any kind of negotiation among parties,” said Solon.

December 6, 2010, Cancun, Mexico.

Bolivia Ambassador to UN Pablo Solón Responds to Secret U.S. Manipulation of Climate Talks Revealed in WikiLeaks Cable

Secret diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks have revealed new details about how the United States manipulated last year’s climate talks in Copenhagen. The cables show how the United States sought dirt on nations opposed to its approach to tackling global warming, how financial and other aid was used to gain political backing, and how the United States mounted a secret global diplomatic offensive to overwhelm opposition to the "Copenhagen Accord." We speak to Bolivia’s ambassador to the United Nations, Pablo Solón. Several of the cables addressed Bolivia’s opposition to the U.S.-backed accord.

AMY GOODMAN: We’re broadcasting from Cancún, Mexico, from the U.N. climate change global summit. Secret diplomatic cables released by the whistleblowing website WikiLeaks have revealed new details about how the U.S. manipulated last year’s climate talks in Copenhagen. The Guardian newspaper reports the cables show how the U.S. sought dirt on nations opposed to its approach to tackling global warming, how financial and other aid was used by countries to gain political backing, and how the U.S. mounted a secret global diplomatic offensive to overwhelm opposition to the controversial "Copenhagen Accord."

Several of the memos addressed Bolivia’s opposition to the U.S.-backed accord. One cable from the U.S. embassy in Brussels describes a meeting this January between European Climate Action Commissioner Connie Hedegaard and White House adviser Michael Froman. The memo states, quote, "Hedegaard responded that we will need to work around unhelpful countries such as Venezuela or Bolivia. Froman agreed that we will need to neutralize, co-opt or marginalize these and others such as Nicaragua, Cuba, Ecuador." Soon after that meeting, the U.S. cut off millions of dollars in environmental aid money to Bolivia and Ecuador.

Bolivia’s president Evo Morales is also criticized in the leaked cables for organizing the World Peoples Conference on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth in April. John Creamer, the chargé d’affaires at the U.S. embassy in Bolivia, writes, quote, "Bolivia is already suffering real damage from the effects of global warming, but Morales seems to prefer to score rhetorical points rather than contribute to a solution. This radical position won him plaudits from anti-globalization groups, but has alienated many developed nations and most of Bolivia’s neighbors," he wrote.

Well, to talk more about the WikiLeaks cables on the international climate negotiations and Bolivia, as well as the talks here in Cancún, we’re joined by Pablo Solón, Bolivia’s ambassador to the United Nations. He’s holding a news conference today in Cancún.

How are these talks going?

PABLO SOLÓN: Well, I would say that the final result, until now, is not good, because we don’t have a commitment from developed countries to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in a way that will stabilize the increase of the temperature well below one degree Celsius. Not even two degrees Celsius. The current pledges on the table will raise up the temperature in four degrees Celsius. That is catastrophic for human life and for Mother Earth.

AMY GOODMAN: Before we go on talking about these talks, I wanted to ask you about these WikiLeaks cables. These are not cables by WikiLeaks, of course; they’re WikiLeaks whistleblowing website released hundreds of—a quarter of a million of U.S. diplomatic cables that they have. You’ve just heard some of the quotes from the cables about Bolivia.

PABLO SOLÓN: Yes. I hope that we are not going to have to wait one year until we know really what happened here in Cancún, because what happened in Copenhagen is also happening here in Cancún, because there is a lot of pressure put into countries in order to force them to accept, I would say, a new version of the Copenhagen Accord. And we are afraid that we are going to have Copenhagen Accord part two in Cancún. So, for us, it is key to keep a very transparent and open negotiation, where all parties really put their positions on the table and where we negotiate. We have made a very strong critics on Friday—on Saturday, because the papers that are put on the table don’t reflect the positions of the different parties, of the different states. They reflect the positions of the chair, of the facilitators. But we are not still in a negotiation between parties.

AMY GOODMAN: You had some of the U.S. documents, for example, talking about the Maldives. At Copenhagen, they were fierce about the possibility of their island being submerged and that they would never cave around the issue of global warming. Then we see these documents, where they turned around, signed on to the Copenhagen Accord. No one quite knew why they turned so quickly. But the documents suggest that the U.S. paid them tens of millions of dollars.

PABLO SOLÓN: I can only speak for facts, because one thing that I must say in relation to the WikiLeaks is that they don’t bring the facts. So, I do not want to judge any nation. But one thing that I can say for sure is they cut aid to Bolivia and to Ecuador. That is a fact. And they said it very clearly: "We’re going to cut it, because you don’t support the Copenhagen Accord." And that is blackmail.

AMY GOODMAN: I want to read for you a part of the text of another leaked cable from John Creamer, the chargé d’affaires of the US embassy in Bolivia, your country. Creamer writes, quote, "Many Bolivians are quick to observe that Morales’s climate change campaign is about enhancing his global stature, not about the environment. Former Morales Production Minister and MAS replacement Senator Javier Hurtado said there is a huge gap between Morales’ strident, pro-environmental rhetoric in international fora and his domestic emphasis on industrialization as the key to development. The foundation of this effort is large-scale natural gas, iron, and lithium production projects, enterprises that have historically proven extremely damaging to the environment." Your response, Ambassador Solón?

PABLO SOLÓN: Well, I think this WikiLeaks reflects the strategy of the United States against Bolivia. They want to show that Bolivia is not seriously committed to fight climate change. They want to present Bolivia as having a double standard. Of course, that is their strategy. They cannot buy us. They cannot put pressure on us. So they try to sell an image that we say one thing and we do another thing. That is absolutely not true.

Bolivia, of course—and I have always said it—is a country that needs to have industrialization, but a very sustainable industrialization. Why? Because we import in Bolivia almost everything. And they know it. We import nails, paper, everything. So we have to develop some industries. But we cannot follow the same path of development of industrialized countries, because that is unsustainable. The planet cannot accept if we all live like Americans or like Europeans. And we know it, and we want to develop a new model, that we call to live good. So, that is our point of view. But the WikiLeaks show exactly the campaign that the U.S. has developed in order to undermine the Bolivian position in these talks.

AMY GOODMAN: So, what about right now here in Cancún, Ambassador Solón? You have the possibility that Kyoto is dead, Japan saying they will not extend, which is very significant since the Kyoto Protocol was hammered out in Kyoto, Japan. The same goes also for Australia, for Canada.

PABLO SOLÓN: The problem with the Kyoto Protocol is that Japan, Canada, Australia, Russia can think that there is no need for a second commitment period, but they have signed it. They are part of the Kyoto Protocol. And the Kyoto Protocol established in its Article 3.9 that there should be a second commitment period. So, while they are part of the Kyoto Protocol—and they are still part of the Kyoto Protocol—there has to be a second commitment period. We have come here to negotiate the number of the reduction of emissions, of greenhouse gas emissions. But we haven’t come here to negotiate if there is going to be a second commitment period or not of the Kyoto Protocol. I mean, if you are a nation, a serious nation, that have signed an international binding agreement, you have to comply with it. You can ask for an amendment, you can withdraw, but while you’re part of that agreement, you have to comply. Otherwise, you’re going to be in a very difficult position, because you’re going to go against the ruling of international law.

AMY GOODMAN: The U.S. has been talk [inaudible] balanced package here. What do they mean?

PABLO SOLÓN: Well, for the U.S., a balanced package is a balanced package where developed countries do whatever they want. They are not committed to a target for emission reductions. That guarantees destabilization and increase in the temperature. And a balanced package for the United States is that also developing countries begin to do commitment. So, for them, it’s less responsibility for developed countries and more obligations for developing countries. That’s what they understand for a balanced package.

AMY GOODMAN: How, in a word, would you say these talks are going?

PABLO SOLÓN: Well, from the point of Bolivia, we are going to fight until the last minute to have really a good outcome out of Cancún. The situation is very complicated now. Very difficult. We don’t see a clear movement in relation to emission reductions, strong emission reductions from developed countries. That is why it’s so difficult at this time. And just one thing. Each year, 300,000 persons die because of natural disasters that are caused by climate change. So, what we are going here to decide or to do will affect 300,000 persons that die per year because of climate change.

AMY GOODMAN: Would you pull out of these talks if Kyoto is ended?

PABLO SOLÓN: No. We will never pull out out of any talk at a multilateral level. We will always be there fighting and defending what is legal, what are our positions, and what are the positions of all humankind.

AMY GOODMAN: How does global warming affect Bolivia?

PABLO SOLÓN: Well, we have lost one-third of our glaciers in our mountains. We’ll lose, in the next decade, the other one-third. And this has terrible consequences for water, for agriculture, for biodiversity. In other areas of Bolivia, there is already almost no water. In the rivers, we begin to see that the temperatures have went very down, and we see fishes that have freeze in regions where that nearly never happen. So we’re already suffering the consequences of climate change. Look at Venezuela. Look at Colombia now. And to say, "OK, we’re going to postpone again the negotiation for one more year or maybe two more years," that’s to be irresponsible. That’s not acceptable for us.

AMY GOODMAN: At this global warming summit, you have the carbon market, all of the various companies that are very interested in what the carbon markets will look like. What does that mean? And what do you think has to be done?

PABLO SOLÓN: As we said it before, they don’t want to save humanity, but they want to save their business, their carbon market business. They want to apply to us to accept to launch new market mechanism. Bolivia has said we are not going to accept to launch new market mechanism, and we are not going to accept to have a mechanism that commodifies forests. We want to have a mechanism to save forests, to preserve forests, but not to develop a market around forests at the worldwide level.

AMY GOODMAN: How does war fit into the picture of global warming?

PABLO SOLÓN: Well, that’s another key issue. Bolivia presented a paragraph saying that we should take into account also the greenhouse gas emissions that come from warfare. They have erased it. Second thing, we have said the finance for climate change should be the same finance that now developed countries give to security, defense, and even war. How much do they give? About $1.60 trillion per year. How much do they say they are going to mobilize for climate change? Only $100 billion. So, it is really unfair to see that defense, security, war has more than 15 times than what they want to do for climate change.

AMY GOODMAN: There are few leaders that are coming here. There were over 120 in Copenhagen. Maybe there will be 20 here. President Morales is coming?

PABLO SOLÓN: President Morales is going to be here on Thursday, 9 of December.

AMY GOODMAN: Well, we’ll certainly cover that. We hope to be interviewing him right here. Ambassador Solón, we thank you for being with us. Ambassador Pablo Solón is the Bolivian ambassador to the United Nations, speaking with us here in Cancún.

Republished from Democracy Now Click link to watch/listen to interview